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DEFENCE 



BRIGADIER GENERAL HULL= 



DEFENCE 



BRIGADIER GENERAL W. HULL. 



Delivered before the General Cotut Mailial, of which Major General \ 
Dearboiu v.a. i-^-ia<.«*, ^t Aihanv, Mai'ch, 1814. 1 



WITH AN 



ADDRESS TO THE CITIZENS OP THE UNITED STATES. 



WRITTEN BY HIMSELF. 
Copied from the original Manuscript, and published by his authorif; 



To which are prefixed. 



THE CHARGES AGAINST BRIGADIER GENERAL HULL, AS 
SPECIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT. 



BOSTON : 

PUBLISHED BY WELLS AND 
Court-Street. 

1814, 




L3S-: 



H 



DISTRICT OP MASSACTrtUSETTS, TO WIT : 

Disti-ict Clerks Office, 
BE it i-ememberetl, that on the ninth day of June, anno domini eiglteen htm*, 
tilled and foUKeen, and in the thirtj-eighth year of the independence of the Uni* 
ted States of America, William WeUs and Robert Lilly "*" *^- c„;4T>ism«'t, 
feavs <3opo«t«i ill inis orace the title of a hook, the right whereof theF claim as 
Proprietors, in the words following, to wit : 

Defence of Brigadier General WillLom Hull. Delivered before tie general 
Court-Martial, of which Maj. Gen. Deaiboni was President, at Albany, March, 
one thousand eight hundretl and fourteen. With an Addiess to the Citi2pns of the 
United States. Written by himself. Copied from the original manuscript, and 
published by his auUiority. To which ai-e prefixed, the Charges agaiist Gene 
ral Hull, as specified by the Govermnent. 

' In confonnity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, intitled " An Act 
for the Encouragement of Learning, by secm-ing the copies of Maps, Charts and 
Books, to the Authors and Propi-ietors of such Copies, during the times therein 
XQcntioned ;" and also to an ^nt intitled, " An Act supplementary to an Act, 
intitled, an Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of 
:Maps, Chaits and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies dm-ing 
the times therein mentioned ; and extending the Benefits thereof to the Aits of 
Sesisning, Engi-avingand Etching Historical, and other Prints." 

WILLI A JI S. SHAW, Xof MmscKMeett;:. 



ADDRESS 



TO THE 



CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, l 



Fellow-Citizens, ^ 

In submitting my defence to your consideration, i 
and in making my appeal to your judgment, I 
have only to ask you to examine with candourj 
and decide with impartiality. I am sensible the] 
fate of one man is of little consequence, compared! 
to the fate of a nation. 

If the sacrifice of me, however innocent, could \ 
make atonement for the sins of others, redeem;; 
our misfortunes, and restore the national charac-j 
ter, it might be justified by precedents in otherl 
countries;, and perhaps, as a patriot, I ought to he\ 
satisfied. It is unfortunate for the administration, j 
and for the other generals who have conducted! 
our armies, that it cannot have the effect. In coun- 
tries, where the people are hardly permitted to ■ 



iv ADDRESS OF 

think, and their only prerogative is obedience, in- 
nocence is no shield ; and because there can be no 
inquiry, the most elevated merit is often brought 
to the scaffold for the most meritorious conduct. 
But in a country where justice is the basis of its 
government, where the people are enlightened by 
science, and understand both their rights and du- 
ties, such outrages on justice cannot with impu- 
nity be committed. 

Under a government thus constituted, when 
public misfortunes occur, those to whom the ad- 
ministration is intrusted are in the first instance 
responsible. They well know the pubhc ven- 
geance will fall on them, unless they avert it, and 
too often have no other means of justification, but 
in the condemnation of others. The power they 
possess, and the patronage they can give, afford 
great facilities in effecting the object. It is how- 
ever our happy lot, that, when this power and pa- 
tronage are unjustly exercised, a remedy ei^ists ; 
and that remedy is an appeal to your justiceL ;To 
that justice I now appeal, in the confident efspec- 
tation, that you will be satisfied of the purity and 
rectitude of my conduct, that you will r -verse 
the unjust sentence which has been pronounced 
against me, and restore me to that honourable 
standing in society, which had been acquired by 
the services of nearly half a century. 



GENERAL HULL, v 

1 regret that it is not in my power, in this 
communication, to present to jou all the testimo- 
ny and documents, on which my defence is 
grounded, and which had any relation to the trial. 
The proceedings of the Court Martial are depo- 
sited in the office of the Secretary of the De- 
partment of War, and by law I am entitled to a 
copy of them. As soon as they are obtained, 
they will be published in a separate number. 

I believe we are all conscious of the crimes of 
which we are guilty. When I might have shel- 
tered myself in the enemy's territory, as a priso- 
ner of war, I ask you to account for my return 
to my own country on any other principle, than 
a consciousness of my innocence, and that I had 
faithfully done my duty? What other principle 
could have induced me to have requested an in- 
vestigation of my conduct? When a Court Mar- 
tial was ordered to assemble at Philadelphia for 
my trial, why did I promptly repair there, with- 
out any restraint, and without even having been 
divested of my sword ? After the trial was post- 
poned by the government, without any request on 
my part ; and having before that time received 
notice of my exchange from the government, why 
did I remain more than a year in the country, 
without any restraint or confinement ? 



vi ADDRESS OP 

When the new court was ordered for my trial 
at Albany, and I was furnished with the volume 
of capital charges, exhibited against me by the 
government, why did I voluntarily appear before 
the Court, and submit to my trial, when it was in 
my power so easily to have avoided it ? Why, 
after the trial, did I return alone and unattended 
to my residence in Massachusetts, and there wait 
the sentence of the Court Martial ? — I do presume 
your answer must be, that this conduct only could 
have resulted from a consciousness of innocenc e, 
and a full conviction that I had done my duty^ 

I now ask you to consider the conduct of the go- 
vernment, in relation to me. Did they believe the 
black catalogue of charges they exhibited against 
me was true ? If they did, could the administration 
have been justified in leaving me at perfect liber- 
ty, for more than a year after I had been furnish- 
ed with a copy of these charges ? Did the mem- 
bers of the Court Martial, who pronounced the- 
sentence, in their consciences believe I was 
guilty, and deserved punishment? If they did, 
how can their conduct in directing me, the day 
after the sentence was concluded, to return to 
my home in Massachusetts, without any kind of 
restraint, and without requiring any kind of secu« 
rity for my appearance to receive the execution 
of the sentence? This direction was given the 



GENERAL HULL. vii \ 

day after the sentence was passed. Can it be < 
presumed there was a concert between the Presi- ' 
dent and the Court, and he had directed the Court \ 
to adopt this measure previous to the sentence ? ] 
Is it possible it was understood between the Pre- i 
sident and the Court, previous to the conclusion ■] 
of the trial, what the sentence should be, and that j 
it should be remitted by him ? And if both the '] 
President and the Court had believed in their ] 
consciences, I had been guilty of the crimes with i 
which I was charged, could it be reconciled to ] 
their duty to leave me in a situation, where I could ; 
so easily avoid the punishment which was to have \ 
been inflicted ? \ 

:i 

I have stated these facts, and made these ob- ^ 
servations, to convince you, that my whole con- 1 
duct has manifested, I myself was conscious | 
of no crime, and it was not the intention either j 
of the President, or the Court Martial, that I ] 
should receive the punishment which had been/ \ 
ordered. j 

I now ask you, my fellow-citizens, to decide \ 

for yourselves what have been the motives of the \ 

administration in this business ? With respect to j 

two thirds of the members of the Court Martial, i 

they have ordered a sentence, which in their con- j 

sciences they believed ought not to be executed, j 



viii ADDRESS OF 

The Court Martial, in justification of their con- 
duct, in recommending me to the mercy of the 
President, can appeal to no precedent, not even 
the proceedings in the trial of admiral Byng. Af- 
ter the Court had found him guilty of a particular 
charge, there was nothing left to their discretion. 
The articles of war provided, that the punishment 
should be death. In my case the articles of war 
provided death, or such other punishment as the 
Court Martial should think proper to order. Why 
then did not the Court order such a punishment 
as they believed ought to have been inflicted ? 

From these facts and observations, I do think 
the motives of the administration must be appa- 
rent. And indeed, I presume it will not be 
in your power to reconcile the conduct of the 
President of the United Statce, and the conduct 
of the Court Martial, without believing there was 
a concert and understanding how this business 
was to be conducted. 

With respect to the lenity of the Court, I in- 
formed them I did not ask it ; and I requested 
no other mercy from them, than the mercy of a 
decision ; that they would decide on my case, and 
keep me no longer in suspense. 

In regard to the pardon of the President, I had 
no opportunity of requesting it, because it was 



GENERAL HULL. ix 

granted, before I had any knawledge of the sen- 
tence. Ingratitude, I hope, is no part of my cha= 
racter. But I do submit to your consideration, 
whether I ought to feel grateful to him, when the 
National Intelligencer, a paper published at his 
door, and under his auspices, in giving an account 
of the trial and announcing the sentence, states, 
that' the punishment is more protracted and terri- 
ble, in consequence of a remission of the sentence. 
If his object was to aggravate and increase the 
punishment, it cannot be called an act of mercy, 

Tlier^^ are two very important facts, relating 
to my sit'iation, as commander of the north-west- 
ern army, not noticed m my defence. One, the 
armistice agreed to by general Dearborn, from 
which my army was expressly excluded. The 
other, the President's message to Congress, the 
first session after the capitulation. With regard 
to the first, the following are the facts. This was 
an arrangement of Sir George Prevost, for the sole 
purpose of employing all \M forces against the 
army I commanded. Havin^fcceived information 
that the orders in council had been repealed, on 
the second day of August, eighteen hundred and 
twelve, he despatched colonel Baynes, his adju- 
tant general, to the head-quarters of general Dear- 
born, at Greenbush, near Albany, with an autho- 
ritv to conclude an armistice — on the uinth of 



X ADDRESS OF 

August it was concluded between him and general 
Dearborn, and my army was excluded. 

Immediately after the departure of colonel 
Baynes on his mission, major general Sheafe of 
the British army was ordered to lake Erie, witR a 
large part of the British force from Montreal, to 
be placed under the command of general Brock. 
From the nature of the transaction, it is certain, 
that general Brock was made acquainted with 
these circumstances, and informed that he might, 
with the most perfect safety to his posts at 
Kingston, York, forts George and Erie, march 
his whole force against my army, which had in- 
vaded the province of which he was governour 
and commander in chief. Calculating the dis- 
tances, and the celerity with which the British 
commanders convey important information, there 
was full time for the purpose. Of this important 
arrangement, in which the army I commanded had 
so much interest, I Jiever received any informa- 
tion from general D^rborn. That general Brock 
took his whole forcPto Maiden, from fort George 
and its vicinity, excepting a few men to take care 
of the cannon and stores, is certain ; and that ge- 
neral Sheafe arrived from Montreal with the rein- 
forcements, immediately after general Brock's 
departure from Fort George, is likewise a fact 
well inown. That at this time, on the ninth of 



GENERAL HULL. M \ 

August, a cessation of hostilities had been cor.- i 
rJiided. which extended from fort Erie, on the j 
^ast part of lake Erie, to Quebec. In my next i 
number, I shall produce documents to prove the \ 
facts I have here stated. They are, however, \ 
all so public, and so well known, that I am fully j 
authorized in stating them without the documents, j 
That on the day ^f the capitulation, the sixteenth \ 
of August, general Brock well knew that a cessa- i 
lion of hostilities below had taken place, is certain, 
because on that day he gave me information of it, j 
and that the orders in council had been repealed, \ 
and observed, he hoped it would be the founda- \ 
(ion of a peace. It is likewise well known, this ^ 
measure was disapproved by the President, and ; 
principally on account of the effect it would have ] 
on my army. When general Dearborn v* as or- ; 
<Jered by the President to make diversions on ] 
the enemy's posts below me, and ought to have \ 
been co-operating with me with all his forces, he i 
was sitting at his ease at Greenbush, and making ! 
arrangements, which were one great cause of the I 
destruction of my army. And yet this samej 
general Dearborn was appointed the president of! 
the Court Martial which has condemned me for the i 
misfortune, which his own misconduct had been! 
a great cause in producing. In sacrificing me,^ 
he has undoubtedly made some atonement for his! 
own faults, in the opinion of the administration,! 

B 



^li ADDRESS OF 

and may be permitted to remain in the possessios 
of his nomiiial rank, and in the enjoyment of his 
emoluments, in the degraded and disgraceful situ- 
ation, to which he has submitted for more than a 
year. Thus has general Dearborn, by adopting 
a measure, which brought the principal part of 
the enemy's force against my army, exhibited his 
profound skill in military operations, and his 
talents and qualifications as commander in chief 
of the American army, 

I shall now proceed to consider that part of ihe 
President's message, of the fourth of November, 
eighteen hundred and twelve, which developed 
Ihe objects of my unfortunate campaign. It is in 
the following words. 

"Previous to its declaration, [the declaration 
" of war] it was deemed proper, as a measure of 
^'precaution and forecast, that a considerable 
''force should be placed in the Michigan terri- 
*' iory, with a general view to its security, and in 
'' the event of war, to such operations in the up- 
" permost Canada, as would intercept the hostile 
'^influence of Great Britain over the savages, 
^'■obtain the command of the lake on which that 
^^ part of Canada borders, and maintain co-ope- 
" rating relations Avith such forces as might be 
" most conveuiently employed against other parts. 



1 
GENERAL HULL. xiii = 

*' Our expectation of gaining the command of I 
^Uhe lakes, by the invasion of Canada from De- I 
" troit, having been disappointed, measures were ■ 
*' instantly taken to provide on them a naval < 
''force snperiour to that of the enemj." ] 

I 
The objects of the force intrusted to my com- I 
mand, are here particularly stated. They are \ 
stated by the first magistrate to the legislature - 
of the nation. This is a document of the hidiest \ 
authority, and must be considered as conclusive I 
evidence, that these were the objects, for which J 
the expedition was ordered, and which the Pre- ! 
sident expected would have been accomplished. | 
If it was the expectation of the President, that ! 
with the few militia under my command, I should ; 
have obtained possession of the lake, it is unac- I 
countable, that it never was communicated to me. \ 
All my instructions from the Department of War ; 
were laid before the Court Martial^ and there Vv as i 
not the least intimation of the kind. Indeed i : 
never had the most distant idea, that this expcc- j 
tation was entertained, until it was disclosed I 
in this message. Both in my repeated written I 
communications, and in frequent conversations j 
with the President and Secretary of the Depart- i 
ment of War, I had urged the necessity of a navy < 
on lake Erie, superiour to the British, in the event: : 
<>f war with Grea^ Britain. I well knew at thai ) 



iiv ADDRESS OF 

tirae, ihey had a strong naval force on the lake, 
perfectly manned and prepared in everj respect 
for ofFensive or defensive war. The United 
States had not a single vessel or gun boat on those 
waters. All they had was an old unarmed trans- 
port vessel, repairing on the stocks, and which was 
Kot launched until near a month after the decora- 
tion of v.'ar. 

There were but two modes of taking possession 
of the lake ; one, by taking or destroying the en- 
emy's naval force ; the other,"by taking posses- 
sion of all their posts and harbours, both on the 
main land and islands, an extent of coast more 
ihrni three hundred miles. I am confident no one 
will believe it was possible for me, either to have 
^aken or destroyed the British fieel then on the 
lake, w'lih the' means I possessed. The force^ 
under my commaiad,. was totally inadequate to 
have effected it in the other way, especially after 
(he full of Michilimackinac, and all the northern 
nations of savages were in hostility against me. 
Although I still entertain the same opinion I gave 
to the government, before the declaration of war, 
that a navy on lake Erie was essentially necessary ; 
yet) I now believe, had an adequate force been 
sent to the Michigan territory, and sufficient 
forces had been ordered to have taken possession 
of forts George and Erie at the same time^ a5<| 



GENERAL HULL. :&y\ 

\ 

these armies had co-operated, th« whole of that 1 
part of the province of Upper Canada, which I 
borders on lake Erie, might have been in our pos- 1 
session 'in the campaign of eighteen hmidred and ^ 
twelve, with all the enemy's harbours on the bor- j 
ders of the lake, by which means the #aval force j 
would have been destroyed, or must have sur^ I 
rendered at the approach of winter. I 

1 
This idea I suggested to the Secretary of War, | 
in my memoir of the sixth of March, eighteen ] 
hundred and twelve, provided the object w^as the 
reduction of the Canadas, and it was the intention i 
of the government, contrary to every opinion I ^ 
had given, not to build a navy on lake Erie. I :| 
suggested it as the only possible mode, and at the ] 
same time pointed out all the difficulties which I 
would attend it. On the sixth of March, at the l 
time when this memoir was presented, I had no j 
command in the army, and had uniformly declin- \ 
ed to accept a military appointment, although I I 
had been strongly solicited. Being then the gc" \ 
vernour of the Michigan territory, it was my duty 1 
to induce the government to provide means for \ 
its safety. j 

I 

About the eleventh of April, after I had been ; 
appointed to the command of the north-western j 
army, unsolicited, and even undesired on my i 

i 



xvi ADDRESS OF 

part ; I (hen presented to the President, througli 
ihe medium of the Department of War, another 
commiinicalion, in which I represented in the 
sjirongest and most explicit terms, the necessitj 
of our having a naval force superiour to the ene- 
my on th^lakes ; and that without it, and unless 
the army I was to command was strengthened 
by additions to its numbers, and unless it were 
followed by detachments to keep open the com- 
munication, and insure its supplies from Ohio; 
and unless it was supported by co-operations on 
other quarters,^ my army could not be able to 
maintain itself at Detroit, much less carry on ofFen^ 
sive operations in the enemy's country. 

After these communications, and under the cir- 
cumstances in which I v/as placed, I ask you, my 
fellow-citizens, whether I had any reason to be- 
lieve it to be the expectation of the government^ 
that I should ha-ve obtained the command of the 
lakes? But in this I was mistaken. It really ap- 
pears, that it w^as, because the President says, in 
the Message I have quoted, " Our expectation of 
" gaining the command of the lakes by the inva- 
*' sion of Canada from Detroit having been disap- 
*' pointed, measures were instantly taken to pro- 
" vide on them a naval force, superiour to that of 
*' the enemy." "J 



GENERAL HULL. xvii 

The other object was, " to maintain co-operat- 
" ing relations with such forces, as might be most 
"conveniently employed against other parts.'* 

I opened a road of two hundred miles through 
a savage wilderness, invaded the enemy's coun- 
try, remained a month in the possession of it, 
waiting for co-operating relations, until I was in- 
formed I should receive none ; and uiilil general 
I Dearborn, instead of co-operations, agreed to a 
cessation of hostilities, which afforded the enemy 
an opportunity of concentrating his whole force 
against my little army. 

By the documents of the government, it thus 
appears, that these were the objects of my expedi- 
tion ; and because I disappointed the expectations 
of the administration in not obtaining the com- 
mand of the lakes, with the few Ohio militia I com- 
manded, and did not maintain co-operating rela- 
tions Vv^ith other forces, when there were none to 
co-operate with me, I have been condemned. 

I do expect, my fellow-citizens, when you be^ 
Gome acquainted with the true history of my case, 
you will reverse the unjust sentence which has 
been pronounced against me. I am now perfect- 
ly supported by a consciousness of having done 
my duty in the most faithful manner, and my only 



xvlii ADDRESS OP GEN. HULL> 

desire is, to convince you and posterity of the 
purity of my motives, and the correctness of my 
conduct. Under this support I am tranquil and 
happy. Had I pursued any other course, I should 
want the consciousness which I now feel, and in 
sincerity I can adopt the language of Pope, 

" One stlf approring hour whole years outweighs 
- *' Of stupid starers and of loud huzzas ; 
"" And more true joy Mai-cellus exiled feels, 
" Than Caesar with 3 senate at his heels." 

William Hull. 

Newton, (Mass.) June 1st. 1S14. 



CHARGES. 



At a general Court Maitial (ordered by the President of the United States) tea- 
Tened at Albany, in the State of New- York, on the third day of January one 
thousand eight hundred and fourteen, and continued by adjoui-nments to the 
twenty-fiftli day of l^Iarch following, brigadier gcnerrd William Hull, of the 
army of the United States, -was tried on the following charges and speeifica- 
t'lons, viz : 

CHARGE I, 

Treason against the United States, between the 
ninth of A\n'i\ and the seventeenth of August, eight- 
een hundred and twelve. 

First specification. In this : That on the first 
day of July, in the year eighteen hundred and twelve, 
before that time and ever since, an open and public 
war was, and is yet carried on and prosecuted by and 
between the United States of America and their ter- 
ritories, and the united kingdom of Great-Britain and 
Ireland, and the dependencies thereof: and that Wil- 
liam Hull, a brigadier general in the army of the said 
United States, a citizen of the said United States, 
owing allegiance to the said United States, and late 
commander of the north-western army of the said 
United States, well knowing the premises, and trai- 
torously and unlawfully designing and contriving to 
send and convey intelligence to the said enemies of 
the said United States, touching a declaration of war 
by the said United States, against the said uaited 
kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, and the de- 
pendencies thereof; and, also, touching the expedition 
on which the said nortji-western army under hi« com- 



XX CHARGES AGAINST 

mand as aforesaid was employed ; and, also, touching 
the numbers, state and condition of the said north-west- 
ern army; in prosecution of the said traitorous and un- 
lawful design, on the said first day of July, in the year 
aforesaid, at the rapids of the river Miami of the lake, 
in the territory of Michigan, the said William KuU 
(then and there being a brigadier general in the army 
of the United States, and being then and there com- 
mander of the said north-western army as aforesaid,) 
did traitorously hire or cause to be hired an unarmed 
vessel, with the pretended purpose of transporting 
therein certain sick soldiers, and the principal part of 
the hospital stores belonging to the said north-western 
army, from the said rapids of the river Miami of the 
lake to Detroit, in the said territory of Michigan, but 
in truth, traitorously contriving and intending that 
the said unarmed vessel, together with all persons, 
papers, and things put on board thereof, should be 
captured by the enemies of the said United States, on 
the passage of the said unarmed vessel from the said 
r?-picisof the ilver of the Miami of the lake to Delri;lS: 
aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan aforesaid : and 
that the said William Hull, in further prosecution of 
his said traitorous and unlawful design and contri- 
vance, (being then and there a brigadier general in 
the army of the United States as aforesaid, and being 
then and there commander of the said north-w estern 
army as aforesaid,) did then and there traitorously put, 
or traitorously cause to be put on board of the said 
unarmed vessel, a trunk containing (among other 
things) the official correspondence of the Secretary of 
the Department of War and the said brigadier general 
William Hull, as well touching the expedition on 
which the said north-western army under his com- 
mand as aforesaid, w as then employed, as touching a 
declaration of war by the said United States against 
the said united kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, 
and the dependencies thereof, and also, certain otfi* 
Oial muster-rolls, reports, an<J returnsj of the numbers, 



GENERAL HULL. sxi 

slate and condition of the said north-western army, 
under his command as aforesaid : and that afterwards, 
to wit : on the second day of July, in the year afore- 
said, the said vessel, so as aforesaid traitorously hired 
or traitorously caused to be hired, by the said biiga- 
dier general ¥/illiam Hull, on its passage from the 
said rapids of the river Miami of the lake to Detroit 
aforesaid, wfs captured by the said enemies of the 
United States, having on board thereof, at the time 
of the said capture, the said trunk containing the said 
official correspondence, as well touching the said ex- 
pedition, as the said declaration of war, and the said 
official muster-rolls, reports and returns, of the num- 
bers, state, and condition of the said north-western 
army (together with certain sick soldiers, and the 
principal part of the hospital stores belonging to the 
said north-western army,) and by means of the said 
capture, and in fulfilment of the said traitorous and 
unlawful design, contrivance, and intendment of the 
said brigadier general William Hull, the said official 
correspondence, as well touching the said expedition, 
as the said declaration of war, and the said official 
muster-rolls, reports and returns, of the numbers, state 
and condition of the said north-western army, (to- 
gether with certain" sick soldiers, and the principal 
part of the hospital stores of the said north-western 
army,) came to the possession, knowledge and use of 
the enemies of the said United States; giving infor- 
mation and intelligence to the enemies of the said 
United States, as v/ell touching the said expedition, 
as touching the said declaration of war, and, also, 
touching the numbers, state and condition of the said 
north-western army of the said United States, then 
and there under the command of the said brigadier 
general William Hull as aforesaid; whereby the 
said William Jiull, on the first day of July, in the 
year aforesaid, at the rapids of the river Miami of the 
lake aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan aforesaid, 
(being tiien and there a brigadier general in the army 



icxii CHARGES AGAINST 

of the United States, and being then and there com- 
mander of the said nc.h-western army as aforesaid, 
and being then and there a citizen of the said United 
States, owing allegiance to the said United States,) 
did then and there traitorously and unlawfully hold 
correspondence with, and give intelligence to the 
enemy, and did then and there traitorously, by the 
means aforesaid, adhere to the enemies of the said 
United States, giving tliem aid and comfort. 

Second specification. And also, in this : That 
afterwards and during the said war, so as aforesaid 
carried on and prosecuted by and between the said 
United States of America and their territories, and 
the said united kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, 
and the dependencies thereof, the said north-western 
army of the said United States, under the command 
of the said brigadier general William Hull as afore- 
said, having entered the said British province of Up- 
per Canada, and having established a military post 
at or near Sandwich, in the said British province of 
Upper Canada, which it was the duly of the said 
, brigadier general William Hull to maintain and de- 
fend, in-order that the said war might and should be 
advantageously carried on and prosecuted on behalf 
of the said United States, and more es})ecially that a 
certain British fort called Maiden, otherwise called 
Amherstburgh, in the siiid British province of Upper 
Canada, occupied by the enemies of the said United 
States, might and should !>€ advantageously attacked 
and taken by the said north-western army of the said 
United States, under the command of the said briga- 
dier general V/illiam Hull as aforesaid, yet the said 
William Hull, (a brigadier general in the army of 
tlie United States, a citizen of the said United States, 
owing allegiance to the said United States, and com- 
mander of the said north-western army of the said 
United States as aforesaid,) well knowing the premi- 
ses, on the eighth day of August, in the year one 
iJiousand eight hundred and twelve, at Sand-wich 



GENERAL HULL. xxiii 

aibresaid, in the British province of Upper Canada 
aforesaid, did then and there traitorously and unlaw- 
fully conspire and combine with certain enemies of 
the said United States, (whose names are unknown) 
to quit and abandon to the enemies of the said United 
States, the said military post established by the said 
north-western army of the said United States, at or 
near Sandwich aforesaid, in the British province of 
Upper Canada aforesaid, and to prevent the said 
British fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherst- 
burgh, from being attacked and reduced, or an attempt 
being made to reduce the same, by the said north- 
western army of the said United States, under the 
command of the said brigadier general William Hull 
as aforesaid ; and that the said William Hull, (then 
and there being a brigadier general in the army of the 
said United States, then and there being commander 
of the said north-western army of the said United 
States, and then and there being a citizen of the said 
United States, owing allegiance to the said United 
States) in prosecution of the said traitorous conspiracy 
and combination, did then and there traitorously quit 
and abandon, and did then and there traitorously cause 
to be quitted and abandoned, the said military post 
established by the said north-western army of the 
said United states as aforesaid, at oi* near Sandwich 
as aforesaid, in the British province of Upper Canada 
aforesaid, and did then and there traitorously neglect 
and omit to make the proper preparations for attack- 
ing and reducing, or attempting to reduce the said 
British fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherst- 
burgh, but on the contrary, did then and there traitor- 
ously prevent the same from being attacked and re- 
duced, and an attempt being made to reduce the same 
by the said north-w^estern army of the said United 
States, then apd there under his command as afore- 
said- : and, in further prosecution of the said traitorous 
conspiracy and combination, did then and there trai- 
torously march, withdraw and remove, and traitorously 
c 



xxiv CHARGES AGAINST 

order to be marched, withdrawn and removed, ilie 
maia i3ody of the said north-western B.rmy of the said 
United States, from the said miiitary post established 
hj the said north-western army of the said United 
States, at or near Sandwich aforesaid, to a place out 
of the said British province of Upper Canada, to wit; 
to Detroit aforesaid, in tlie territory of Blichigari 
aforesaid; whereby the said William Hull, on the 
said eighth day of August, in the year one thousand 
eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, at Sandwich 
aforesaid, in the saiti British province of Upper Ca- 
nada, (being tlien and there a brigadier general in 
the army of the said United States, and being then 
and tliere commander of the said nortli-v>'estern army 
of tb.e said United States, and being then and there a 
citizen of the said United States, owing allegiance 
to the said United States,) did then and there trai- 
torously conspire, combine, and hold correspondence 
with the enemies of the said United States, and did 
tlien and there traitorously and shamefully quit and 
abaridau, and traitorously and shamefully cause to be 
quitted and abandoned the said military |>ost, so as 
aforesaid et^tablished by the said north-western army 
of the said United States, at or near Sandwich afore- 
said, in the British province of Upper Canada afore- 
said, and did then and there traitorously neglect and 
omit to mr.ke the proper preparations for attacking 
and reducing, or attempting to reduce the said fort 
called Blalden, otherwise called Amherstburgh, in 
the said British province of Upper Canada, but did 
tlien and there traitorously prevent the said British 
fort palled Maiden, otherwise called Amherstburgh, 
in the said British province of Upper Canada, from 
being attacked and reduced, or an attempt being made 
to reduce the same by the said north-western army 
of tlie United States, under his command as aforesaid, 
and by the means aforesaid, did then and there trai- 
torously adhere to the enemies of the said United 
vStates, giving them aid and comfort. 



GENERAL HULL. xx> 

Third specification. And also, in this : — That 
afterwards and during the said war, so as aforesaid 
carried on and prosecuted, by and between the said 
United States of America and their territories, and 
the said united kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, 
and the dependencies thereof, to wit : on the sixteenth 
day of August, in the year one thousand eight hun- 
dred and twelve aforesaid, at Detroit, in the Michi- 
gan territory aforesaid, the said William Hull was 
then and there a citizen of said United States, owing 
allegiance to the said United States, and was then 
and there a brigadier general in the army of the said 
United States, and was then and there commander of 
the north-western army of the said United States, and 
was then and there commander of a certain fort, 
called Fort Detroit, and belonging to the said United 
States, erected at or near the town of Detroit, upon a 
bank of the river Detroit, in the said territory of Mi- 
chigan ; the works ivhereof, and the guns and gun- 
carriages belonging thereto, then were, and long be- 
fore had been decayed, dilapidated, and out of repair. 
And that the said brigadier general William Hull, 
then and there did traitorously conspire and combine 
with certain enemies of the said United States, 
(whose names are unknown,) then and there traitor- 
ously and shamefully to surrender and abandon to the 
enemies of the said United States, the said fort, called 
Fort Detroit, belonging to the said United States as 
aforesaid, and then and there under the command of 
the said brigadier general William Hull as aforesaid, 
with all the troo})s, regulars as •^^ell as militia, then 
and there under the command of the said brigadier 
general Hull as aforesaid, and all the public stores 
and arms, and all public documents, including every 
thing else of a public nature, appertaining to the said 
fort, called Fort Detroit, and to the said north-west- 
ern army of the said United States, under the com- 
mand of the said brigadier general William Hull as 
sforesaid. And that in prosecution of the said trai- 



xxvi CHARGES AGAINST 

torous conspiracy and combination, the said brigadier 
general William Hull did then and there wilfully and 
traitorously neglect and omit to repair and strengthen 
the works of the said fort, called Fort Detroit, then 
and there under his command as aforesaid, and to put 
the same (together with the said guns and gun-car- 
liages belonging thereto) into a proper state and 
condition for resistance and defence against the ap- 
proaches, attacks, and assaults of the enemies of the 
said United States. And did then and there wilfully 
and traitorously neglect and omit to fortify the places 
and passes at and near to the said fort, called Fort 
Detroit, by and through which the troops of the ene- 
mies of the said United States might then and there 
reasonaiiiy be expected to eipproach, and did approach 
the said fort, called Fort Detroit, for the purpose of 
attacking and subduing the same. And diet then and 
there traitorously neglect and omit to oppose, resist, 
repel and defeat, and to attempt to repel and defeat 
the troops of the enemies of the said United States, 
in their hostile preparations, and approach to and 
towards the said fort, called Fort Detroit, for the 
purpose of attacking and subduing the same^ And 
ilmt in further })rosecution and completion of the said 
traitorous conspiracy and combination, the said briga- 
dier general William Hull did then and there traitor- 
ously and shamefully abandon and surrender the said 
fort, called Fort Detroit, then and there under his 
command as aforesaid, (which it was his duty then 
and there to maintain and defend,) together with all 
the troops, regulars as well as militia, then and there 
in the said fort, called Fort Detroit, then and there 
belonging to the said United States as aforesaid, and 
then and there under his command as aforesaid, and 
all the public stores and arms, and i)ublic documents, 
including every thing else of a public nature, in and 
appertaining to the said fort, called Fort Detroit, and 
to the said north-western army of the said United 
States, then and there under his command as afore^ 



GENERAL HULL, xxvii 

said, unto the enemies, of (lie said Unitcu States, to 
wit :— to the British forces tlien and there under the 
command of major general Brock ; wiiereby the said 
William Hull, on the said sixteenth day of August, 
in the year one thousand eight hundred and twelve 
aforesaid, at Detroit aforesaid, in the territor^^ of Mi- 
chigan aforesaid, (being then and there a citizen of 
the said United States, owing allegiance to the said 
United States, and being then and there a brigadier 
general in the army of the said United States, and 
being then and there commander of the said north- 
western army of the said United States, and being 
then and there commander of the said fort, called Fort 
Detroit, belonging to the said United States as afore- 
said,) did then and there traitorously and shamefully 
abandon and surrender the said fort, called Fort De- 
troit, to the enemies of the said United States, to wit: 
• — to the said British troops under the command of 
major general Brock as aforesaid; and did then and 
there by the means aforesaid, traitorously adhere to 
the enemies of the said United States, giving them 
aid and comfort. 

CHARGE ir. 

Cowardice at and in the neighbourhood of Detroit, 
between the first day of July and the seventeenth day 
of August, in the year one thousand eight hundred 
and twelve. 

First specification. In this : — That during the 
said war so as aforesaid carried on and prosecuted by 
and between the said United States of America and 
their territories, and the said united kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, 
the said brigadier genera] William Hull, commanding 
the north-western armj^ of the said United States as 
aforesaid, having entered the said British province of 
Upper Canada, in prosecution of the said war on be- 
half of the said United States, and being there in pos- 



xxviii CHARGES AGAINST 

session of the town of Sandwich and the adjacent 
country, in the name and on behalf of the said United 
States, and having declared and avowed the object 
and intention of attacking and subduing the British 
fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherstburgh, in 
the said British province of Upper Canada, and, ge- 
nerally, of maintaining and enlarging his position and 
possession in the said British province of Upper 
Canada, on the eighth day of August, in the year one 
thousand eight hundred and twelve, at Sandwich, 
aforesaid, in the British province of Upper Canada 
aforesaid, did then and there misbehave himself before 
the enemy, and shamefully manifest an undue fear 
and apprehension of danger by a course of conduct 
and conversation evincing personal alarm, agitation 
of mind, and privation of judgment, by abandoning 
the said object and design of attacking the said Bri- 
tish fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherst- 
burgh, by quitting the position and possession taken at 
the town of Sandwich and in the adjacent country, in 
the British province of Upper Canada as aforesaid, and 
by retreating abruptly from and out of the said British 
province of Upper Canada to Detroit, in the territory 
of Michigan aforesaid, without anj^ cause for so doingy 
arising from the superiour numbers, state and condition 
of the British forces which were then and there op- 
posed to the said army of the said United States, 
wider the command of the said brigadier general Wil- 
liam Hull, and without any other just and sufficient 
cause whatsoever; whereby the officers and soldiers 
of said north-western army of the said United States, 
then and there under the command of the said briga- 
dier general William Hull, were induced to lose and 
did lose all confidence in the personal courage and 
the military capacity of their said commantler; the 
inhabitants of the said British province of Upper 
Canada were taught to distrust the power and profes- 
sions of the invading general ; a shade was cast upon 
the reputation of the American arms j and the service 



GENERAL HULL. ^ix 

of the said United States, in the prosecution of the 
said war, suffered great detriment and disadvantage. 
Second specification. And, also, in this :■ — That 
during the said war so as atbresaid carried on and 
prosecuted by and between the said United States of 
America and their territories, and the said united king- 
dom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependen- 
cies thereof, to wit : on the fifteenth day of August, 
in the year one thousand eight hundred and twelve 
aforesaid, the enemy having raised certain batteries 
on the banks of the said river Detroit, in the said 
British province of Upper Canada, opposite the said 
fort Detroit, and certain American posts and batteries 
established and erected near the said fort Detroit, in 
tlie said territory of Michigan, and a cannonade being 
commenced from the said batteries of the enemy 
against and upon the said fort of Detroit and the said 
American posts and batteries established and erected 
near thereto, in the said territory of Michigan, the 
said brigadier general William Hull, on the said fif- 
teenth day of August, in the year one thousand eight 
Jiundred and twelve aforesaid, at Detroit aforesaid, in 
the territory of Michigan aforefeaid, (being then and 
there commander of the said fort Detroit, and of the 
said American posts and batteries established and 
erected near thereto, in the said territory of Michigan, 
and being then and there commander of the said 
north-western army of the said United States,) did 
then and there during the continuance of the cannon- 
ade aforesaid, shamefully misbehave himself before 
the enemy, and manifest great fear and apprehension 
of personal danger by a course of conduct and con- 
versation evincing personal alarm, agitation of mind, 
and privation of judgment, and particularly by various 
timid and cowardly actions and expressions then and 
there used and uttered in the presence of the officers 
and soldiers then and there belonging to the said 
north-western army of the said United States, and then 
and there under his command as aforesaid, as well in 



sxx CHARGES AGAINST 

the public street of the town of Detroit, as in places 
adjacent to the said fort of Detroit, and the said 
American posts and batteries established and erect- 
ed near thereto, in the said territory of Michigan; 
whereby a fatal encouragement was atforded for the 
hostile enterprises of the enemy, a pernicious example 
(calculated to intimidate and to disorganize) was given 
to the American troops, and the service of the United 
States in the j)rosecution of the said war, was exposed 
to hazard, shame, and disappointment. 

Third specification. And, also, in this : — That 
during the said war, carried on, and prosecuted by and 
between the said United States of America and their 
territories, and the said united kingdom of Great Bri- 
tain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, to wit : 
on the sixteenth day of August, in the year one thou- 
sand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, the British 
forces under the command of mtyor general Brock hav- 
ing crossed the said river Detroit, having landed at a 
place called Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring 
Hill, in the said territory of Michigan; and having 
thence marched towards the said fort of Detroit, with 
the design to attack the same, the said brigadier ge- 
neral Hull, on the said sixteenth day of August, one 
thousand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, at De- 
troit aforesaid, in the said territory of Michigan, (be- 
ing then and there commander of the said fort of 
Detroit, and being then and there commander of the 
«aid north-western army of the said United States) 
did then and there, during all the time of the enemy's 
crossing ihe said river Detroit as aforesaid, landing 
at the said Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring 
Hill as aforesaid, and marching towards the said fort 
Detroit as aforesaid, with the design to attack the 
same as aforesaid, shamefully misbehave himself be- 
fore the enemy, and manifest great fear and appre- 
hension of personal danger, by various timid and 
cov/ardly actions and expressions then and there used 
and utterred in the presence of the officers acd sol- 



GENERAL HULL. xxxi 

diers belonging to the said north-western army of the 
said United States, then and there under his com- 
mand as aforesaid; by avoiding all personal danger 
from making an attempt to prevent the enemy's cross- 
ing the said river to Detroit and landing at the said 
Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring Hill ; avoiding 
all personal danger from reconnoitering and encoun- 
tering the enemy in battle on the said march of the 
enemy towards the said fort of Detroit; by hastily 
sending flags of truce to the enemy with overtures for 
a capitulation ; by anxiously withdrawing his person 
from the ximerican troops in the open field to a place 
of comparative safety, within the walls of the said 
fort Detroit; by an irresolute fluctuation of orders, 
sometimes inconsistent with each other, and some- 
times incoherent in themselves; by forbidding the 
American artillery to fire on the army on the said 
march of the enemy towards the said fort Detroit; by 
calling the American troops from the field, and crowd- 
ing them in the said fort Detroit, Avhile the enemy 
was on the said march towards the said fort Detroit; 
by a precipitate declaration to the enemy, that he 
surrendered the said fort Detroit, and the said north- 
western army of the said United States, before termis 
of capitulation were signed or considered, or even 
suggested; and generally by a course of conduct and 
conversation evincing personal fear, agitation of mind, 
and privation of judgment; whereby the said fort of 
Detroit, and thesaidnorth-westernarmy of the United 
States, then and there under the command of the said 
brigadier general William Hull, were then and there 
rendered an easy and certain conquest to the approach- 
ing enemy ; the officers and soldiers of a gallant army 
(compelled by the obligations of military law to obey 
the orders of their commander) were exposed to un- 
merited mortification and reproach ; and the service 
of the said United States, in the prosecution of the 
said war, suffered great detriment and discredit^ 



sxxii CHARGES AGAINST 

Fourth specification. And, also, in this : — Thai 
iluriiig the said war so as aforesaid carried on and pro- 
secuted by and between the said United States of 
America and their territories, and tlie said united 
kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the depen- 
dencies thereof, to wit : on the sixteenth day of Au- 
gust, in the year one thousand eight hundred and 
twelve aforesaid, at Detroit aforesaid, in the territory 
of Michigan aforesaid, the said fort Detroit being then 
and there well garrisoned and supjilied with cannon, 
ammunition, and provisions; the said norlh-\\estern 
army of the sai<l United States being then and there 
well supplied with arms, ammunition, and provisions ; 
and the officers and soldiers thereof being then and 
there in high spirits, and eager to meet and encounter 
the enemy in battle ; and a fine train of artillery being 
then and there subject to the orders and disposal of 
the said brigadier general Hull, for the purposes of 
defence or attack, yet the said brigadier general Wil- 
liam Hull (then and there being commander of the 
said fort Detroit, and of the said north-western army of 
the said United States) acting upon the impulse of per- 
sonal fear and apprehension, and contemplating, as 
the means of personal safety, a shameful abandonment 
and surrender of the said fort Detroit, and of the said 
north-western army of the said United States under 
his command as aforesaid, to the approaching enemy, 
did then and there shamefully misbehave himself be- 
fore the enemy, and did then and there enter into a 
disgraceful capitulation with the enemy, containing no 
consolatory stipulation that the said garrison and army 
should march out of the said fort of Detroit with the 
honours of war ; no just and humane stipulation for the 
securit}^ and protection of such of the inhabitants of the 
said British province of Upper Canada as had accept- 
ed the said brigadier general William Hull's invita- 
tion to join the American standard; nor any reason- 
able stipulation for an opportunity of rej)orting to the 
♦Secretary for the Department of War the circitm- 



GENERAL HULL. xxxiii 

stances of so unexpected and so important an event ; 
and did then and there shamefully abandon, surrender, 
and give up the said fort of Detroit, together with all 
the troops, regulars as w ell as militia, then and there 
under his command as aforesaid, and all the public 
stores and arms, and all the public documents, includ- 
ing; every thing else of a public nature belonging to the 
said fort of Detroit, and to the said north-western 
army of the said United States, then and there under 
his command as aforesaid, to the said approaching 
enemy, to wit : — to the British forces under the com- 
mand of major general Brock, without any cause for 
so doing, arising from the superiour numbers, state and 
condition of the said British forces; or from the ac- 
tual want, or just expectation of sudden w^ant, of arms, 
ammunition, and provisions for the said fort Detroit, 
and the said north-western army of the said United 
States, and without any other adequate cause what- 
soever; whereby the territorial sovereignty, rights, 
and property of the said United States v, ere shame- 
fully ceded to the enemy ; a brave and patriotic army 
was wantonly sacrificed by the personal fears of the 
commander; and the service of the said United States, 
in the prosecution of the said war, suffered a great 
and afflicting loss. 

CHARGE IIL 

Nedect of duty and nnofiicerlike conduct, while 
commanding a separate army, between the ninth of 
April and the seventeenth of August, in the ye'dv one 
thousand eight hundred and twelve. 

First specification. In this : — That before 
and during the said war, carried on and prosecuted 
as aforesaid, by and between the said United States 
of America and their territories, and the said united 
kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the de- 
pendencies thereof, the said brigadier general William 
Hull, being duly appointed to command the north- 



Sxxiv- CHARGES AGAINST 

Avestern army of the said United States, did actually 
take and assume tlie command of the said army, on 
or about the twenty-fifth day of May, in the year 
one thousand eight hundred and twelve, at or near 
Daj^ton, in the state of Ohio, and did thence con- 
stantly continue in the actual command of said army, 
as well on the march from Dayton aforesaid, to De- 
troit, in the territory of Michigan, and at Detroit 
aforesaid, as in the British province of Upper Cana- 
da, until his capitulation with the enemy, and the 
consequent surrender of fort Detroit, in the said Mi- 
chigan territory, with all the troops, regulars, and 
militia under his command, to the British forces un- 
der the command of major general Brock, to wit : — ' 
at Detroit aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan 
aforesaid, on the sixteenth day of August, in the year 
one thousand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid. 
And that the said brigadier general William Hull, 
unmindful of the important trust reposed in him, dur- 
ing all the time aforesaid, and as well on the march 
of the said army from Dayton aforesaid, to Detroit 
aforesaid, and at Detroit aforesaid, as in the British 
province of Upper Canada aforesaid, was guilty of 
neglect of duty and of unofficerlike conduct, by ne- 
glecting and omitting, with sutficient care and fre- 
quency, to inspect, train, exercise, review, and order, 
and to cause to be inspected, trained, exercised, re- 
viewed, and ordered, the said army under his com- 
mand as aforesaid ; and, also, by neglecting and 
omitting, in due form and time, to prei)are an order 
of battle, and to make the same known to the said 
army on the march from Dayton aforesaid, to Detroit 
aforesaid, in the Michigan territory aforesaid, whereby 
the discipline of tlie troojis under the command of 
the said brigadier general William Hull as aforesaid, 
was in danger of being relaxed ; their comfort was 
liable to be impaired; their confidence in the military 
skill pnd dispositions of their commander was dimi- 
nished ; and the snid army was exposed to the hazard 



GENERAL HULL. xxxv 

<^r disorder and defeat in the event of an attack being 
i>iade thereon by the enemy. 

Second specification. And, also, in this :— 
That during the said war so as aforesaid carried on 
and prosecuted by and between the said United 
States of America, and their territories, and the said 
united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the 
dependencies thereof, to wit ; on or about the first 
day of July, in the year one thousand eight hundred 
and twelve aforesaid, at the rapids of the river Miami, 
in the territory of Michigan, the said brigadier gene- 
ral William Hull, then and there commanding the 
said north-western army of the said United States, on 
the march thereof from Dayton, in the state of Ohio, 
to Detroit aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan 
aforesaid, then and there having sufficient cause to 
know or to believe, that war was then existing between 
the said United States and their territories, and the 
said united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
and the dependencies thereof, was guilty of neglect of 
duty and of unofficerlike conduct, by then and there 
hiring or causing to be hired an unarmed vessel, and 
putting or causing to be put on board thereof, to be 
transported by water-passage from the said rapids of 
the river Miami of the lake, to Detroit aforesaid, 
(the said brigadier general William Hull having suf- 
ficient cause to know or to believe the imminent 
danger of capture by the enemy to which the said 
unarmed vessel on the passage aforesaid, would be 
exposed) certain sick soldiers, and a great part of 
the hospital stores belonging to the said army, to- 
gether with a trunk, containing (among other things) 
the papers hereinafter mentioned, which it was the 
duty of the said brigadier general William Hull most 
carefully to keep and preserve from the knov^ledge 
and view of the enemy, that is to say : tlie official 
correspondence of the Secretary of the Department of 
War and the said brigadier general William Hull, as 
well touching the expedition on which the said north- 

D 



xxxTi CHARGES AGAINST 

western army under his command as aforesaid, wa? 
then employed, as touching a declaration of war by 
the said United States of America agciinst the said 
united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and 
the dependencies thereof; and, also, certain other 
official muster rolls, reports, and returns of the num- 
bers, state, and condition of the said army under his 
command as aforesaid. And the said unarmed ves- 
sel on the passage aforesaid, from the said rapids of 
the river Miami of the lake towards Detroit afore- 
said, afterwards to wit : on or about the second day 
of July in the year one thousand eight hundred and 
twelve aforesaid, was captured by the enemy, having 
on board thereof, at the time of such capture, the 
said sick soldiers, the said hospital stores, and the 
said trunk, containing the said olficial correspon- 
dence, and, also, the said muster rolls, reports, and 
returns of the numbers, state, and condition of the 
said arm}^ ; whereby the said sick soldiers were made 
prisoners of war ; the said hospital stores were lost 
to the United States ; and the said otlicial correspon- 
dence, and the said muster rolls, reports, and returns 
of the numbers, state, and condition of the said army 
came to the possession, knowledge, and use of the 
f^nemies of the United States, to the great injury of 
the said United States. 

Third specification. And, also, in this ; — That 
during the said war so as aforesaid carried on and 
prosecuted by and between the said United States of 
America and their territories, and the said united 
kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the de- 
pendencies thereof, the said brigadier general Wil- 
liam Hull, having arrived with the said north-western 
army of the said United States under his command 
as aforesaid, at Detroit, in the territory of Michigan, 
OTi the seventh day of July, in the year one thousand 
eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, and having the 
possession and command of said fort of Detroit, from 
that time, constantly, until the abandonment and sur- 



GENERAL HULL. xxxvii 

render thereof to the British forces under the command 
of major general Brockj on the sixteenth day of Au- 
gust, in the year one thousand eight hunured and 
twelve aforesaid, and finding upon his said arrival at 
Detroit aforesaid, that the works of the said fort De- 
troit were greatly damaged and dilapidated, and that 
the guns and gun-carriages belonging to said fort of 
Detroit were also damaged and out of repair; and, 
moreover, well knowing the importance of the said 
fort Detroit to the service of the said United States 
in the operation of the said war, and that the same 
(together with the said guns and gun-carriages) should 
be put and kept in proper order and repair, was guilty 
of neglect of duty by neglecting and omitting, dur- 
ing all the time of his possession and command as - 
aforesaid, in proper and sufiicient manner to repair 
and strengthen, or cause to be repaired and strength- 
ened, the works of the said fort Detroit, by neglect- 
ing and omitting, in a proper and sufficient manner, 
and in due time for the service of the said United 
States, to repair or cause to be repaired, the said guns 
and gun-carriages, and generally by neglecting and 
omitting to put, or cause to be put the said fort of De- 
troit in a proper state and condition for resistance and 
defence in the event of an invasion and attack hj 
the enem}^; whereby the said fort Detroit was left an 
easy conquest to the enemy ; the said guns and gun- 
carriages, being afterwards required for the service of 
the said United States, in the British province of 
Upper Canada, were still found unfit for transporta- 
tion and use ; great time was consumed in preparing 
and fitting them for the said service ; and tlie opera- 
tions of the war were fatally obstructed and sus- 
pended. 

Fourth specification. And, also, in this :— 
That during the said war so as aforesaid carried osi 
and prosecuted by and between the said United States 
of America and their territories, and tiie said united 
'kmzilom of Great Britain and Ireland, and tJie de- 



xxxviii CHARGES AGAINST 

pendencies thereof, the said brigadier general Wil- 
liam Hull, declaring and avowing an intention antl 
design, with the said north-western army of the said 
United States under his command as aforesaid, to in- 
1 ade and enter the British province of Upper Canada, 
to invest and attack the British fort called Maiden, 
otherwise called Aniherstburgh, in the said British 
province, and to maintain and enlarge his position 
and possessions in the said British province, and well 
knowing that expedition, resolution, and energy were 
indispensible to the prosecution and accomplishment 
of such intention and design, and having arrived at 
Detroit aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan afore- 
said, on the seventh day of Julv, in the year one 
thousand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, and 
having invaded the said British province of Upper 
Canada, on the twelfth day of July, in the year 
aforesaid, and therein taken possession of the town 
of Sandwich aforesaid, and having with the main 
body of his said army evacuated the said British pro- 
vince of Upper Canada on the eighth day of August, 
hi the year aforesaid, was guilty of neglect of duty 
and unofficerlike conduct, by not seasonably repair- 
ing, titling, and transporting, or causing to be repaired, 
litted and transported, the guns and gun-carriages 
which were necessary to the operation of the war in 
the said British province of Upper Canada, by an 
useless and injurious waste of time and opportunity 
at Sandwich aforesaid, in the said British province 
of Upper Canada, without making an attempt to re- 
duce the said British fort called MaHen, otherwise 
called Amherstburgh, by an unnecessary consumption 
of time, in projects to conciliate the British inhabi- 
tants of the said British province of Upper Canada, 
and the neighbouring Indians, without resorting to a 
more effectual display of a military power, capacity, 
and disposition to maintain the acquisitions of con- 
quest, and to perform the promises of protection; by 
postponing in the first instance, and by abandoning 



GENERAL HULL. xxxiis 

in the next, an investment and attack upon the said 
British fort called Maiden, otherwise calietl Ainherst- 
bur^h, and by finally evacuating the said British pro- 
vince of Upper Canada, without having provided 
effectually, in any respect, for the safety of the inha- 
bitants thereof who had accepted the said brigadier 
general William Hull's invitation to join the Ameri- 
can standard, and without having, in any degree, ac- 
complished the said intention and design of the said 
brigadier general William Hull, so as aforesaid de- 
clared and avowed upon the ijivasion of the said Brit*' 
ish province as aforesaid ; Avhereby an opportunity 
was afforded to the enemy to bring into suspicion and 
contempt the power and the conduct of the Ameri- 
can commander; to collect and combine the British 
forces ; to seduce, intimidate, and engage the In- 
dians ; to awe into submission the wavering inhabi- 
tants of the said British province of Upper Canada; 
to reinforce the said British fort called Maiden, other- 
wise called Amherstburgh ; and to jjrepare for invest- 
ing and attacking the said fort of Detroit, in the said 
territory of Michigan; while on the other hand, the 
said army of the said United States, under the com- 
mand of the said brigadier general Vf iliiam Hull, as 
aforesaid, diminishing in effective numbers in con- 
sequence of sickness and other casualties ; the otScers 
and soldiers naturally became dissatisfted and dis- 
gusted with a scene of such inactivity, irresolu- 
tion, and procrastination ; the hope of support and 
^o-operation, as well from the Indians as from the 
British inhabitants of the said British province of 
Upper Canada, was destroyed, and the general ardour 
of the troops, in the prosecution of the war, insensi- 
bly abated. 

Fifth specification. And, also, in this : — That 
tluring the continuance of the said v/ar, carried on 
and prosecuted as aforesaid, by and between the said 
United States of America and their territories, and 
the said united kingdom oC Great Britain and Ireland*, 
d2 



xl CHARGES AGAINST 

and the dependencies thereof, the said brigadier 
general William Hull, with the said north-western 
army of the said United States under his command as 
aforesaid, arrived at Detroit aforesaid, in the territory 
of Michigan aforesaid, to wit ; on the seventh day 
of July, in the year one thousand eight hundred and 
isvelve aforesaid; that with the said army under his 
command as aforesaid, he entered and invaded the 
said British province of Upper Canada, to wit : on 
ihe twelfth day of July, in the year aforesaid; that 
with the main body of the said army under his com- 
mand as aforesaid, he evacuated the said British pro- 
vince of Upper Canada on the eighth day of August, 
in the year aforesaid, thence returning to Detroit 
aforesaid, in the s?* 1 territory of Blichigan, and that 
he abandoned, surrendered, and gave up the said fort 
Detroit, with all the troops, regulars as well as militia, 
rnder his command as aforesaid, to the British forces 
under the command of major general Brock, to wit : 
on the sixteenth day of August, in the year aforesaid. 
And that during all the movements aforesaid, and 
during all the time aforesaid, to wit ; from the said 
seventh day of July, in the year one thousand eight 
hundred and twelve aforesaid, to and including the 
said sixteenth day of August, in tlie year aforesaid, 
it was of high importance to the security and supply 
of the said fort Detroit, and the said army of the said 
United States, under the command of the said briga- 
dier general William Hull as aforesaid, that a free 
,nnd open communication should be had and preserv- 
ed between the said fort of Detroit and the said army 
of the said United States, under the command of the 
said brigadier general William Hull as aforesaid, and 
a certain American settlement and military pest 
made and established at the river Raisin, in the said 
territory of Michigan; and that the said brigadier 
general William Hull, well knowing the premises, 
but unmindful of the trust reposed in him, was guilty 
of neglect of duty and unofficerlike conduct, by suf- 



GENERAL HULL. xli 

feriiig the enemy to interrupt and cut off the said com- 
munication between the said fort of Detroit and the 
said army of the said United States under his com- 
mand as aforesaid, and the said American settlement 
and military post made and established at the river 
Raisin aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan afore- 
said, to wit ; on the first day of August, in the year 
one thousand eight hundred and twelve afore:3aid, or 
on some other day of the said month of August, or 
on some day of the preceding month of July, in 
the year aforesaid ; also, by afterwards, to wit : on the 
fourth day of August, in the year aforesaid, detaching 
major Thomas B. Van Korn of colonel James Find- 
lay's regiment of Ohio volunteers, with an inadequate 
force, (the said brigadier general William Hull having 
sufficient cause for knowing or believing the same to 
be inadequate) to attempt again to open the said com- 
munication between the said fort Detroit, and the said 
army of the said United States, under the command 
of the said brigadier general Wiiiiam Hull as afore- 
said, and the said American settlement and military 
post on said river Raisin, in the territory of Michigan 
aforesaid ; also, by afterwards, to wit : on the eiglith 
day of August, in the year aforesaid, detaching lieute- 
nant colonel James Miller, of the fifth regiment of 
United States infantry, with the number or about the 
number of five hundred men to attempt again to open 
the said communication between the said fort of De- 
troit and the said army of the said United States, under 
the command of the said brigadier general William 
Hull, and the said American settlement and military 
post at the said river Raisin, in the territorj^ of Mi- 
chigan aforesaid, and neglecting to furnish and forward, 
or cause to be furnished and forwarded, the said last 
mentioned detachment at or near Brownstown, in the 
aaid territory of Michigan, on its m.arch aforesaid, 
upon tlte service aforesaid, an adequate supj)ij of pro- 
visions, (the said brigadier general William Hull hav- 
ing sufficient cause to know or to believe that the 



slii CHARGES AGAINST 

said last mentioned detachment was at or near Browns* 
town aforesaid, on its march aforesaid, upon the ser" 
vice aforesaid, in want of provisions, and that they 
could not prosecute and accomplisli the said service 
unless an adequate supply of provisions was furnished 
and forv, arded to them at or near Brownstown afore- 
said ;) and, also, by afterwards, to wit : on the four- 
teenth day of August, in the year aforesaid, detaching 
colonel Duncan Mac Arthur, colonel of a regiment of 
Ohio volunteers, and colonel Lewis Cass, colonel of 
another regiment of Ohio volunteers, with the num- 
ber or about the number of four hundred men, as 
well to attempt again to open the said communica- 
tion between the said fort Detroit and the said 
army of the said United States, under the command 
of the said brigadier general V/illiam Hull as afore- 
said, and the said American settlement and mili- 
tary post at the river Raisin aforesaid, in the terri- 
tory of Micliigan aforesaid, as to escort certain pro- 
visions from the said American settlement and mi- 
litary post to Detroit aforesaid, without issuing, fur- 
nishing, and forwarding, or causing to be issued, furnish- 
ed and forv* arded to the said last mentioned detach- 
ment an adequate supply of provisions for the service 
on which they were employed as aforesaid, (the said 
brigadier general William Hull having sufficient cause 
to know or to believe that (he said last mentioned de- 
tachment was in want of a further supply of provi- 
sions upon the service aforesaid, and that they could 
not prosecute and accomplish the said service unless 
such further sup))ly was issued, furnished, and for- 
y/arded to them ;) Avhereby the said detachment, un- 
der the said major Thomas B. Van Horn, being en- 
countered by the enemy with a superiour force, was 
defeated and returned to Detroit aforesaid, without ac- 
conij^lishing the service on which they w^ere employ- 
ed as aforesaid; the said detachment under the said 
lieutenant colonel James Miller, having achieved a 
signal victory over the enemy during the march on 



GENERAL HULL. xliii 

tlie service aforesaid, at or near Brownstown afore- 
said, were nevertheless compelled, from the want of 
an adequate supply of provisions, to abandon the ser- 
vice on which they were employed as aforesaid, and 
to return to Detroit aforesaid; the said detachment 
under the said colonel Duncan Mac Arthur and the 
said colonel Lewis Cass, from want of an adequate 
supply of provisions were unable to prosecute and ac- 
complish the service on which they were employed 
as aforesaid, and were returning to Detroit afore- 
said, at the time of the abandonment and surren- 
der of the said fort Detroit and the said army of 
the United States to the British forces under the 
command of major general Brock as aforesaid : and 
finally, the said communication between the said 
fort Detroit and the said army of the United States, 
under the command of the said brigadier general Wil- 
liam Hull, and the said American settlement and mi- 
litary post at the said river Raisin, in the territory of 
Michigan aforesaid, by reasons of the said neglects 
and omissions of the said brigadier general William 
Hull as aforesaid, was, and remained interrupted and 
totally cut off by the enemy, to wit : from the said 
first day of August, in the year aforesaid, or from some 
other day in the said month of August, or in the pre- 
ceding month of July, in the year aforesaid, to and 
including the said sixteenth day of August, in the year 
aforesaid. 

Sixth specification. And, also, in this i — That 
jluring the continuance of the said w ar, so as aforesaid 
carried on and prosecuted by and between the said 
United States of America and their territories, and 
the said united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
and the dependencies thereof, the said brigadier ge- 
neral William Hull, with the said north-western army 
of the said United States, under his command as afore- 
said, having invaded and entered the said British pro- 
vince of Upper Canada as aforesaid, and having de- 
clared and aYO^yed an intention and design of invests 



xliv CHARGES AGAINST 

ing and attacking the said British fort called Mai- 
den, otherwise called Amherstburgh, in the said 
British province of Upper Canada, and a detach- 
ment of the said army under his command as afore- 
said, led by the said colonel Lewis Cass, and the 
said lieutenant colonel James Miller, having attack- 
ed and repulsed the enemy, and seized upon a cer- 
tain bridge over the river, called the river Aux Ca- 
nard, on tlie rout from Sandwich, in the said Bri- 
tish province of Upper Canada, to the said British 
fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherstburgh, 
and an opportunity having thereby been otfered for 
an immediate investment and attack upon the said 
British fort called Maiden, otherwise called Am- 
herstburgh; yet the said brigadier general William 
Hull, well knowing the premises, and unmindful of 
the trust reposed in him, to w it : on or about the 
eighteenth day of July, in the year one thousand 
eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, at Sandwich 
aforesaid, in the British province of Upper Canada 
aforesaid, was guilty of neglect of duty and un- 
otHcerlike conduct, by neglecting and omitting to 
advance with the said army under his command as 
aforesaid, to maintain or attempt to maintain the 
possession of the said bridge over the said river, call- 
ed the river Aux Canard, and by neglecting and 
omitting to proceed to the immediate investment 
and attack of the said British fort called Maiden, 
otherwise called Amherstburgh, in the said British pro- 
vince of Upper Canatla, whereby the advantage of 
acquiring and keeping possession of the said bridge 
over the said river called the river Aux Canard, as 
aforesaid, w as improvidently lost, and the prospect of 
a successful investment and attack upon the said Bri- 
tish fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherst- 
burgh, speedily vanished. 

Seve.vtii specification. And, also, in this :— 
That during the isontinuance of the said war, so a.^ 
aforesaid curried oa asd prosecuted by and between 



GENERAL HULL. slv 

t lie said United States of America and their territories, 
and the said united kingdom of Great Britain and Ire- 
land, and the dependencies thereof, the said brigadier 
general William Hull, with the said north-western ar- 
my of the said United States under his command as 
aforesaid, having evacuated the said British province 
of Upper Canada, returning thence to Detroit afore- 
said, in the territor}^ of Slichigan aforesaid, the ene- 
my having afterwards taken possession of the bank of 
the said river Detroit, opposite to Detroit aforesaid- 
and thereon erected batteries wherewith to attack and 
annoy as well the said fort of Detroit, and the Ameri- 
can posts and batteries erected and estc.blished near 
thereto, as the town of Detroit in the said territory of 
Michigan ; the enemy having also manifested an in- 
tention and design to invade and enter the said terri- 
tory of Michigan, and to invest and attack the said 
fort Detroit; and the enemy having also afterwards, 
in pursuance of such intention and design, landed at a 
place called Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring 
Hill, in the neighbourhood of the said fort Detroit, 
in tlie territory of Michigan aforesaid ; yet the said 
brigadier general William Hull, well knowing the 
premises, and unmindful of the trust reposed in him, 
to w it : from the eleventh day of August, to and in- 
cluding the sixteenth day of August, in the year one 
thousand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, was 
guilty of neglect of duty and unofficerlike conduct, 
by neglecting and omitting to prevent, and to attempt 
to prevent the enemy from erecting the said batteries 
on the bank of the said river Detroit, opposite to the 
said fort of Detroit, aforesaid : by neglecting and 
omitting to fortify the landing place at the said Spring 
Wells, otherwise called Sprhig Hill, in the territory 
of Michigan aforesaid ; and by neglecting and omit- 
ting to a^inoy and attack the enemy on and after his 
landing at Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring 
Hill aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan aforesaid; 
whereby the enemy was enabled securely to ereet 



^Ivi CHARGES AGAINST GEN. HULL. 

the said batteries on fche bank of the said river Detroit 
as aforesaid, for attacking and annoying as well the 
3aid fort of Detroit, and the American posts and 
batteries erected and established near thereto, as the 
«aid town of Detroit, to invade the said territory of 
Michigan without opposition or loss, and to approach 
the said fort Detroit with the air and confidence of 
51 triumph. 

A. J. DALLAS, 

Jutl^e Advocatr. 



DEFENCE 



BRIGADIER GENERAL HULL. 



ifr. President, 

And Gentlemen of the Com-t-JIai-tial, 

i. HAVE too long, and too severely felt the effects oT 
public pr^udice, excited by unfounded reports and 
groundless clamours, not to rejoice, that the time has 
arrived, when I may speak in my own vindication, 
before an impartial and honourable tribunal. 

The charges, upon which you are now to decide, 
have been propagated through the union, with a seal 
and industry^ to which my age, my character, and my 
former services, have been in vain opposed. 

My reputation and feelings have been the sport of 
every one, who either from malicious, selfisli, or poli- 
tical motives, chose to traduce me. The time has 
been, when no one would have dared to couple disho- 
nour with my name ; when my heart has exulted to 
find myself mentioned among those who deserved 
well of tlieir country. But since my efforts to serve 



2 DEFENCE OF 

her, have been unsuccessful, how have 1 been tortured 
■with cruel and unfounded accusations l—Even con- 
scious innocence has not always given me fortitude • 
to bear with this injustice, unmoved.— Knowing the 
integrity of my own motives, and how zealously I 
have sought to discharge my duty to the public, my 
heart has often swollen with indignation, when I have 
seen the indefatigable pains that have been taken, by 
repetitions of the foulest calumnies, to excite, and keep 
alive, prejudices against me. Your own knowledge. 
Gentlemen, of what has been passing in the world, 
will convince you, that this is not declamation ; but I 
shall shew you, in the course of my defence, that men, 
from whose profession and whose rank it was not to 
be expected, have been parties in this injustice. 

At length, hov/ever, the time I have so anxiously 
desired has arrived, when my conduct must be tested 
by evidence, instead of the misrepresentations of my 
enemies. And I do eel a confidence, that when 
YOU have pronounced upon that evidence, I may ap- 
peal to your judgment to refute the clamours which 
have been niised against me. 

I cannot but think, Mr. President, that the charges 
against me are exhibited in a form, hitherto unprece- 
dented in proceedings of this nature. It was not to 
be expected, that in a court where the accused, 
whatever may be his infirmities or incapacity to at- 
tend to his own defence, is not permitted to have 
'• the benefit of counsel, the charges would be envelop- 



GENERAL HULL. 3 

ed ill such a profusion of words, that it is difiicult for 
one, iiot accustomed to the technical forms of pleadings 
in the civil courts, to understand them, and be so 
complicated by repetitions, that it is still more diffi- 
cult to reduce them to s.ny order or analysis. 

It is extremely important, however, that the Court 
should ascertain, and ahvays bear in mind, precisely 
of what I am accused. The course of proceeding, 
which has been adopted by the Court, renders this 
the more necessarj^ as testimony has been given, 
which certainly cannot be applied to any of the spe- 
cifications. The Court have thought proper to ad- 
mit it, with an intimation, that any further objection, 
^vhich I might offer to its propriety or relevancy, when 
I arrived at this stage of my defence, would be con- 
sidered. — In submission to this decision of the Court, 
I have omitted to make objections on this ground in 
several instances. 

I shall not attempt to offer an argument to the 
Court, to prove the injustice of making one charge 
against a person, and trying and convicting him on an- 
other. I did however understand from what passed, 
when I first submitted to the Court an objection of this 
nature, that an opinion was entertained by some of the 
members, that though the testimony might not apply to 
any specification, yet if the fact intended to be proved 
would come under either of the general charge^ the 
testimony would be proper. If this were so, then 
there would be no use in the specifications. Indeed 



4 DEFENCE OF 

they would be worse than useless, for they would only 
mislead the accused, and induce him to prepare 
against one accusation, when he might be tried on 
another. The impropriety of admitting any thing un- 
der the general charge, for which there is not a spe- 
cification, I think will appear manifest. Let us sup- 
pose, that a general charge is made of unofficer-like 
conduct, and the only specification, insulting a supe- 
riour. Suppose that under this general charge and 
specification, testimony should be offered of absence 
without leave. This would also be unofllicer-like con- 
duct, and therefore would come under the general 
charge. But would it not be the height of injustice to 
try the accused for absenting himself; a crime of 
which the charges gave him no notice. I trust the 
Court will see the validity of the objection I am con- 
sidering, and that they will be careful to give no 
weight to any part of the testimony, which does not 
apply to some one of the specifications. 

I do not think it necessary to occupy the time of 
the Court with a recapitulation of the charges, nor 
shall I exhaust your patience by attempting, in my 
defence, to follow the volume on your table, through 
all its reiterations. It will be found, for the most part, 
to be a repetition of the same facts, displayed in the 
jargon of special pleading, with an incongruous dis- 
semination of such opprobrious epithets, as fancy 
might furnish to heighten the imputation of guilt. I 
shall endeavour to arrange and consider the accusa- 
tions in such order as will enable me to bring my de- 



GENERAL HULL. 5 

fence into some compass, and to be the better mider- 
stood; — I shall particularly notice the charges, which 
the Judge Advocate, in his opening, mentioned as 
those which he expected would be substantiated, and 
I shall not omit to make my defence against every 
accusation, which there has been the least testimony 
to support. 

The cardinal accusations, if I may be permitted so 
to express myself, are founded upon an alleged delay 
at Sandwich, the retreat from Canada, and the sur- 
render at Detroit. If I can satisfy the Court thai 
these acts were in themselves necessary, or justiftablen 
it will then remain for me to ansv/er suCh of the ac» 
cusations as relate to the manner in which these acts 
were done, and to answer also some charges not im- 
mediately connected with these transactions. This 
course will enibrace the whole of my defence. Of 
this latter description, is the first specification, under 
the charge of treason, which relates to the vessel sent 
from the Miami, I shall therefore give this a separate 
consideration ; and as it stands first and highest in the 
black catalogue of the crimes which are imputed to 
me, and is repeated m other specifications, 1 shall, in 
the first instance, ask the attention of the Court to 
this subject. 

I have already protested against the authority of; 
this Court to decide upon this charge, because trea- 
son is a crime of which a court martial has no cog- 
nisance. Their power is confined to such military 



n% 



e DEFENCE OF 

crimes as are specified in the articles of war. And 
their jurisdiction is so limited, not only by the consti- 
tution, but by the very articles themselves. 1 have 
thought it my duty, in the most solemn manner, to make 
and insist on this protest, for the sake of repelling a 
dangerous example, and not as it respects myself, or 
the case now under y©ur consideration ; for my only 
desire is to acquit myself of the criminal acts and mo- 
tives which have been so wantonly imputed to me. 
If I cannot succeed in this, I am indifferent as to the 
names by which the crimes may be called, and if I 
do not acquit myself of the other charges, which are 
the most wounding to the feelings of a soldier, I am 
equally indifferent to the punishment that may be in- 
flicted. I have no desire to preserve a life, that shall 
be stigmatized by a conviction of this Court on the 
charges of cowardice. 

The first specification, under the charge of treason, 
relates to sending the vessel, on the first of July, from 
the Miami, with hospital stores, sick, baggage, and 
army documents. As to sending the vessel with what 
she had on board, except the last article, it is not dis- 
puted; but that for the reasons, which according to 
the testimony of general Mac Arthur, I assigned for 
it at the time, it would not have been an improper 
measure had not war been declared. The whole 
criminality then, in this respect, rests on the truth of 
the allegation, that I despatched the vessel, knowing 
of the war; and with a design to give traitorous in- 
telligence to the enemy. 



GENERAL HULL. 7 

It is very certain that I had no direct intelligence 
of the war on the first of July, when the vessel was 
despatched. I had on the twenty-sixth of June re- 
ceived a letter from the Secretary at War, dated on 
the day war was declared, the eighteenth of June; 
and I afterwards received another letter from him of 
the same date, announcing to me the declaration of 
war. It seems to have been intimated tliat the letter 
of the eighteenth of June, which I received on the 
twenty-sixth, was the letter announcing the war. 
But I think the testimony of general Mac Arthur 
settles that point. He acknowledges that I shewed 
him the letter which I received on the twenty-sixth 
of June at the time I received it. And also the letter 
-^yhich I received on the second of July, at the time 
that letter came to my hands. But if the testimony 
of general Mac Arthur, and other witnesses, left any 
doubt on this subject, it must be removed by a reference 
to a letter from me to the Secretary at War, which has 
been read by the Judge Advocate, dated at Fort Find- 
lay on the twenty-sixth June, which acknowledges 
the receipt of the letter from him of the eighteenth 
of June, which I had then received. In which I say, 
"m the event of a war,^' it will be necessary to pur- 
sue certain measures. I think this is evidence, not 
only that the letter, which I had received on the twen- 
ty-sixth of June, was not the letter which announced 
the war, but that the letter which I did receive, gave 
me no expectations that war was declared when I 
wrote. 



8 DEFENCE OF 

It may be said, however, in the language of soni^ 
of the specifications, that though I had no certain iip- 
formation of the declaration of war when I despatch- 
ed the vessel, I had " sufficient cause to know or be> 
" lieve that war then existed." As I have said the first 
letter from the Secretary at War dated on the eighteenth 
of June, gave me no cause to know or believe the fact, 
all that is in that letter which could by any possibility 
be supposed to have relation to such an event, are 
these few words, " circumstances have recently oc- 
" curred, which render it necessary you should pursue 
"your march to Detroit with all possible expedition." 
This was but a reiteration of my former orders. In 
the letter from the Secretary at War of the ninth of 
April, I am directed " to repair with as little delay as 
*• possible to Detroit." How then was I to infer, from 
this letter, that war had been declared ? I did never 
suppose, that if war was declared, I should receive a 
peremptory order from Washington, to march my 
whole army, in all events, to Detroit; thereby leav- 
ing the enemy at Maiden, eighteen miles in my rear, 
directly on my line of communication, with all the 
facilities which he had, by reason of his command of 
the waters, to cut off my supplies. Such an order ap- 
peared to me so inconsistent with my military expe- 
rience, that I did not suppose it could have been found- 
ed on a declaration of war, or even on a prospect of 
immediate hostilities. I did suppose, that, in the evGnt 
of a war, a discretion would have been left me, to 
conduct my troops in such a manner, as I might judge 
from circumstances would be most condiicive to their 



GENERAL HULL. S 

seciirity, and most likely to effect the destruction of 
the enemy; and that I should have been left at liberty 
to post my army in what I might think the most ad- 
vantageous situation. I did suppose, that when it was 
seen that war would be immediate and inevitable, I 
should have been informed of measures taken to re- 
inforce me, and to keep open the road, which it was 
known I was obliged to make for near two hundred 
miles through the wilderness, and on which my army 
must depend for its supplies. I did suppose, that I 
should have been informed of co-operations intended 
for my support, and of means provided for my com- 
municating with those who might direct those co-ope- 
rations. And I did suppose, that I should have been 
informed of measures taken to obtain the command 
of the waters. All my intercourse, as well previous- 
ly as subsequently to my appointment, as I shall here- 
after prove, with the executive officers of the govern- 
ment, gave me reason to expect, that all these mea- 
sures would be pursued in the event of a war. How 
then was I to understand, from this simple intimation, 
that circumstances had occurred which required that 
I should pursue my march to Detroit with expedi- 
tion, that war was actually declared or immediately 
expected? Besides, it naturally occurred to me, that 
if the circumstances alluded to by the Secretary were 
a declaration of war, or such as would immediately 
lead to it, I should be told so explicitly. I could con- 
ceive no reason for making his communication to me 
in ambiguous terms. 

But it may be said, that general Mac Arthur has 
proved, by the testimony which he has given, relative 



10 DEFENCE OP 

to conversations he had with me \vhen I received the 
letter from the Secretary at War, on the twenty-sixtli 
June, and when I despatched the vessel on the tirst 
of July, that I had "sufKcient cause to know or 
'' believe that war then existed." 

General Mac Arthur's testimony on this subject is 
as follows : " On the evening of the twenty-sixth of 
" June, an express arrived from Chillicothe, bearing a 
" letter for me, another for general Hull. I w ent 
" with the bearer to general Hull, who opened his let- 
*' ter and handed it to me. It was from the Secretary 
" at War, dated June eighteen, eighteen hundred and 
" twelve. It stated, that circumstances had occurred 
" that made it necessary that the General should pro- 
" ceed to Detroit, take measures for defence, and wait 
'* for further orders. I also received a letter from a 
" friend, quoting a postscript to a letter from general 
*' Worthington, a senator in congress, which postscript 
" said, ' before this reaches you, war will be declared.' 
" I stated to the General, that colonel Dunlap, the 
" bearer of the express, had told me, that before that 
" time war was declared. The General then asked 
*' me what I thought of the Secretary's letter. I said 
*' I thought it notice of a declaration of war. The 
" General said it seemed very much like it. The 
" General and I had a great deal of conversation on 
" the information we had, from time to time, received, 
*' and we appeared to agree that war was certainly 
" ileclared.'* 



GENERAL HULL. 11 

General Mac Arthur further testifies, " that on the 
'' morning of the day on which we left the encamp- 
" ment near the Miami, the General sent for me to 
" his tent, and stated that he thought of sending the 
" baggage by water from that place. I said I thought 
" it hazardous, that possibly the British might have 
" information of war, and might take the vessel. 

" The General replied, he could not imagine 
" there was any danger, the wind was fair and the ves- 
" sel would pass in a short time ; adding that he could 
" not take upon himself the responsibility of carrying 
'' on the teams any further. I think there was a ver- 
" bal or written order to embark the baggage. I stat- 
" ed to the General that I did not like to send on my 
*• baggage, but if it was a general order it must be 
*' complied with. We proceeded on towards Detroit, 
'" and on the first or second evening after, the com- 
*" mandants of corps were called to the tent of general 
" Hull, and were informed, that a letter had been re- 
" ceived from the Secretary at War, announcing the 
" declaration of war.»* The witness further stated in 
some part of his examination, that notwithstanding 
the order, he sent nothing by the vessel but his mess 
boxes. 

I must beg leave first to remark to the Court, that 
this testimony of general Mac Arthur affords strong 
evidence of the fallibility of his memory. For he 
states, that the letter from the Secretary of War, which 
I shewed to him at Fort Fiodlay on the twenty-sixth 



12 DEFENCE OP 

of June, ordered me to " proceed to Detroit, take mea- 
sures for defence, and wait for further orders." An order 
to prepare for defence would have been a much more 
significant intimation of a declaration of war than any 
thing the letter contained. A copy of the letter fur- 
nished by the War Department is before the Court, and 
will prove how far general Mac Arthur may be mis- 
taken. The expressions which he gives, as having 
been contained in the letter which he saw on the 
tv/enty-sixth of June, are contained in the letter an- 
nouncing the war, which was shewn to him on the 
second of July. It cannot be pretended, that he might 
have seen this last mentioned letter on the twenty- 
sixth of June, because if that had been so, there could 
not have been, after the explicit information contain- 
ed in that letter, any such debate, as he states there 
was between us on the twenty-sixth of June, as to the 
possibility of war having been declared. I do not 
mean to charge general Blac Arthur with a wilful mis- 
representation. I have no doubt but that the zeal, 
which he has manifested for my conviction, has led 
him into this mistake. As this is the highest charge 
against me, he probably has felt the most anxiety that 
it should be substantiated ; and his mind has adopted 
as the impressions of his memory, what are only the 
results of his wishes. I mark this inaccur:^cy of ge- 
neral Mac Arthur the more particularly, to shew, that 
inasmuch as he was so materiall}^ mistaken, with re- 
spect to the contents of the letter which he states he 
had in his hand, and deliberately perused, and hag 
confounded what passed at one time with what occur- 



GENERAL HULL. 13 

red at another, he may very possi])ly be as far mis- 
taken in relation to the conversations he has related. 

I do aver, that, in respect to the conversation which 
he relates as having passetl between us on the twenty- 
sixth of June, he is mistaken ; or rather, he represents 
it in a manner calculated to make impressions alto- 
gether different from what in truth it ought to do. After 
he had informed me of the letter he had received, 
quoting the postscript from general Worthington, and 
after he had communicated to me what had been said 
by colonel Dunlap, the bearer of the letters, I might 
have said, it seemed like war, or matle use of some 
expression of that sort. But I deny that I ever said 
that the Secretary's Letter seemed like war ; on the con- 
trary, that letter induced me to suppose, notwithstand- 
ing the postscript from general Worthington and the 
information of colonel Dunlap, that war could not 
have been declared. 

I beg the Court to remark, that neither the post- 
script, nor the information of colonel Dunlap did state, 
or could have stated, that war was declared ; but merely 
gave their opinions, that war would be declared by 
the time the letters were received, without stating any 
grounds for their opinions. Considering however the 
information of general Worthington as coming from 
a source entitled to great respect and consideration, 
it induced me to think it possible, that war might 
have been declared. But when I found day after day 
passing without intelligence from the Government, 
3 



14 DEFENCE OP 

when I found that on the first of July, five daj^s had 
elapsed since the arrival of colonel Dunlap, and when 
I felt confident that not a moment would be lost in 
despatching a messenger to me, whenever war was 
declared, I was satisfied that the information, which 
had been communicated to me through general 
Mac Artliur, had no other foundation than those ru- 
mours and expectations, which had been so long afloat 
throughout the country. — One circumstance was a 
strong inducement to believe, that the relations of 
peace with Great Britain had not been interrupted. 
When I left Washington, the Secretary of War had 
told me, it was not expected that war would be de- 
clared before the fourth of July. This is a fact, 
though the Secretary at War has answered to the ninth 
interrogatory addressed to him, that " he had not such 
''a recollection of the conversation between us re- 
" specting the probable time of the declaration of war, 
"as to enable him to answer satisfactorily on that 
" subject." 

But as I had not on the first of July, when I des- 
patched the vessel, received mj'self any information 
of the declaration of war, I was to presume, that the 
enemy could not have been apprised of that event. 
It appeared to me an inadmissible imputation on the 
administration, to suppose it possible, that they would 
suffer information of intended hostilities to be convey- 
ed to the enemy, before it could reach their own Ge- 
neral—Yet it was fourteen days after war was de- 
clared before I had any information of it : though 
it appears, that a letter from the Secretary at War, 



GENERAL HULL. 15 

written on the eighteenth of June, had reached me at 
Fort Findlay in seven days, and an attention to the 
dates of the correspondence between me and the War 
I>epartment will shew, that the commmiication be- 
tween the City of Washington and the army, even 
when it was in Canada, might be made in eight or ten 
days. In the Secretary's letter to me of the first of 
August, which has been read, he acknowledges the 
l-eceipt of mine of the nineteenth of July by captain 
Curtis, who left my head quarters at Sandwich on the 
twentieth of July. I never heard that any duplicate 
of the letter of the eighteenth of June was written to me, 
or that the letter was delayedby any accident; nordo 
I know that any letter was Written to me by the ad- 
ministration, after war was declared, except the one 
of the eighteenth of June, till the ttventy-fourth of the 
same month, when six days had elapsed. A letter 
written at Washington on the eighteenth of June 
might have reached me by express in five days. But 
the letter which was to give me the first information 
of the war, if it left Washington on the eighteenth or 
nineteenth of June, could not have travelled at a 
greater rate than thirty miles a day. 

I think, after this statement, the Court will not say, 
that it was treasonable in me to conclude, that it was 
impossible the administration should have left me ig- 
norant of the war, when it might be known to the 
enemy. 

I beg to direct the attention of the Court to the 
testimony of general Cass upon this point. He had 



16 DEFENCE OP 

a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances, with 
which general Mac Arthur and myself were accjuaint- 
ed. He had seen the letter of the eighteenth of June 
from the Secretary at War, which I received on the 
twenty-sixth. He knew what information general 
Mac Arthur had received from his correspondent and 
from colonel Dunlap. He testifies, that v/hen the 
vessel was despatched from the Miami, he had no rea- 
son to believe that, at that, tjme, IJtnew of the war. 
He had no conversation with me, which could induce 
such a belief. He sent his own baggage and servant 
by the vessel which, on his cross examination, he says 
Tie c^i 'a-inly should not have done, if he had had any 
thought that war then existed^ 

But it appears, that, immediately after the receipt 
of the letter announcing to me the declaration of war, 
I used every possible exertion to recal the vessel. I 
refer the Court on this point to the testimony of cap- 
tain Fuller. This conduct is entirely inconsistent 
with the criminal intentions which are imputed to 
me in respect to this transaction. 

It remains for me to notice that part of this charge, 
which slates, that I put on board the army documents 
and papers, whereby the enemy were made acquaint- 
ed with the force of the army, the designs of the 
government, and with the declaration of war. 

I do not hesitate to acknowledge, that it was im- 
proper to trust the documents which were put on 



GENERAL HULL. 17 

board that vessel to such a conveyance, or even for 
me to part with them in any way, whether in peace or 
war. But I trust it has satisfactorily appeared to the 
Court, from the testimony of captain Hull, that this 
was owing to an accident, which might have hap- 
pened to the most careful commander. I had ordered 
my baggage to be put on board the vessel, not sup- 
posing it possible that the trunk, containing my pa- 
pers, could have been considered by my aids-de-camp 
included in that order, and it was not till after the vesr 
sel had departed, that with equal surprise and regret I 
learnt that my aids-de-camp had, with my baggage, 
shipped a trunk which contained nothing but papers. 
There is one allegation in this charge, that I feel my- 
self authorized to repel with some indignation, because 
I think it could only have been made with a view to 
exculpate others from misconduct at my expense, by 
an attempt to make it be believed, that the enemy de- 
rived a knowledge of the war from the capture of this 
vessel- If this were so. how is it to be accounted for, 
that the enemy should have assailed her in a hostile 
manner before she v/as captured ? 

The Court will recollect, that lieutenant Goodding 
states, that when the vessel was off Bois Banch Island, 
the enemy's armed brig- Hunter bore down upon her, 
and that she was pursued by a batteau from Maiden, 
filled with armed men. But the suggestion, that the 
enemy derived their knowledge of the declaration of 
war from the papers found on board the vessel, is re- 
pelled by the fact, that this vessel had no documents on 
board which couid possibly give them that information. 



18 DEFENCE OF 

SJie could not have had, for 1 had no such documents 
in my possession at the time she sailed from the Rapids 
of the Miami. It is also a fact, M'hich is now notorious; 
that the enemy had received information of the passing 
of the act declaring war, several days before I had any 
communication from Washington on the subject. It is 
as ungenerous as it is unjust, to charge the enemy's 
prior knowledge of the declaration of war to any act 
of mine. 

1 have now closed my defence on this first specifi- 
cation under the charge of treason. And although I 
persist in my olyection to this Court's taking cognizance 
of that crime, yet I have given the charge a full exami- 
nation, because the same facts are specified under the 
charge of unofficer-like conduct. And I shall rely upon 
what I have now said for my vindication against the 
specification which relates to this subject under that 
charge. 

To sustain this charge of treason there are two other 
gpecincations, one relating to the sup])osed delay in at- 
tacking Maiden and the retreat from Sandwich : the 
other to the surrender of Detroit. But as there is a 
repetition of thes^ specifications under the two other 
charges, I shall not now notice them further than to 
observe, that these specifications, under the charge of 
trecson, allege, that the delay, the retreat, and the sur- 
render, were all in pursuance of a traitorous combina- 
tion and conspiracy between me and certain enemies 
of the United States, whose names are unknown. If 
the Court had cognizance of this crime of treason, I 



GENERAL HULL. 19 

could not be convicted, unless the traitorous combina- 
tion and conspiracy were proved. I might ask, where 
is the evidence of any combination or conspiracy be- 
tween me and the enemy ? But I forbear with indigna- 
tion the examination of such a question — And now, 
when the Court has before it all the testimony that the 
utmost efforts of my prosecutors have been able to bring 
against me, I ask them to judge from what malignant 
source the information which could have suggested 
this charge must have been drawn. Some of the wit- 
nesses who have testified against me, must have fur- 
nished the materials, from which the gentleman em- 
ployed by the government to frame the charges must 
have drawn them. They must then have made sug- 
gestions to him, which they dare not attempt to sup- 
port by their own oaths, or by one particle of proof; 
and which could have resulted only from the bitterness 
of their own hearts towards me. 

Pursuant to the arrangement of my defence, which 
I have before suggested, I shall next consider the spe- 
cifications, which charge me with crimes, or miscon- 
duct, in delaying to attack Maiden; in withdrawing the 
army from Canada ; and in making the final surrender. 

There are, as I have said, accusations, which are 
not immediately connected with these transactions, 
and these I shall notice in the course of my defence. 
But if I should satisfy this Court, that these cardinal 
accusations are unsupported, that the measures to 
which they refer were fit and proper, and such as cir- 



20 DEFENCE OF 

ciimstances required ; or if it should now appear, that 
a different course in respect to either of these meas- 
ures ought to have been adopted, yet if I should sa- 
tisfy the members of this Court, that in my conduct 
upon these occasions, I have been actuated by the 
purest motives, and a sense of duty, I trust I shall 
not be judged criminal. I shall not pretend, that I 
may not have erred, but error and crime are not con- 
vertible terms. 

When I accepted a commission from the govern- 
ment, I pledged to them my utmost zeal and ability, 
in discharge of the duties of the office they conferred 
upon me ; and I trust that pledge will not be consid- 
ered as forfeited, though it should appear to this 
Court, that on some occasions my judgment may 
have misdirected me. The profession of a soldier 
would not be longer honourable, if neither the purest 
intentions, nor the most zealous exertions could shield 
him from criminal imputations on the errors of his 
judgment. 

My defence, Mr. President, on these points, as 
well as all others, will be a relation of facts and cir- 
cumstances, and an exposition of the considerations 
and motives which have governed my conduct. 

You cannot, Gentlemen, form a just decision upon 
my case, nor judge of the considerations which have 
influenced my conduct, unless you understand what 
were my views, and the views and expectations of the 



GENERAL HULL, 21 

ex'^ciitive officers of the government of the United 
States, in respect to the north-western army, its rela- 
tions, and objects, when I accepted my commission in 
April, eighteen hundred and twelve. 

I feel some embarrassment, in presenting to you this 
part of my case. I am well aware, that it may be 
said, that I am attempting to exculpate myself by 
censuring others. I well know too, that the political 
feelings of many persons are so sensible and warm, 
that the slightest imputation of misconduct against 
the administration will excite their prejudice, and 
that such prejudices are the more likely to be roused, 
when the charge is made by one, who is prosecuted 
by the administration. But, Gentlemen, I shall say 
nothing pf the officers of the government, which is not 
supported by irrefragable testimony. I shall only pre- 
sent for your consideration facts, which are proved by 
documents before you, and shall make no observations 
upon them, which are not obviously and absolutely 
necessary for my defence. Much less shall I attempt 
to charge the administration with any wilful miscon- 
duct. I believe every member of it to have bepn ac- 
tuated by the purest motives, and the most ardent zeal 
in preparations for and prosecution of an inevitable 
war. A wai\ in which I should never have enlisted, 
had I not believed it both just and nee : ry. And 
while my country is engaged in such . >ntest, let my 
former services to her, let my form- character shield 
me from the suspicion, that I wj^ idd voluntarily say 
one word, that shall lessen the confidence of my 



22 DEFENCE OP 

countrymen in those, under whose auspices our bat- 
tles must be fought, and by whose wisdom and strength 
our misfortunes are to be redeemed, and our honour is 
to be saved. 

But in my own vindication, and in defence of that 
honour, which the government have now put at stan 
I am obliged to say, that the army I commanded \ . 
not that co-operation and support, which, when I : 
cepted my commission, the government gave me r 
son to expect, and without the prospect of whicl . 
should never, v/ith the force that was placed un* ♦ 
my command, have thought of carrying on offensi ; 
operations against Upper Canada; nor even he ■>■ 
placed my army, unless in obedience to orders, in i | 
situation, in which it was, after its arrival on the ^ , 
tei-s of lake Erie. a 

When I accepted the command of the north-wt 
ern army, I did not suppose, that, in the event o 
war with Great Britain, the force of that army wo . 
be adequate to conquer Upper Canada; nor did I 
lieve, that the administration had such an opini 
But on the contrary, I did understand, and such 
will appear was the understanding of the executi 
officers of the government, that in the event of a w 
the operations of my army would be strengthei 
and secured by a competent naval force on laa.. 
Erie, and by the direction of other forces against the 
enemy's territory. 

Had these expectations been realized, instead of 
having lingered out so many months as a prosecuted 



GENERAL HULL. 23 

criminal ; instead of now standing before you as an 
accused, I might still have shared my country's con- 
fidence. 

The foul charges, to which I am now to answer, 

would not have thus blasted the laurels of my youth ; 

?^'^even in the wilds of Canada, and amidst these 

^tened locks, they might have retained their pris- 

e verdure. 

i 

proceed, Gentlemen, to turn your attention to the 

, ;uments, by a reference to which I mean to shew, 

,at were my views and expectations, and what I 

I a right to suppose were the views and expecta- 

, js of the administration, on the subject which we 

. now considering. 

The first paper read by the Judge Advocate w^as a 
norial addressed by me, in eighteen hundred and 
e, to the then Secretary at War. 

Vom this memorial the following is an extract : — ■ 

My residence at Detroit, for four years, has given 
e some knowledge of our northern and western 
ontier, and I take the liberty of communicating to 
Du such facts as have fallen under my observation, 
le opinion I have' formed, and the measures, which 

*"-^3pear to me the most expedient under the existing 

" state of things." 

After a variety of suggestions, and among others, 
that though war should not take place, it would be 



24 DEFENCE OP 

necessary to have a larger force in Upper Canada 
than was then there. The memorial is as follows : — 

" I would likewise suggest, for consideration, the ex- 
'* pediency of building some armed vessels on lake 
*' Erie, for the purpose of preserving the communica- 
" tion. Consider, you have three military posts to the 
" north and west of these waters, and no other com- 
" munication with them." 

It is true, this memorial was written in time of 
peace, but the suggestion, as to the naval force, could 
only be with reference to its use in war. 

I do not know for what purpose this memorial was 
read by the Judge x\dvocate, unless it were to shew, 
of what importance I thought our possession of De- 
troit. Sir, my opinion on that subject has ever been, 
and is yet the same, as expressed in that memorial. 
I thought the administration had the same sentiments, 
and therefore I was the more firmly persuaded, that 
they would have taken every possible means to sup- 
port the army, which was sent for its protection. 
At the moment I was surrendering that fortress, a 
conviction of its great importance increased the 
poignant regret, which I felt for the necessity of the 
measure. 

On the sixth March, eighteen hundred and twelve, 
■which was about a month before I was appointed to 
a command in the army, I addressed another me- 
morial to the administration, which is so important 



GENERAL HULL. 25 

to shew my views, with respect to the force to be di- 
rected against Upper Canada in the event of a Avar, 
that 1 beg leave to read the whole of it. It is in the 
following words : 

€OPY.) 

^^ Washington, March 6, 1812. 

*' SIR, 

"The prompt manner in which you have adopted 
measures for the protection of Detroit, and the other 
settlements in the territory of Michigan, inspires me 
with confidence, that such ulteriour arrangements will 
speedily be made, as the peculiar situation of that 
section of the United States may require. 

" How far the measures already adopted will give 
security to that part of the country, in the event of 
war with Great-Britain, is a subject worthy of con- 
sideration. 

" Officers of a company have been appointed, with 
orders to recruit in the territory. 

" The Secretary, acting as Governour, has been au- 
thorized to make a detachment of four companies of 
militia, and call them into actual service. 

" The commanding officer of Fort Detroit has been 
directed to erect batteries on the banks of the river 
Detroit, for the protection of the town. 

4 



26 DEFENCE OF 

" These, as incipient measures, I very much approve, 
and was particularly pleased with the decisive man* 
ner they were adopted. It must be apparent, how- 
ever, they add no physical strength to that section of 
the country ; the force already there is only better 
organized and prepared to be called into action. The 
comparing of this force with the force which may be 
opposed to us, will evince the necessity of additional 
means of defence, if the country is worth preserving- 

"In the fort of Detroit, I understand by the last re- 
turns, there are less than one hundred regulars. The 
population of the territory is less than five thousand, 
and this population of the territory principally of Ca- 
nadian character. Connected with the post of De- 
troit, and three hundred miles north, is the island of 
iMichilimackinac, where is a fort garrisoned by a 
company of regulars. Near the south bend of lake 
Michigan, on the westerly side, is Fort Dearborn, 
likewise garrisoned by a company of regulars. 

" This is all the force on which we can at present 
calculate, for the safety of our frontier, and for the 
protection of the Indians, which the United States 
are bound by treaties to afford. 

" No support can be derived from the Indian nations, 
even in the event of war, because our officers are in- 
structed to advise them to remain neuter, and not to 
accept their services if they should be offered. 



GENERAL HULL. 27 

*' I will now consider the British force opposed to 
this part of the United States. A fort at Amherst* 
burgh, at the mouth of the Detroit river, garrisoned 
by about one hundred British troops. Another fort 
on the island of St. Joseph's^ at the mouth of the river 
St. Mary's, garrisoned by about fifty British troops. 
Two armed ships on lake Erie, which command the 
waters, and would prevent all communication from the 
States through that channel. A population of at leas! 
fifty thousand in that part of Upper Canada, which is 
connected with the Detroit river and lake Erie, and 
could easily be brought to operate against our settle- 
ments. 

" About four thousand men, principally Canadians, 
employed in the Indian trade and under British in- 
fluence ; and lastly may be reckoned all the Indians 
in Upper Canada, and a large proportion of the pow- 
erful nations residing in the territory of the United 
States, who now hold a constant and friendly inter^ 
course with the British agents, and are liberally fed 
and clothed by the bounty of the British government. 

" It appears, from this statement, that the British 
force which can be brought to operate against us in 
the territory, is more than ten to one, w ithout includ- 
ing the Indians. 

"It requires no ditScult reasoning to determine what 
must be the consequence. That part of the United 
States must fall into the hands of ^e British govern- 



28 DEFENCE OF 

ment, with all the inhabitants, the forts at Chicago., 
Michilimackinac and Detroit, and all the public stores, 
with the public and private vessels on the lake. 
This will give our enemies the entire command of all 
the country north and north-west of the Miami of 
lake Erie; and the settlements on the western part 
of the state of Ohio will be subject to the depreda- 
tions of the powerful northern nations of savages. 
There is nothing in my opinion (in the event of war) 
can prevent this state of things, but an adequate force 
on the Detroit river, opposite to the settlements in 
Upper Canada. 

" It may be asked, how is this force to be placed 
there, and how is it to be supported ? If, Sir, we can- 
not command the ocean, Ave can command the inland 
lakes of our country. I have always been of the 
opinion that we ought to have built as many armed 
vessels on the lakes as would have commanded them. 
We liave more interest in them than tlie British na- 
tion, and can build vessels with more convenience. 
If however there is no intention of the kind, that 
communication must be abandoned until we take 
possession of the Canadas. 

• The army which marches into the country must 
open roads through the wilderness, and the supplies 
of provisions, and whatever else may be necessary,, 
must pass by land through the state of Ohio. 

" If the conquest of the Canadas is the object of the 
Government, they will there have an army in a 



GENERAL HULL. 2& 

proper situation to coinmence operations, and at 
the same time protect the defenceless inhabitants, and 
controul the Indians within our territory. The answer 
pro])ably may be, it is more expedient to leave the 
Michigan territory to its fate and direct the force to 
Montreal. This will prevent all communication by 
the St. Lawrence with Upper Canada, and it must of 
course surrender. In this expectation I think it 
probable there would be a disappointment, if a force 
is not sent sufficient to oppose the British force, which 
may be collected at Amherstburgh and its vicinity. 
Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Chicago must fall. 
The inhabitants must once more change their alle- 
giance, and the Indians become the exclusive friends 
and allies of the king, their great father, 

" In the garrisons at these places they will find large 
quantities of arms and military stores of every kind. 
Upper Canada and our country, of which they v/ill be 
in the possession, will famish them with provisions. 
How then will Upper Canada be conquered, ]3y pos- 
sessing Montreal ? They will be in the quiet posses- 
sion of their country, and a part of ours, and how are 
they to be approached ? You cannot approach them 
by water, because they command the lakes. In ap- 
proaching by land, you must pass through a wilder- 
ness, filled with savages, under British controul, and 
devoted to British interest. — The consequences of 
such an attempt may probably be best learned from 
the history of the campaign in that very country, 
conducted by generals Harmer, St. Clair, and Wayne. 



30 3DEFENCE OF 

In Upper Canada they have a governour, who is a 
major-general in their army, and who commands the 
regular troops, the militia, and the Indians. The whole 
force of the country is therefore combined under 
Ills command, and may be directed to a single point 
without any collision. 

" From the preceding statement of facts and obseF- 
vations it must be apparent, that Fort Detroit and 
the settlements in its neigh]30urhood, and likewise 
Michilimackinac and Chicago, under present circum- 
stances, are in the power of the British, and that their 
possession of them would be extremely calamitous to 
the United States. 

" In the event of peace with England, I am of the 
opinion, that the northern frontier ought to be bett^ 
protected than it is at present. In the event of waK, 
and the object being the reduction of the provinces 
of Upper and Lower Canada, I think it must be evi- 
dent, that the establishment of an army at Detroit, 
sufficient to defend that part of the country, controul 
the Indians, and commence operations on the weakest 
points of defence of the enemy, would be an incipient 
measure, indispensably necessary. With respect to 
the other points of attack, I shall make no observa- 
tions, as I probably shall have no agency in them. 

"In considering this subject, I have endeavoured to 
divest myself of all local feelings, and have grounded 
my observations and opinions on public considerations 



GENERAL HULL. 81 

alone. Two things appear to me to be certain, one 
is, that in the event of war, the enemy will attempt to 
take possession of that country, with a view to obtain 
the assistance of the Indians residing in our territory; 
and the other, that under its present circumstances 
of defence it will be in their power to do it. A part 
of your army, now recruiting, may be as well support- 
ed and disciplined at Detroit as at any other place. 
A force adequate to the defence of that vulnerable 
point, would preverda^war with the savages, and pro- 
bably induce the enemy to abandon the province of 
Upper Canada without opposition. The naval force 
on the lakes would, in that event, fall into our pos- 
session, and we should obtain the command of the 
waters, without the espense of building such a force. 

" The British cannot hold Upper Canada without 
the assistance of the Indians, and that assistance they 
cannot obtain if we have an adequate force in the 
situation I have pointed out. 

" There is another consideration very important. It 
will do more to prevent a general Indian War with 
the Indians, as far west and beyond the Mississipi, than 
any other measure. The Indians cannot conduct a 
war without the assistance of a civilized nation. The 
British establishment at Amherstburgh is the great 
emporium, from which even the most distant Indians 
receive their supplies. A force, at the point I men- 
tioned, would prevent all communication of the Indians 
with that post. Indeed, Sir, in every point of view 



32 DEFENCE OF 

in V, hich the subject can be consitlered, it appears to 
me of the first importance to adopt the measure. 

" I am vpry respectfully, 

"Your most obedient servant, 

"William Hull." 

To this document is annexed a copy of a letter 
from me to the Secretary at War, and the two docu- 
ments are certified as authentic documents in the fol- 
lowing words : *^ 

" Copy of the original on file in the War-office. 

" D. Parker, Chief Clerk." 

Can it be supposed, after this exposition of my 
views of what w ould be the enemy's force and situa- 
tion, that I could ever have taken the command of 
about four hundred regular troops, and sixteen hun- 
dred militia, to effect, by means of such a force, with- 
out any assistance or co-operation, the conquest of a 
province, a part only of which I had represented as 
containing fifty thousand inhabitants? That I could 
have contemplated an attack on an enemy, having at 
its disposal, a body of regular troops, the controul over 
countless savages, and the great advantage of the 
command of the lakes and waters ? This memorial 
was received and approved by the Government. This 
in itself is proof of their adoption of its sentiments, 
and that it was their opinion, as well as mine, that 
in the event of a war, snch an army as was put under 
my command could do nothing offensive, unless y^e 



GENERAL HULL. 33 

had a naval force on the upper lakes; and without a 
co-operation on other parts of the enemy's territory, 
which should distract his attention, and prevent his 
bringing the greatest weight of his power on a single 
point. 

A few days after I was appointed to the command 
of the north western army, I presented another me- 
morial to the President, through tlic War Depart- 
nient, in which I was explicit, as to what might be 
expected from such a force, as I was to lead; as 
to the necessity of reinforcements; of our com- 
manding the lakes ; and of a co-operation in other 
quarters. My draft of this memorial I have lost, in 
the way which I shall hereafter explain. The ex- 
istence of the original, and its general purport, is 
proved by Mr. Eustis, who, in his answ er to the sixth 
and seventh interrogatories, addressed to him, says, 
" I have a perfect recollection of your having present- 
'' ed the memQri|il referred to in the interrogatory. I 
" recollect," he adds, " your attendance, by appoint- 
" ment, at the War Office. The memorial, or that part 
" of it which related to the naval defence of lake Erie, 
" was referred, or communicated, to the Secretary of 
"the Navy, who was present. The brig Adams, 
' which had been employed as a transport, under di- 
" reotion of the War Department, became the subject 
*' of conversation. Whether she was (being tjien on 
" the stocks repairing) actually transferred to the Navy 
" Department, I do not distinctly recollect. If that 
" was the case, the evidence is on record," 



34 DEFENCE OP 

Yet this memorial, or a copy of it, I have never 
been able to obtain. I have applied for it to the Se- 
cretary at War. He referred me to the Secretary of 
the Navy; the Secretary of the Navy to Mr. Dallas; 
to him I applied, and he referred me to the present 
Judge Advocate, who knows nothing of it. 

And finally, when my trial commenced in this 
city, I addressed a letter to the President of the 
United States, requesting him, to interpose his autho- 
rity to procure me a document, which I considered 
so important in my defence. 

It was, Sir, too much for me to have expected an 
answer from the President himself, though the time 
f has been, when such an answer would not have been 
considered as conferring too great an honour. 

The President referred my letter to the gentlemen 
at the head of the War and Navy Dep^ir^ments. They 
also would not condescend to answer my letter, but 
handed it over to their clerks. The elevation of these 
gentlemen seems to have rendered them giddy. I 
ask, would it not have comported Avith the importance 
of the occasion, the decorum due to an old man, and 
a veteran soldier, not yet convicted of any crime, for 
the Secretaries themselves to have addressed me ? 

But in answer to my letter, I received a letter from 
the ChiefClerkinthe War Office, dated twelfth of Fe- 
)3mary, onelhousand eight hundred and fourteen; with 



GENERAL HULL. • 35 

a certificate from the chief clerk in the Navy Depart- 
ment. The letter from the War Office is in the fol- 
lowing words : 

" War Office, February 12th, 1814. 

'' SIR, 

Your letter of the first instant, addressed to the Pre« 
sident of the United States, has been referred to me. In 
answer to which, I have the honour to state, that all 
your communications to the War Department, after you 
were appointed brigadier general in the army, have 
bten transmitted to P. S. Parker, esquire, judge advo- 
cate of the court-martial, now sitting at Albany, togeth- 
er with such others as you had required, as far as they 
could be found on the files of this office. The pub- 
lic records of papers of the War Department have 
been constantly within my observation and charge for 
several years past, and I assure you, Sir, I have 
never s^en or heard of a memoir, pointing out the ne- 
cessity of a navy on lake Erie. 

" Since the receipt of your letter, I have carefully 
examined the files, and inquired of every gentleman 
attached to the Department, without being able to 
give any information on the subject. 

'" I have the honour to be, Sir, 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
" Daniel Parker, C G. 
•brig. gen. william hull, j 

" ALBANY." 5 



30 • DEFENCE OP 

It is unaccountable, Mr. President, that a public 
document of this nature should be lost. That it did 
exist, and was on the files of the War Office, is proved 
beyond controversy, by the deposition of the late 
Secretary at War, who swears that he has a perfect 
^recollection of it. But a most extraordinary part of 
this letter from the War Department, is that which 
states, that the writer has had the public records, and 
papers of the War Department, constantly under his 
charge and observation for several years past; yet, 
that he never knew or heard of a memorial, pointing 
out the necessity of a navy on lake Erie. Mr. Pre- 
sident, it is a fact hardly to be credited, that the copy 
of the memorial of the sixth of March, eighteen hun- 
dred and twelve, from which I made tliat copy which 
I have just read to the Court, is certified as a true 
copy from the files of the War Office, by the very gen- 
tleman, who writes me the letter of the twelfth of 
February. Let me quote from the memorial of the 
sixth of March, or rather from the copy certified as I 
have mentioned above, a passage which is in the fol- 
lowing words : 

" If, Sir, we cannot command the ocean, we can 
" command the inland lakes of our country. I have 
" always been of opinion that we ought to have built 
" as many armed vessels on the lakes as would have 
" commanded them. We have more interest in them 
" than the British nation, and can build vessels with 
" more convenience. If, however, there is no inten- 



GENERAL HULL. 37 

'* tion of tlie kind, that communication must be aban- 
" doned until we take possession of the Canadas." 

When the writer of the letter had certified a copy 
of this memorial but a few days ago, how could he 
say, that he never knew or heard of a memorial point- 
ing out the necessity of a navy on lake Erie ? 

I will not presume. Sir, that tlie writer of the let- 
ter intends an equivocation, and designs that his mean- 
ing shall turn upon the use of the word necessity. 
This I think would not be consistent with the solem- 
nity of the occasion on which his letter is written ; 
nor, Sir, would it serve him : because it is impossible 
to read my memoir of the sixth of March, without 
perceiving, that I do, from the beginning to the end, 
point out the necessity of a navy, in every sense in 
which the word necessity can be applied on such a 
subject. I am very far. Sir, from meaning to insinuate, 
in the remotest degree, that the letter from the Clerk 
of the War Department contains any intentional mis- 
representation. His character and station protect 
him from such a suspicion, and as the memorial which 
proves the inconsistency of the letter has been fur- 
nished, the declaration in the letter could not have 
been made with any sinister design ; and I have only 
trespassed on the patience of the Court with these 
observations on this subject, to shew, that as the me- 
morial of the sixtli of March, eighteen hundred and 
twelve, has been so entirely forgotten at the War 
Office, the eertificate from thence, that a memorial 
5 



38 DEFENCE OF 

pointing out the necessity of a navy on lake Erie, 
was never read or heard of there, is no sort of evi- 
dence that another such memorial may not have ex- 
isted as well as that of the sixth of March. 

The certificate from the Navy Department has heen 
read. It will appear in the minutes, and I shall trou- 
ble the Court with no remarks upon it. 

In respect to this memorial I can now only rest 
upon my own declarations, which I think, when I am 
in this manner deprived of the benefit of the paper, 
I am authorized to make. It did contain a represen- 
tation, in the most explicit and strongest terms, of 
the necessity of our having a naval force superiour to 
the enemy on the lakes ; and that without it, and un- 
less the army I was to command, was strengthened 
by additions to its numbers ; and unless it were fol- 
lowed by detachments, to keep open the communica- 
tion, and insure its supplies from Ohio ; and unless it 
"vvas supported by co-operations, on other quarters, my 
army could not be able to maintain itself at Detroit, 
much less carry on offensive operations in the enemy's 
country. 

That such were the views and sentiments of the 
government as to my expedition, as well as my own, 
and that I was not expected to do more than protect 
Detroit, and that quarter, and to keep in awe the In- 
dians, will further appear, from the facts and docu- 
ments, to ^vhich I shall now refer. 



GENERAL HULL. ff9 

Upon this subject, I beg to turn the attention of 
the court to the testimony of general Porter. It will 
prove, how pressing I was on the subject of a naval 
force, not only with the Secretaries, but with the 
President himself. 

The deposition of captain Charles Steward, of the 
navy, states, that, at an interview he had with the 
Secretary of the Navy, in the beginning of April 
eighteen hundred and twelve, the Secretary informed 
him, " that it was contemplated to give him the com- 
*' mand on the lakes ; that a naval force superiour to the 
" British on the lakes, had been strongly urged by 
" general Hull, as essential, and as a certain means 
" of insuring to the army success." 

I beg the court to notice that it is here stated, that 
I had strongly urged that the command of the lakes 
was essential to success. 

The first letter which I received from the Secretary 
of War, after my appointment, and which is dated 
the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and twelve, 
describes the force which w^as to be under my com- 
mand. The description, of itself, I presume, must pre- 
clude an idea, that it could have been intended for 
invasion or conquest. But its objects are expressed 
in this letter. I am directed, as the commander of that 
force, to " adopt such measures with the chiefs of the 
" several tribes of Indians, as might, in my judgment, 



40 DEFENCE OF 

^'^ appear to be best calculated to secure the peace of 
" the country." 

In the first letter which I received from the War 
Department, dated the eighteenth of June, and which 
was delivered to me on the twenty-sixth of the same 
month, I am directed to pursue my march to Detroit 
with all possible exi)edition ; and the second letter 
from the Secretary at War, of the same date, which 
announced to me the war, gives me the same positive 
command to proceed to that post. If the army I 
commanded, had been deemed competent to carry on 
offensive operations against the enemy without any 
assistance or support, my orders would certainly have 
been of a different nature. 

It would have been left to my discretion, to pur- 
sue such measures as I might have judged most effi- 
cacious. With an army, competent to make an inva- 
sion, Detroit would not have been the point from 
which it should have been matle. 

A station opposite Amherstburgh would have been 
on many accounts a preferable position, but Detroit 
was the proper situation for the army, for the purpose 
of protecting the territory and inhabitants of Michi- 
gan, and of keeping in awe the savage tribes. 

I beg that it may be observed, that I do not pre- 
tend, that it was not contemplated, that the army I 
commanded, when I was appointed to it, might be 



GENERAL HULL. 41 

employed in ofiTensive operations against the British^, 
in the event of a war; but I am endeavouring to 
shew, and I trust shall satisfy the Court, that neither 
myself, nor the officers of the government, ever sup- 
posed it would be competent to act as an ojEfensive 
army, unless it was assisted and supported ; or unless, 
as was supposed might be the case, such a (lefection cA' 
the inhabitants of Canada to the government, and a 
union of the Indians with us, should happen on the 
appearance of my army, as would in a great measure 
destroy the enemy's means of resistance. 

The next letter I received from the Secretary at 
War, is dated the twenty-fourth June, eighteen hun- 
dred and twelve. This letter informs me, that I am 
authorized to commence oflensive operations. This 
would not have been the language addressed to me 
Mpon this occasion, if the government had supposed 
I had a force sufficient to commence such operations. 
In that case I should have received a command in- 
stead of an authority. 

In thi^ letter, the Secretary adverts to my taking; 
possession of Maiden; but not as if he supposed I 
had the power of doing it. I am not to make the at- 
tempt, unless the force under my command, should be 
equal to the enterprise, nor unless I could do it, con- 
sistently with the safety of my own posts. 

The caution, which it is thought necessary to com- 
municate to me, by this letter, to be limited i*i itiy 

5* 



42 DEFENCE OF 

assurances of protection to the Canadians, and the 
notice that it conveys me, that an adequate force 
cannot be relied upon, for the reduction of the enemy's 
posts below, is evidence, that my annj^ was not thought 
sufficient to maintain itself in the enemy's country, 
without assistance and co-operation. 

In my letter to the Secretary at War of the ninth 
of July, eighteen hundred and twelve, which is in 
answer to that I have last mentioned, in which I am 
told, that I am authorized to commence offensive 
operations, I expressed, in the most explicit terms, 
jny opinion of the inadequacy of my force to the 
only offensive operation which could be undertaken 
from that quarter. My words are, " the British com- 
*' mand the water and the savages ; I do not think 
'• the force here equal to the reduction of Amherst- 
" bargh ; you must not therefore be too sanguine." 

I beg the Court to remark, that this letter was writ- 
ten immediately after my arrival at Detroit, and a 
few days before I passed into Canada ; of course be- 
fore I had any knowledge of the fall of Michili- 
mackinac, an event which had so decisive an influ- 
ence on my subsequent operations. 

On the tenth of July, I wfote two letters to the 
Secretary at War, both on the subject of provisions 
for the army. I mention to him in the first, that the 
contractor could not furnish the supplies, on account 
of the lakes being closed against us, by the British 
naval force. In the second letter, I reiterate the 



GENEilAL HULL. 43 

same information; and also inform the Secretary, 
that 1 have made a new contract for provisions, which, 
as they cannot be transported on the lake, must be 
carried on horses from Ohio, through the wilderness. 
My letter concludes with these words ; " The com- 
" munication must be secured, or this army will be 
*' without provisions. Troops will be absolutely ne- 
^' cessary on the road, to protect the provisions. This 
" must not be neglected. If it is, this army will perish 
" by hunger." 

The receipt of these letters is acknowledged by 
the Secretary at War, in his letter to me of the twen- 
ty-sixth of July, eighteen hundred and twelve. To 
this letter, from the War Department, I wish particu^ 
larly to direct the attention of the Court. 

It shews, that the government well understood the 
situation of my army, and how much it stood in need 
®f assistance and support. 

By this letter I am informed, that governour Meigs 
has been directed to furnish troops to guard the road, 
and insure the transportation of provisions; — that 
general Winchester had been ordered to reinforce 
me with fifteen hundred men; — that a force was 
collecting at Niagara ; — that the commander in chief 
would be apprised of my situation, and directed to 
take measures to afford me the necessary support. 

It is not my intention, at this moment, to shew, 
that none of the expectations, which this letter au- 



44 DEFENCE OF 

thorized, were ever realized. I now refer to it, only 
as I have mentioned, to prove, that the officers oi' the 
executive government must have considered my army, 
situated as it was, incompetent to carry on, of itself, 
effectual operations against the enemy. 

In my letter to the Secretary at War, of the nine- 
teenth of July, eighteen hundred and twelve, are the 
following paragraphs : 

" If you have not a force at Niagara, the whole 
force of the province will be directed against this 
army." 

" It is all important, that Niagara should be invest- 
ed — all our success will depend on it." 

There has been read by the Jutlge Advocate, a 
letter from the Secretary of War to me, dated the first 
of August. This letter I never received. It, however^ 
shews no less, on that account, how necessary it was 
thought, that a diversion should he made, in favour 
of the army I commanded. I 'therefore extract from 
it the following paragraph : 

" On the twenty-sixth July, your letters of the se- 
venth and tenth were enclosed to general Dearborn, 
with a copy of mine to you of the twenty-sixth, ac- 
companied with a request, that he would make a di- 
version in your favour. The General must have 
received this letter at Albany. By the mail of this 
evening, yours of the twenty-ninth is enclosed ta 



GENERAL HULL. 45 

him, with an instruction, to make a diversion at 
Niagara and Kingston, as soon as practicable." 

In another letter from the Secretary of War of the 
first of August, he acknowledges the receipt of my 
proclamation to the Canadians. I now refer to that 
proclamation, merely to direct the attention of the 
Court to that part in which I say, that the force I 
commanded was " but the vanguard of a much great- 
er." I do this to shew the confidence I then had, 
that the corps I commanded was to be reinforced and 
supported. 

On the twentieth of August, the Secretary of War 
addressed a letter to me, which T did not receive, but 
from which I here quote a paragraph, to shew how 
necessary he thought co-operation was for my sup- 
port. The paragraph is in the following words : 

" Orders have been given to general Dearborn to 
" attack the enemy's posts at Niagara and Kingston, 
" as soon as may be practicable. Our force at Nia- 
" gara, according to general Dearborn's account, will 
" amount to twenty-four hundred, and he w ill notify 
'' you of such movements and operations, as he may 
-' order," 

It is from these documents, which have all been 
introduced by the Judge Advocate, that I prove what 
I undertook to do, that when I took command of the 
north-western army, it was understood by the ad- 



46 DEFENCE OF 

ministration, as well as by myself, that in the event 
of a war with Great-Britain, my force was to be aug- 
mented ; that my communication with the state of 
Ohio was to be preserved, by troops from that quar- 
ter ; that the lakes were to be commanded by us ; 
and that my operations v, ere to be facilitated by di- 
versions on the frontiers below me. 

The Court will hereafter i)erceive, what an impor- 
tant influence a disappointment in all these particu- 
lars had on the events under consideration ; and will 
not therefore, I hope, think 1 have uselessly trespass- 
ed on their time, by detaining them so long on this 
part of the subject. 

1 cannot, however, omit one farther remark. I 
would ask the Court, if subsequent events do not ex- 
clude a supposition, that the administration did ex- 
pect, that my army was in all events to be of itself 
adequate to the invasion and conquest of the enemy's 
country; unless it be admitted, that there was an 
entire ignorance of what was necessary to accomplish 
these objects ? For we have since seen general 
Harrison, with an army more than quadruple to that 
which I led, for more than a year, threatening the 
enemy on the same point, at which he was invaded by 
my army ; and though ten thousand troops were co- 
operating with him, on the points where I had been 
led to expect co-operation, yet he dared not to set his 
foot on the enemy's shore, till after our glorious naval 
victory on lake Erie, and was then obliged to content 



GENERAL HULL. 47 

himself with the possession of no greater territory 
than his troops coukl cover. 

I must intreat the Court, before I proceed to the 
consideration of other matters, to indulge me with 
the repetition of a remark which is so necessary for 
understanding the subsequent parts of my defence, 
that I am anxious to impress it on their minds. 

It is, that though, as I have said, and I trust I have 
proved, it was understood both by the administration 
and by myself, that the force which I commanded 
would not in all events, in case of war, be competent 
to the invasion and conquest of Canada, yet both 
the officers of the executive government and myself, 
did contemplate, that in certain events, I might, with 
the army which I led, subdue the enemy's posts in the 
Upper Canada. It was contemplated and believed, 
that there would be a very general defection of the 
inhabitants of that province, and that many of them 
would arrange themselves under the American stan- 
dard ; and it was also contemplated and believed, that 
it would be possible for me to draw from them the aid 
of the savages. When I landed in Canada, and pre- 
viously to the fall of Michilimackinac, there was every 
reason to suppose, that these expectations v/ould be 
realized. Until that event took place, of which the 
enemy had notice about the second of August, I had 
those sanguine hopes of success which I expressed in 
my proclamation, and in my communications with 
the War Office. But after that misfortune, the scene 



4S DEFENCE OP 

was entirely changed. From that moment, I saw, 
that although it was possible that I might obtain 
temporary advantages, yet that they would eventuate 
in the greatest disasters, unless I was aided and sup- 
ported from other quarters. 

Thus, Gentlemen, I have endeavoured to shew you, 
that I took the command under the expectation, that, 
in the event of a war, the operations of my army 
would be assisted, by a competent force upon the 
lakes, by detachments to keep clear the communica- 
tion which I had opened through the wilderness, and 
by the co-operation, or at least such a demonstration 
of force against other parts of the enemy's territories, 
as would prevent his directing all his energies to the 
point where I might meet him. But it unfortunately 
happened, that none of these expectations were ful- 
filled. The effects of these disappointments will after- 
wards be considered. 

I now resume my vindication of the measures, which 
form the most prominent features in my accusation ; 
that is to say, the delay at Sandmch ; tJie retreat from 
thence ; and tlu surrender at Detroit. 

It is necessary for me to explain the views and 
intentions I had, when I yielded to the importunities 
of my officers, and crossed to the enemy's country. 

It must be recollected, that the order I received in 
the letter of the eigliteenth of June, which amiounced 



GENERAL HULL. 49 

the war, directed me to proceed to Detroit, and there 
to wait for further orders. 

Finding that an impatience^ to cross had been ex- 
cited in tlie army, which was likely to be extremely 
injurious to my authority, and the discipline of the 
troops, I called a council of war, and laid before the 
officers, the orders by which I w as then boiind ; and 
asked their advice, as to the expediency of crossing. 
The council, notwithstanding my orders, were of 
opinion, that I ought to cross. I did not feel myself 
at liberty to follow their advice, and determined not 
to do so. But on the same day, I received the Se- 
cretary of War's letter of the twenty-fourth of June, 
in which he says, " should the force under your com- 
" mand be equal to the enterprise, consistently with the 
"safety of your own posts, you will take possession 
'•of Maiden, and extend your conquests, as circum- 
"■^ stances may justify." 

I did not think the force, under my command, equal 
to the conquest of Maiden, nor did I think, that with 
such a length of line of communication, as it was re- 
quisite for me to keep open, I ought to make the at- 
tempt. My letter to the Secretary at War, dated on 
this same ninth of July, which I have already quoted, 
expresses this opinion of the incompetency of my 
force, in terms not to be misunderstood. 

Yet, as soon as I had received this last mentioned 
letter from the Secretary, 1 determined to take post 
6 



00 DEFENCE OF 

in the enemy's country. IMy reasons for this deter- 
jnination were, that I hoped thereby to satisfy the 
impatience of my officers, and preserve the confidence 
of my army ; which expressions of discontent were 
likely to impair. — I should command the streights, 
and tliereby prevent the enemy from sending succours 
to their northern posts, or carrying on the important 
trade of their north-western company. 

I knew, that it would have a great effect upon the 
Indians, to shew them the American flag flying on 
both shores; and I hoped, by establishing myself at 
Sandwich, to facilitate and increase the defection from 
the British stamlard, which had manifested itself 
among the inhabitants and militia, and their Indian 
allies. My views, in taking post in the enemy's ter- 
ritory, are expressed in my letters to the Secretary of 
War. In my letter of the ninth of July, I had, as I 
have above mentioned, told him, I thought my force 
incompetent to attack Maiden. In my letter of the 
thirteenth, written from Sandwich, I say, " I consider 
" the possession of tliis bank as highly important ; by 
"erecting one or two batteries, opposite the batteries 
" at Detroit, the river will be completely commanded. 
" In the rear of the army, on the Detroit river, lake St. 
' Clair, and the river Le Trench, is a populous and 
" valuable part of the province. It is likewise pro- 
" bable, when the Indians see the American standard 
" on both sides the river, it will have a favourable 
"effect." I intended, nevertheless, without loss of 
time, to make preparations for putting in a state of 



iJJENERAL HULL. 51 

service my field arlilleiy, for an at lack on Maiden ; 
and whenever that shoukl be ready, and I should find 
tliat the enemj^'s force was not likely to be further 
weakened by desertions, I would make the attack, if 
I had a prospect of co-operation and support from 
below, without which I thought, and I think recent 
events will prove that I thought correctly, I could 
neither preserve my own posts on our side of the 
river, nor that which the enemy then possessed, if I 
should be so fortunate as to Avrest it from him. 

My officers, however, were not less importunate, 
for proceeding immediately against Maiden, than they 
had been to cross the river. 

I felt myself compelled to yield to their importu- 
nity, and had appointed a day for the attack. But, 
before that day arrived, I received intelligence, that 
determined me to postpone the enterprise, and to re- 
cross to Detroit. 

As preliminary to my vindication of these measures, 
it is important to consider, what numerical force I 
could command when I crossed into Canada; its 
nature ; and the probable force and strength of the 
enemy. 

In every stage of this trial, I have felt as a great 
misfortune, the want of that documentary evidence, 
which might be expected from me. This arises from 
the loss of the packet, which sailed from the Miami ; 



:)2 DEFENCE OF 

. and from the more recent loss of all my baggage, and 
most of my papers. When I left Detroit, a prisoner, 
I left my baggage with my daughter, Mrs. Hickman, 
to be carried to mj^ home by her. She soon after 
embarked in the enemj^'s brig Adams, for fort Erie. 

On her arrival there, she was permitted to go to 
Buffalo, leaving her own and my baggage on board 
the brig. The same night the brig was taken by 
commodore Elliot, retaken by the enemy, and burnt 
with all my baggage on board. 

This loss of my documents has left the witnesses, 
who testified against me, to speak on many important 
points, from estimation and conjecture, and they seem- 
ed, to have availed themselves of the liberty, so as 
always to make their estimates such, as would be most 
against me. 1 shall myself be obliged often to speak . 
of numbers from conjecture and estimate, but when I 
do so, I shall endeavour to present to the Court the 
data, on which my estimates are founded. 

Major Jessup, the brigade major, says, that we 
moved into Canada with sixteen or eighteen hundred 
men. Now, neither the Michigan legion, or the Michi- 
gan militia, crossed with the army into Canada. And 
besides, there were, as the Court will recollect has 
been testified by several of the witnesses, a portion of 
the Ohio volunteers who refused to cross. This num- 
ber was about one hundred and eighty. 



GENERAL HULL. 53 

Major Jessup further testifies, " That some time 
"early in August, a few days previous to leaving 
" Canada, he was called into a council of war, to ex- 
" plain a report of brigade, and that there were then 
" eighteen hundred effective men in Canada and at 
^^ Detroit. The Michigan legion were included in 
" the eighteen hundred, Ijut the Michigan militia were 
"not," 

Now, if there were but eighteen hundred belonging 
to the brigade at this time, including all that were 
either with me in Canada, or at Detroit, and includ- 
ing the legion, how could sixteen or eighteen hun- 
dred have crossed with me ? At the time that this 
report of major Jessup's was made, we had lost but 
few of the troops that had crossed; and from the 
amount, which he gives of the whole forces, at that 
time, to ascertain what was the number that crossed, 
must be deducted the Michigan legion, and the Ohio 
volunteers that refused to pass the river. This 'will 
leave an amomit much short of ihe sixteen or eighteen 
hundred, with which, major Jessup says, we passed 
into Canada. 

The Court will remember, that by a muster roll and 
return, made at Fort Findlay on the twenty-sixth of 
June, which has been exhibited by the Judge Advo- 
cate, the whole force which I then had under my 
command, amounted to one thousand, nine hundred 
and fifty,. I was obliged to leave detachments, at 
Mac Arthur's Block-house, at Fort Fiadlay, and at 



54 DEFENCE OF 

the Miami. There were about forty invalids taken 
ill the vessel, that sailed from the Miami. I left 
some sick at the river Raisin, and the whole force 
with Avhich I arrived at Detroit, I am convinced, did 
not exceed fifteen hundred men* And I am confi- 
dent, that the force with which I passed into Canada, 
did not exceed fourteen hundred. What proportion 
of the militia, which I had with me at Sandwich, 
would have been effective to lead against the enemy, 
the Court may judge from general experience. 

Major Van Horn has testified, that when detach- 
ments were ordered, it was always found, that not 
more than two thirds of the command ordered could 
be marched. I do not believe, that at any time, I 
could have led thirteeen hundred effective men against 
Maiden. Of these, there was only colonel Miller's 
regiment, of less than three hundred, that had seen any 
service. The rest were militia, who, though they 
vrere very ardent and patriotic in their expressions 
had had no experience, and neither men nor officers, 
had ever been tried. It is not extraordinary, that I 
should have felt some want of confidence in these 
raw troops, for such a contest, as we must have ex- 
pected before Maiden ; when it appears, by the testi- 
mony of colonel Miller, that their own officers were 
not willing to be responsible for their firmness in an 
assault. Colonel Miller states, tliat in a council, in 
which the propriety of attacking Maiden was discuss- 
ed, at which general Mac Arthur, general^ass, and 
colonel Findlay, were present; "General Hull said-. 



GENERAL HULL. ^ 

if we would answer for our men, he would lead us 
" to Maiden. I told him, I would answer for the men 
" I commanded ; but the others said, they would not 
*' be responsible for their men, but believed they would 
*' behave well." 

I know, sir, that it may be said, that my proclama- 
tion to the Canadians, and my letters to the Secretary 
at War, hold a different language. That in these I 
speak with coniidence of attacking Maiden, and of 
the excellence and sufficiency of my force. And I 
presume the specifications refer to my proclamation, 
and to these letters, when they allege that I had 
declared and avowed my intention of attacking and 
subduing Maiden. I cannot conceive, that these 
declarations could prove me guilty, if my measures 
■without them would not have been so. I do not see, 
that they can in any way be made the test of the 
propriety, or impropriety, of the course I pursued. 
It would be hard, indeed, if every general were to be 
judged criminal, who did not accomplish all the in- 
tentions he may have avowed — this would be a rule, 
which I presume there are mani/ generals would not 
consent to establish. If it were adopted, no change 
of circumstances would justify the relinquishment of 
a design, once formed. 

I think, when it is considered under what circum- 
stances my proclamation was published, it will not 
be thoU§ht just, to adduce it as evidence against me 
on this occasion. I was then in an enemy's country, 
the inhabitants of which were sufficient, independent 



56 DEFENCE OF 

of his regular force, which was establislied near mc, 
and of his Indian allies, to overwhelm the army I 
commanded. I had no prospect of even maintaining 
myself, much less of making conquests ; unless I could 
induce a great portion of those inhabitants to forsake 
his standard. It was incumbent on me to use all 
means to deprive him of aid from the savage tribes. 
I knew that these two objects could only be effected 
by representing myself as having the utmost confi- 
dence in the force I commanded, and that it was able 
to overcome all opposition. With these views I pub- 
lished the proclamation. And, indeed, the force I 
commanded, would have been equal to all I represent- 
ed, had the same spirit of desertion and defection con- 
tinued, which had manifested itself in the enemy's 
country, when we first invaded Canada. 

But unfortunately, before we retreated, all calcula- 
tions founded on this basis had failed. 

In my letters to the War Department, down to the 
latter end of July, I speak with confidence of attack- 
ing Maiden, whenever the field artillery shall be pre- 
pared. But I beg the Court to recollect, that this 
confidence was grounded upon the expectation, that 
I then entertained, that the enemy would be w eaken- 
ed by the desertion of his militia, and the abandon- 
ment of the Indians. In all my letters, which speak 
of the intended attack, I mention also the daily de- 
sertions from the enemy's standard. That Ldid not 
rely on the competency of mj^ own force, till the ene- 
py's should be reduced, must appear from my letter 



GENERAL HULL. 57 

of the ninth of July, to which I have more than once 
referred. 

About the first of August, we received the account 
of the fall of Michilimackinac. On the fourth, I 
wrote a letter to the Secretary, from which the follow- 
ing are extracts. 

" At the time the army under my command took 
" possession of this part of the province of Upper 
" Canada, every thing appeared favourable, and all 
" the operations of the army have been successful. 
"Circumstances have since occurred, which seem 
-' materially to change our future prospects. 

"The miexpected surrender of Michilimackinac, 
" and the tardy operations of the army at Niagara, 
" are the circumstances to which I allude. I have 
" every reason to expect, in a very short time, a large 
" body of savages from the north, whose operations 
" will be directed against this army," &c. 

After these observations, I do not believe, that the 
Court will think, that it is to be justly inferred, either 
from my proclamation, or from my letters, that I con- 
sidered my force under any circumstances, which 
existed before we left Canada, competent to the re- 
duction of Maiden. 

The force of the enemy, lieutenant Forbish states, 
wasj towards the last of July, about one hundred and 



38 DEFENCE OF 

seventy regulars, and five hundred and fifty militia.. 
The Indian force could never be ascertained with 
any precision; it could not have been, less than 
near a thousand. I always supposed the enemy's 
force greater than this information makes it. But 
whatever may have been the force of the enemy, it 
must have been estimated as very considerable, by 
some of my officers, as well as by myself. The Court 
will recollect, that when I made the detachment under 
colonel Van Horn, to the river Raisin, and colonels 
Cass and Mac Arthur remonstrated with me against 
the sufficiency of his force, they each proposed to go 
on that expedition witli his regiment. If the enemy 
had not appeared to be somewhat formidable to them, 
they could never have advised me to make so large 
a detachment as six hundred men, on a service in 
which they could only have expected to meet a small 
part of his force. Colonel Mac Arthur has affi)rded 
other evidence of his opinion of the power of the 
enemy. For when I proposed to leave him, with his 
regiment, on the Canada shore, he charged me with 
having an intention to sacrifice him, by leaving him 
with such a force at that post; although he would have 
been in an entrenched camp with artillery, where he 
would also have had some protection from the guns 
at Detroit, and would be in reach of instant support 
from thence. 

The fort at Maiden, I was well acquainted with. 
In time of peace, I had often been in it. I knew that 
it was capable of being made a place of strength, and 



GENERAL HULL. 59 

fliat, ill contemplation of a war, the British for some 
lime had been using great exertions to put it in the 
best possible state of defence. I knew, that for near 
twenty years, a field officer had commanded, and 
about an hundred regular troops had constantly been 
stationed in it ; and that there always had been a regu- 
lar corps of British artillery attached to the com- 
mand. The question was, whether, with the troops 
I had under my command, so few of whom had ever 
been tried, I was to attempt to carry this fortress with 
the bayonet ? For myself, particularly, when I con- 
sidered, what would have been the consequences of 
an unsuccessful attempt, I had a strong conviction 
that it would be wrong to make the effort, till we 
could have the advantage of heavy artillery. But 
finding that many of my officers, who had seen no 
service, were impatient at delay, and were destroying 
my influence with the army, and its discipline, l}y 
their complaints and censures — for tlieir satisfac- 
tion, and not for my own, nor for my own justification, 
two days after I crossed, that is, on the fourteenth of 
July, I called a council of war, in which it was decid- 
ed, that no attempt ought to be made on Maiden, with- 
out the heavy artillerj^ 

My utmost exertions were then used, to get in 
readiness the two twenty-four pounders, and two how- 
itzers, which were at Detroit. Carriages were to be 
made for them entirely new. Though a delay, in these 
preparations, is one of the charges made against me, 
not a witness has attempted to support it. Indeed, 



60 DEFENCE OP 

Gentlemen, I dare appeal to every officer, who was 
with me, and who is willing to speak the truth, 
whether I did not use all possible means, and make 
all personal exertion, to accomplish, as speedily as 
possiljle, this desirable object. I several times cross- 
ed the river myself, to inspect and hasten the artificers. 
I ordered planks to be taken off my own house, to fur- 
nish a necessary part of the materials for the gun 
carriages. 

Captain Dallaba, in his second examination, states, 
that he received an order to prepare the heavy ar- 
tillery, after the army had crossed to Canada; he 
thinks it was on the fifteenth or sixteenth of July. 
My recollection is, that the order was given on the 
fourteenth, that is, the day afte£_ we crossed ; and on 
the very day that the council of war advised, that the 
attack should not be made without the heavy can- 
non. From that time, it is not pretended there was 
any delay in preparing them for service, and could 
not have been, without the fault of the officer, who 
was trusted with the service. Till we crossed to 
Sandwich, the artificers were employed, as appears 
by the testimony of the same witness, in mounting 
the guns of fort Detroit. I beg the Court also to 
notice the testimony of colonel Miller on this point- 
he says, he saw no want of exertion in preparing the 
artillery. 

The necessary field artillery was not prepared till 
the seventh of August. Two days previous to this, 



GENERAL HULL. 61 

J had called another council. The members deter- 
mined it would be advisable to wait two days for 
the artillery, and if it was not then ready, the attack 
ought to be made without it. I did not concur in this 
opinion. Indeed, the opinion of the officers in this, 
and the former council, appeared to me inconsistent. 
For if, according to the decided opinion of the first 
council, it was then improper to make the attack 
without heavy ordnance, why was it not as necessary 
when the last mentioned council sat ? And if it were 
proper to wait two days for the artillery, according to 
the opinion of the last council, why was it not proper 
to wait longer ? 

It may be said, that between the first and second 
council, the enemy's force had diminished by deser- 
tion. No doubt it had as to numbers. Great part of 
the militia had left them, and many of their Indian 
allies ; but the fort of Maiden retained all its strength, 
and there was no doubt, but that their regular force, 
(of which not an individual had deserted,) and their 
Femaining militia were sufficient to man it. Indeed, 
reinforcements had arrived from Fort George, both in 
the brig Hunter and one other vessel. At this coun- 
cil, I found that nothing would satisfy my officers, or 
the army, but a movement towards the enemy. I felt 
myself obliged to yield to the advice of the council, 
and did, as general Cass has testified, declare that I 
would lead the army against Maiden, as soon as the 
artillery should be completed. 
7 



62 DEFENCE OF 

My opinion was, that an attempt on Maiden should 
never be made until there was an absolute certainty 
of success. This opinion was founded, not only on 
considerations which I shall hereafter mention, but 
upon the orders I had received from the War De- 
partment, in the Secretary's letter of the twenty-fourth 
of June, which I have so often quoted ; and by which 
I was directed not to attack Maiden, unless I judged 
my force was equal to the enterprise, nor unless I 
could do it consistently with the safety of my own 
posts. I thought, by delay, I was every day strength- 
ening the probability of success in the entei-prise, 
because the force of the enemy was daily diminishing 
by the desertion of his militia and Indians. 

But I thought myself bound to delay, till I had 
possessed myself of every possible means of insuring 
success, from a consideration of what would be the 
consequences of a defeat. 

The anny would have been destroyed ; if not by 
the tomahawk of the Indians, they must, after a de- 
feat, have perished for want of supplies. A defeat 
would have been the signal for all the hordes of sa- 
vages in the surrounding wilderness, to fall upon the 
unsuccessful troops. Every path would have been 
filled with these remorseless warriours. But it was 
not only the fate of the army that I anticipated on 
such an event; the horrours that it would let loose on 
the neighbouring country, and throughout our exten- 
sive borders, were presented to my mind, I knew, 



GENERAL HULL. 63 

that if the army I commanded v. ere beaten in battle, 
there would be nothing to restrain the ravages of that 
part of our enemy, which, when a battle is decided in 
their favour, makes the vanquished, and their de- 
fenceless country and people, their prey. 

In the ungenerous letter which colonel Cass wrote 
to the government, (and which, as I think, was most 
unwarrantably published) he seems to think, that 
these are philanthropic considerations, unworthy a 
soldier. But, Sir, though brought up in the field, and 
though I have seen something of the horrours of war, 
I am not yet such a soldier, as that I can think of 
such scenes with indifference. When I considered 
what would be the condition of the territory, over 
which I had so long presided, and over which I was 
then Govemour, in case the force I commanded should 
be beaten in battle, and the inhabitants be left to the 
mercy of the savages, without any stipulation or force 
for their protection, I thought I should deserve the 
heaviest curses, if I risked a battle, before I had taken 
every means in my power to insure victory. 

These were the considerations, that induced me to 
resist the urgency of my officers to move to the attack 
of Maiden, till the eighth of August. It had been 
ascertained on the sixth, that the cannon would be 
ready on the eighth ; and on the sixth I issued an 
order for the army to prepare to move to the attack 
on the eighth. Every thing was in readiness for the 
^nterpi^isie on the seventh. But on that evening, I 



t34 DEFENCE OP 

crossed with the whole army to Detroit, except a de- 
tachment of about three hundred men, under major 
Denny, which was left intrenched at Sandwich, and 
which was also moved over on the eleventh. 

This retreat from the enemy's shore is one of the 
acts of treason, cowardice, and unofficer-like conduct, 
of which I am accused. I proceed to submit to your 
consideration my answer to this accusation, and the 
reasons which then governed my conduct, and which 
I yet believe to have been correct. 

About the first of August, as appears by my letter 
of the fourth, I received an account of the fall of Mi- 
chilimackinac. Lieutenant Hanks, with his men and 
some Indians, had arrived at my encampment. The 
eifect of this great misfortune was immediately seen 
and felt in the vicinity of my post. The Wyandot 
Indians settled at Brownstown, who had previously 
shewn the most friendly dispositions, and given the 
strongest assurances of their neutrality, joined the 
British. For though they passed over under the 
pretence of having been made prisoners, the circum- 
stances which then occurred left no doubt but that 
they had formed an alliance with the enemy. This 
procedure of this tribe of Indians, was not only evi- 
dence of their own, but of the defection of the sur- 
rounding nations, who are all united by some sort of 
confederacy, in which the Wyandots have a superiour 
influence, which is acknowledged by the other tribes, 
speaking of them as their fathers. When, therefore, 



GENERAL HULL. 65 

i learned that this nation had joined the standard of 
the enemy, I knew that the Chippeways, Ottaways, 
Pottawattamies, Munsees, the Shawanees, Senekas, 
and other tribes, who altogether could furnish between 
two and three thousand warriours, would also be an 
addition to his force. 

At the same time I received intelligence, as ap- 
pears by another letter of mine to the Secretary at 
War of the same date, (fourth of August,) that a 
British officer, with fifty-five regular soldiers and two 
brass field pieces, had landed on the west part of lake 
Ontario, had penetrated to the head waters of the 
river Le Trench, and was collecting the militia and 
Indians in that quarter to lead them against my army. 
From the information I had received, I had reason 
to think, and so I mention in my letter to the Secre- 
tary, his force would amount to six or seven hundred. 
The fall of Michiiimackinac also changed the dispo- 
sition of the inhabitants of Canada, and from the time 
that accounts were received of that event, there were 
no more of their militia came over to us. I had also 
been informed of the arrival of the British colonel 
Proctor at Maiden, and it was generally believed, 
that he had brought with him some reinforcements, as 
well naval as military. To the enemy's naval force 
I had nothing to oppose. By it, the enemy might 
command the lake ; obtain his supplies without the 
least interruption ; transport his troops at his pleasure, 
and co-operate with land movements on the margin 

of the waters. I had also intercepted a letter from a 

7# 



66 DEFENCE OF 

Mr. Mac Kenzie, at Fort William, to a Mr. Mac Intosh, 
at Sandwich, dated the nineteenth of July, from 



" The declaration of war reached us on the six- 
*' teenth instant, but we are neither astonished nor 
" alarmed. Our agents ordered a general muster, which 
" amounted to twelve hundred, exclusive of several 
" hundred of the natives. We are now equal, in all, 
*' to sixteen or seventeen hundred strong. One of 
*' our gentlemen started on the seventeenth, with 
" several light canoes, for the interiour country, to 
" rouse the natives to activity, which is not hard to 
" do on the present occasion. We likewise despatch^ 
^' ed messengers in all directions with the news. I 
" have not the least doubt but our force will, in ten 
" days hence, amount to at least five thousand eflfec- 
*' tive men. Our young gentlemen and engagees 
" offered most handsomely to march immediately for 
" Michilimackinac. Our chief, Mr. Shaw, expressed 
" his gratitude, and drafted one hundred — they are to 
" proceed this evening for St. Joseph's. He takes 
" about as many Indians. Could the vessel contain 
*' them, he might have had four thousand more. It 
*' now depends on what accounts we receive from St. 
" Joseph's, whether these numerous tribes from the 
*' interiour will proceed to St. Joseph's or not. 

At the time that this intercepted letter fell into my 
hands, I was informed by lieutenant Hanks, that be* 
fore he left Michilimackinac, several agents of the 



GENERAL HULL. (>7 

north-west territory had arrived at that post, after its 
surrender, from Fort William, on the north side of lake 
Superiour, who stated, that a large force of Canadians 
and Indians were collected at Fort William, ready to 
descend the lakes, and that there was also a force of 
the same description, collected at the outlet of lake 
Superiour. I was further informed by lieutenant 
Hanks, that immediately after the surrender of Michi- 
limackinac, which was on the eighteenth of July, the 
British commander had sent an express to Little 
York ; and it was supposed, that on the return of the 
express, all the forces which had been collected and 
were collecting in the northern regions, would be 
ordered to Maiden. - The death of lieutenant Hanks 
deprives me of the benefit of his testimony. But 
'this is sufficiently supplied by the evidence of Mr. 
Stone, and doctor Day, gentlemen who were at Mi- 
ehilimackinac when it surrendered, and who accom- 
panied lieutenant Hanks to my head quarters at Sand- 
wich, and doctor Day was present when lieutenant 
Hanks made the communication to me. 

It may be said, that this information ought not to 
have had any influence upon my conduct, because 
the northern Indians could not, and in fact did not 
arrive in a great length of time. 

I presume that no testimony is wanting to prove 
to this Court, that from the points where they were 
collected, they might have descended in a very few 
days. The savages of our country have an advan- 



68 DEFENCE OF 

tage of ail other troops, in the celerity and facility 
with which they make their movements. These too, 
were to be aided by the means of the north-west 
company, which were particularly adapted to trans- 
portation, from the nature of their trade upon the 
waters of the lakes. 

As to the fact, that the northern savages did not 
arrive at Maiden till long after the surrender. < — • 

The testimony of captain Eastman is, that he re- 
Tiiained at Detroit twenty-four days after the capitu- 
lation; that the Sagganau Indians, with about sixty 
warriours, arrived three days after the surrender ; that 
the Michilimacldnac Indians, with about eleven or 
twelve hundred warriours arrived about the tenth or 
eleventh of September. It may be well to remark 
here, how formidable this force proved to be, although 
it was but a small portion of that which would have 
come, had not Detroit been surrendered. But can it 
be concluded that this force would not have arrived 
earlier, had not intelligence of the fall of my army 
reached them, which it must have done a few days 
after the event happened ? When information of so 
many adverse circumstances had reached me from 
various quarters, the fate of my army appeared in- 
evitable. I had but one of two courses to pursue, and 
either seemed to me almost a desperate alternative. 
I must either advance or retreat. If I had seen 
nothing that I was to regard, but the power of the 
enemy, I had no doubt but that I ought to have 



GENERAL HULL. 6§ 

adopted the former expedient. I was obliged to con- 
sider the effect a retreat would have in my own camp. 
The young and inexperienced officers I had under 
my command, who could see no danger that was not 
immediately before their eyes ; who thought and said 
that they were very brave, but with a few exceptions, 
do not know it to this day from any trials of their 
courage; who despised all precaution, and thought all 
generalship consisted in inconsiderate and impetuous 
advances — I knew well, would pursue the conduct 
which they afterwards did, and, by representing a re- 
treat as proceeding from the most unworthy and un- 
justifiable motives, destroy the efficiency of the army, 
by robbing me of its confidence. The cabals, which 
had risen to such a height as to mature a plan of mu- 
tiny, in which my chief officers were to be the ring- 
leaders, could not be entirely concealed from me; 
although, till I saw the confession published to the 
world, by one of the conspirators, I did not know the 
extent of their design. 

Under these awful circumstances, dangerous as the 
attempt on Maiden appeared to me to be, I thought 
it might be less so, than a retreat. I determined to 
attack Maiden, and on the sixth of August issued 
orders to have every thing prepared for the move- 
ment of the army on the eighth. And, Gentlemen, 
there is no part of my conduct, since I ha^^e been a 
soldier, that I reflect upon with so much self conviO' 
tiou of errour, as \ do upon this. 



/O DEFENCE OP 

I look back with regret upon the moment when I 
yielded to the councils of the inexperienced officers 
I commanded, and determined to make an attempt, 
^vhich my own judgment did not approve, which was 
contrary to all military knowled3i;e, and which even 
success might not justify. I thought, however, it was 
possible, that if I were successful, and should possess 
myself of the enemy's fortress, I might possibly main- 
tain mj^self there for some short time ; and in that time 
I hoped I might have some succour and security from 
my own country, and her armies, that I had been led 
to expect would be operating below me. 

On the seventh of August every thing was in rea- 
diness for the intended movement, but on that day 
at about one o'clock, an express arrived Avith letters 
to me from the commanding officers on the Niagara 
frontier, two from major-general Hall, and the other 
from general P. B. Porter. These letters were sent 
to me by express, to inform me, that a large force from 
the neighbourhood of Niagara were moving towards 
my army. But what was more decisive in its influ- 
ence on ray measures, was, that I learned from those 
letters, that I was not to expect that these movements 
of the enemy were to be checked, or that my army 
would be sustained, by any operations against the 
enemy in any quarter. I found that the invasion of 
Canada, and the whole war, was to be carried on 
by the three hundred regular troops under colonel 
Miller, and the twelve or fourteen hundred militia, 
which bad been placed under my command. I must 



GENERAL HULL, It 

liere again beg leave to turn the attention of the 
Court Martial to the correspondence between the 
Secretary at War and mj^elf, to remind the Court 
Martial of the reasons I had t6 expect supplies, as^ 
sistance, and co-operation, when I took the command 
of the north-western army. When I received these 
letters from generals Hall and Porter, my situation 
became embarrassing and distressing to a great de^ 
gree. I had but a few hours before, w ith w hat re- 
luctance appears from the testimony of general Cass, 
yielded to importunities of my officers, and given 
them expectation, that I would lead the army against 
Maiden. I had issued orders for making the neces- 
sary preparations, and fixed a time for the movement* 
I knew well what would be the effect of disappoint- 
ing the expectations which those measures had rais- 
ed. But as general Mac Arthur has testified, I told 
him, as commander of that army, I felt myself res- 
ponsible for its moveinents, and its fate. Under an 
awful sense of that responsibility, I determined to 
recross the river, with the greater part of the army. 
In making this movement, I had no design of relin- 
quishing the attack of Maiden. My intention was to 
take post at Detroit, and there to wait until some na- 
val force on the lake, and a co-operation from below, 
uhich, from the beginning, I had relied upon, and 
which the letters I had received from generals Hall 
and Porter gave me reason to expect, would com- 
mence at some future but probably distant period-, 
afforded some hopes of success, and of advantage 
from success. My forlher intention \wo3- to concen- 



T2 DEFENCE OF 

trate my forces at Detroit, that I might from thence 
open and secure my communication with the state of 
Ohio; upon which, in my judgment, the salvation 
of the army depended. This consideration had so 
much influence on my measures, not only at this time, 
but throughout the campaign, and in the final surren- 
der, that it Avill be proper to present it to the Court, 
in such a view, as that they may judge of its impor- 
tance. 

From Urbana to the Miami of the lake, is a per- 
fect wilderness. Through this wilderness^ a distance 
of a hundred and twenty miles, and through a countiy 
of which the Indians were the inhabitants and pro- 
prietors, the army had to cut a road, when they ad- 
vanced ; and it was the only road by w hich supplies 
of any kind could be received. From the Miami to 
the settlements on the Detroit river, the country is 
little better than a wilderness, there being only two 
or three little settlements. Along the Detroit river 
the country is partially cleared and cultivated. The 
improvements extend from half a mile to a mile 
back from the river, and in part of these improve- 
ments, on the margin of the streights, is the road to 
tlie town of Detroit. The whole country from Ur- 
bana to the town of Detroit is filled with savages, 
all of whom, with very unimportant exceptions, be- 
came hostile to us, and infested every part of the 
road which w^as not protected by an armed force. 
From the Miami to Detroit, a distance of seventy- 
two miles, the road runs so near the waters of lake 



GENERAL HULL. . 73 

Erie, and of the streiglits, that the enemy having the 
command of those waters, could, with the greatest fa- 
cility, transport from their shore, and from one point 
to another, detachments to intercept the communi- 
cation. Their vessels too, would always afford them 
a secure retreat, in case of disaster. There were, in 
the whole Michigan territory, less than five thousand 
white inhabitants ; about two thousand of whom were 
settled along the Detroit river. The soil, thougli 
fertile, was but little cultivated : the inhabitants 
greatly relying for their support upon the supplies of 
fish and venison, which the woods and waters afforded. 
The territory has never furnished sufficient provi- 
sions for its ov/n inhabitants ; there are annually, as 
appears from the testimony before you, large quanti- 
ties of pork and beef brought in from the state of 
Ohio ; and, notwithstanding the testimony of some of 
the witnesses, I assert, that at the time the army was 
in that quarter, they could not have taken the neces- 
sary supplies from the country for any length of time, 
without distressing the inhabitants. It has been 
proved, that even in time of peace the few troops 
who were stationed at Detroit were fed by supplies 
from Ohio. The country must afford insufficient 
provisions for an army, or there could be no necessity 
for furnishing general Harrison from the western 
states, at the immense expense, which his supplies 
have cost. The testimony of general Mac Arthur 
affords some evidence of the state of the country in 
respect to provisions. He stated that from the morn- 
ing of the fourteenth of August, when he marched 



74 DEFENCE OF 

from Fort Detroit with a detachment, till the sixteenth, 
when they met with and killed an ox, in a march of 
near thirty miles, he saw nothing that was food for 
man, except some unripe corn and some honey. The 
opposite shores of the enemy were not more produc- 
tive in supplies. The whole of the country border- 
ing on the streights and on the lake, is a wilderness, 
except the settlement at Amherstburgh, and a very 
thin population on the banks of the Detroit river, 
and a small place on lake Erie, known by the name 
of the New-settlement. Above, on the river Trench, 
at about the distance of sixty miles, is the most fruit- 
ful and valuable part of the country. Independent 
of these settlements, which had been exhausted by the 
two armies, the whole is wilderness. After the fall 
of Michilimackinac, when all the hives of northern 
Indians became hostile, and were let loose upon us, 
when the north-west company, as appears by the let- 
ter of Mr. Mac Kenzie, had arrayed against us their 
numerous retainers, and when the navigation of the 
upper as well as of the lower lakes was free to the 
enemy, no supplies could have been obtained from 
the river Trench, or the bordering country. 

It must be remarked, that from the time the army 
arrived at Detroit, not one pound of provisions had 
been received. From the moment the declaration of 
war was known to iiie enemy, he had intercepted the 
only line of communication, and thus cut off all sup- 
plies. 



GENERAL HULL. 75 

It appears from a return made outhe day the army 
arrived at Detroit, and -which is mentioned in the 
minutes of a council of war, held on the ninth, tliat 
there were then in store 

125,000 rations of flour, and 
70,666 rations of meat. 

This stock, as it was never replenished, must have 
been proportionately exhausted, at the time of the re- 
treat from Canada, and at the time of the final surren- 
der. And, indeed, would have been entirely so, 
had we not drawn, as far as we could, our supplies 
from the country, which every day became the more 
stripped, and the less able to afford them. 

A return made to me by the contractor, on the 
twenty-fifth of July, shews not only the quantity of 
provisions on hand at that date, but it shews, by a 
comparison with the return of the ninth of the same 
month, the rate at which the provisions were con- 
sumed. This return has been proved and read in 
evidence. It is as follows : " Provisions on hand at 
" Fort Detroit, twenty-fifth of July, eighteen hundred 
'- and twelve — 

" 70,000 rations flour, 
" 21,000 salted meat, 
" 100,000 whiskey." 

It has been said by generals Cass and Mac Arthur, 
and by other witnesses, that they never heard com- 



76 DEFENCE OF 

plaints of a want of provision. This is certainly tine. 
There was not, previously to the surrender, an actual 
want or deficiency of provisions. Our stores were 
not then entirely exhausted; but there was a certain- 
ty that they would soon be so. 

Such then was my situation when I determined to 
retreat from Canada. I had above me hordes of hos- 
tile savages. I had below me an enemy in a fortress, 
which I believed to be a work of strength, and suf- 
ficiently manned for its defence. I found that he had 
been left at liberty to augment his force, by drawing 
'his troops from all other points. I commanded an 
army, the troops of which (except a few regulars of 
the fourth regiment) had no experience, and had never 
been tried ; and this army was otficered by men, the 
chief of whom had not hesitated to express, in the 
most indecent terms, his want of confidence in me. I 
vvas told, that I must not expect any co-operation or 
assistance ; I saw that my provisions would be soon 
exhausted, and that neither my own nor the enemy's 
country would afford supplies for any length of time. I 
saw that my only communication was cut off, and 
unless it were opened the army would be subdued by 
want. 

Under these circumstances, I determined to recross 
the river, take the principal part of the army, not 
with an intent, as I have said, to relinquish the en- 
terprise against Maiden and the Upper Province, but 
to writ for a co-operation and assistance, which might 
afford more favourable prospects, and in the me?\n 



GENERAL HULL, 77 

iinie, Avhicli I considered a duty of the first impor- 
tance, to open the only communication by which I 
coukl obtain supplies. An attack on Maiden was an 
alternative, which, as I have said, presented itself to 
my mind. It was one which I had the most powerful 
inducements to adopt. I well knew what rewards of 
honour and glory awaited an achievement, which my 
country had been led to expect with so much certain- 
ty and anxiety. I knew what were the expectations 
of my officers, and what resentment a disappointment 
would create. I knew a retrograde movement would 
expose me to censures, and to the malice of my ene- 
mies; but in deliberating on this alternative, I could 
not but take into view the possibilitj^ of a defeat in 
the attempt, and the consequences which, as I have 
before mentioned, would result not only to the arm}'', 
but to the people of the territory. A more decisive 
consideration, however, induced me to reject this al- 
ternative. I then felt confident, and I do naw feel 
most confident, that if I had attacked Maiden, and 
had been successful, it would have been but a useless 
waste of blood. It would have been utterly impossible 
to have maintained the fortress. It must have fallen 
for w^ant of supplies. It must be remembered, that the 
waters of the lakes were shut against us. There could 
have been no possible communication with the fortress^ 
but, by the road which I had cut through the wilder- 
ness. How was that road to have been kept open ? 

Most probably, after an engagement, cr after car- 
lying the works by storm, I could have taken into 
8* 



78 DEFENCE OF 

Maiden but a few hundred men. Could I have 
made sufficient detachments from the garrison, to have 
performed this service ? Let it be remembered, that 
generals Mac Arthur and Cass censured me for send- 
ing so small a detachment as two hundred men in this 
duty ; and thought the force ought to have been 
double or equal to one of their regiments. And when 
colonel Miliar, with six hundred men, two hundred 
and eighty of wb.om were almost the whole of the 
regular force under my command, had defeated the 
enemy near Maguago, he thought it necessary to send 
to me for a reinforcement of one hundred and fifty, or 
two hundred, to enable him to secure his passage to 
and from the river Raisin, though his loss in the bat^ 
tie did not exceed eighty, and though he knew at the 
river Raisin he was to be joined by the detachments 
under captain Brush, and the companies under cap- 
tains Campbell and Rov.land. 

If the road could have been opened, still no sup- 
plies could have passed into the fort, without crossing 
the water, and on that the British had a force, to 
which we had nothing to oppose. If we had possess- 
ed the fort, it would have been pressed by the north- 
west company, and its retainers from the north, with 
all the hosts of savages of those regions. A British 
force no doubt \Vould have approached it from lake 
Ontario, by the river Le Trench. On the water it 
Vr'ould have been attacked by tlie naval force, and all 
this it m (St have encountered, without the possibility 
of obtaining supplies, and wiliiout the least prospect 
of relief or assistance. 



GENERAL HULL. n 

My judgment, Mr. President, may mislead me now, 
as it did then ; but yet I think, that if I had led t)te 
army I commanded to the conquest of Maiden, under 
such circumstances as I have stated, it woiiid have 
been as great a crime as any of which I am accus- 
ed. Certain I am, that I should have wanted that 
consciousness of having acted from the purest motives, 
and according to my best judgment, which has been 
my only consolation in all I have suffered. 

If it be true, as I have stated, and as I think the 
testimony proves, that my army had not provisions 
for any length of time, and that neither my own, nor 
the enemy's country would have been capable of fur- 
nishing them, I need hardly state to the members of 
this tribunal, how important it was for me to keep 
open the road I had made through the wilderness, the 
only communication by which supplies could appi;oach 
me. 

In modern warfare, the first great object of each 
contending party, is the resources of his enemy. The 
fate of armies is found to depend upon the abundance 
of their resources, on their security, and in the facility 
of keeping up a communication with them. It has be- 
come a principle to manoeuvre in such a manner, as to 
cover the places from whence supplies may be drawn; 
not to go far from them, but with great caution, and ne- 
ver to cease preserving with them those connections, in 
which the strength of an army consists, and on which 
its success depends. These are the sentiments of a 



80 DEFENCE OP 

modern military writer of great celebrity. The ex-* 
perience of all military movements in latter times, 
proves their correctness. I always felt the force of 
them. It was a great violation of these principles, 
and therefore as I considered a great mistake, to 
march the army I commanded, after the war had 
commenced, to Detroit, leaving a British garrison 
eighteen miles in our rear, directly upon our line of 
communication, which from its proximity to the lake, 
and his force upon the water, the enemy had the 
means of intercepting with peculiar facility. But the 
orders I received in the letter of the Secretary of 
War, which announced to me the declaration of 
war, w^ere positive upon this point. They left me 
no discretion. I was to march to Detroit, and there 
to wait for further orders. I had seen the necessity of 
keeping open the communication, Avhen I w as on the 
march, and therefore I built and garrisoned block- 
houses on the road. When in the enemy's country, 
I felt every day, more strongly, the force of this ne- 
cessity, and therefore detached major Van Horn on 
that service. Whether that was a proper detachment, 
as it is made a separate charge, will be a subject of 
separate consideration, in a subsequent part of my de- 
fence. After the defeat of major Van Horn, and 
when I found the situation of my army immediately 
before I left Sandwich, such as I have before describ- 
ed, I was perfectly convinced that no success, not 
even the capture of Maiden, could save it from even- 
tual destruction, if my communication with Oliio was 
not opened. 



GENERAL HULL. 81 

The Court will recollect, that general Mac Arthur 
and general Cass have stated in their testimony, that 
when they objected to the sufficiency of the force I de- 
tached under major Van Horn, they each recommended 
that I should send him with his regiment on that duty. 
This shews what force, in their estimation, was ne- 
cessary for the purpose. What force colonel Miller 
thought necessary, I have already stated. If these 
gentlemen were correct on this point, my army could 
not be in a proper situation, when I must have 
stretched back with nearly half and the most etficient 
part of my command, to insure me supplies. It must 
be recollected also, that it was not a temporary de- 
tachment, that would have answered any purpose. I 
must have kept always separated from the army, a 
sufficient force to have kept open the road from De- 
troit to Ohio, a distance of about two hundred miles, 
I do not believe, that after the fall of Michilimackinac, 
when the savages became arrayed against us, and in- 
fested every part of the road, that my whole force 
would have been sufficient to have protected so ex- 
tensive a line. 

These, Gentlemen, were the grounds on which I 
made a retrograde movement, with a part of the army, 
to Detroit. It was from thence to open the only 
channel, through which it could derive the means of 
its existence. I repeat, my judgment may have mis- 
led me. If it did, it continues yet to mislead me ; 
for every day that I have lived I have become more 
coaMent, that I did right to leave the enemy's coun» 



82 DEFENCE OP 

fry. Had I followed the dictates of my own judg- 
ment, I should have made my retreat to the Miami 
and there waited for co-operation and assistance. The 
distance from thence to the Ohio would have been 
^ comparatively short ; I should have had no enemy 
in my rear but scattering savages, and he could not 
then have availed himself of the great advantage he 
derived from the command of the waters. 

For the reason that I did not do so, let me appeal 
to the testimony of the two officers next in command. 

When I proposed this measure to colonel Cass, his 
answer was, that if I did under the then existing 
circumstances, every man of the Ohio volunteers 
would leave me. His language in substance was, as 
he states it himself, that the volunteers would retreat 
with me, if they thought a retreat necessary. But as 
they undertook to judge, that it was not then necessa- 
ry, they would leave me and not a man would retreat 
under my command. Colonel Cass's testimony on 
this subject is in the following words : " I recollect a 
"conversation with general Hull, after the retreat 
'* from Canada, and before we went to the river Rai- 
"sin, in which general Hull suggested, that as he 
" heard of no co-operation from below, it might be 
" necessary to take post at the Miami. I think I told 
" general Hull, that, if under existing circumstances, 
" he took such a step, the Ohio militia would desert 
" him to a man. Whether I told general Hull so or 
'' not, I am confident it would have been the case." 



GENERAL HULL. 83 

It may be well to remark, that this testimony of 
colonel Cass is evidence of the insubordination that 
was among the troops. By whom, and by what 
means, it had been encouraged, the Court may judge. 

Upon this part of the subject, that is to say, the re- 
treat from Canada, I have but a few words more to 
say. I retreated for the purpose of being enabled to 
take effective measures for opening my communica- 
tion. The importance of accomplishing this design, 
I have endeavoured to shew. But it seems that the 
government, or whoever it may have been that drew 
the charges, that are now before you, were also sensi- 
ble of this importance ; for one of the accusations, that 
I am to answer, is, that I did not keep open this com- 
munication, and yet the measure I took to accom- 
plish this object, and which was the only measure 
that afforded any prospect of success, that is to say, 
withdrawing the army from Canada, is also made a 
ground of crimination. 

I beg the Court to notice, that these reasons for the 
retreat are such as I assigned for it at the time, as well 
as now. For the evidence of this I refer to my let- 
ters to the Secretary at War of the fourth and eighth 
of August. My letter to governour Scott, of the 
ninth of August, and my letters to governour Meigs 
and colonel Wells of the eleventh of August, all 
shew, that I abandoned Canada because I had as- 
certained that I should soon be surrounded by an 



84 DEFENCE OP 

overwhelming force ; because my commmiication, if 
I remained where I was, would inevitably be cut off; 
and because I found that the few regulars and militia 
I commanded, were to be left to carry on, without any 
assistance or co-operation, the offensive war, which 
the United States had declared against one of the 
most powerful nations on earth. 

It appears, that the view which my officers had of 
our situation, about the time of the retreat and sur- 
render, was very different from what it would appear 
to have been, from the testimony they have given 
before you ; at least, this observation applies to ge- 
neral Cass. The testimony of Mr. Silliman, (the 
general's brother-in-law,) of Mr. Mills, and of Mr. 
Converse, his neighbour, proves, that in letters writ- 
ten by him, at the times to which his testimony re- 
lates, he had different sentiments from those he ha& 
here expressed. 

In a letter of the third of August, at which time 
we were in possession of the enemy's territory, and 
all the resources that might be drawn from thence, 
general Cass tells Mr. Silliman, that provisions would 
become necessary for the existence of the troops. 

In a letter to Mr. Silliman after the fall of Michili- 
mackinac, general Cass says, that the impression made 
by the fall of Michilimackinac could scarcely be con- 
ceived. In the same, or some other letter, according 



GENERAL HULL. U 

lo the testimony of Mr. Sillirrian, general Cass pressed 
him to use Ms influence to procure reinforcements for 
the army, and expresses his surprise, that we were 
left without co-operation, by putting to his correspon- 
dent the following interrogation : " Is there nothing 
*' to be done in the lower end of the lakes, to make a 
•^ diversion in our favour ?" In a letter from general 
Cass to the same gentleman, dated on the twelfth of 
August, general Cass says, " think our situation as 
' bad as you may, it is still worse." 

It is most unfortunate for me, that I have in the 
course of this prosecution so often to feel the want of 
documents. I want to prove the contents of a me- 
morial, v/hich was tiled on record in the War Depart- 
ment. I ask for the record, and it is lost. I am im- 
peached for not having regularly issued orders to the 
army. The witnesses who are to support this charge 
prove, that there were orderly books in v/hich my or- 
ders were entered ; but they have either been lost, or 
what is more extraordinary, left at home. Captain 
Mac Commick has an orderly book, but when he was 
called here as a witness, he left his book behind him. 
Other officers seem very unaccountably to have 
thought the order to ship their baggage at the Miami 
included their orderly books, and they have been lost 
by that means. And now these letters from genera! 
Cass to Mr. Silliman, the contents of which it might 
be so important to me to contrast with the General's 
testimony, it appears, were intrusted to tlie General's 
■ivifc, and they too have been lost, 
9 



86 DEFENCE OF 

But I ask the Court, do not even the slender ac- 
founts which we have had of the contents of these 
letters shew, that general Cass, at the time they were 
written, did believe that the army would be in want of 
provisions ? — that reinforcements were necessary ? — 
<hat tlie foil of Michilimackinac was to have a decisive 
operation on the fate of the army ? — that our hopes 
rested on co-operation from below, and that the situ- 
ation of the army was critical in the extreme ? — If 
these were general Cass's sentiments, when he wrote 
the letters, I must leave it to the Court to reconcile 
them to the testimony he has given. 

Tie surrender of the fortress of Detroit, and of the 
forces in the Michigan territory under my command, 
is another charge, against which I am now to defend 
myself. I beg the court to observe, that the course I 
am pursuing, is to examine, in the first instance, the 
propriety or necessity of these principal measures ; 
the circumstances attending their accomplishment be- 
ing ground of distinct accusation, I propose to give 
them distinct considerations. 

As to the point, on which I am now about to make 
my defence, I must beg the Court to bear in mind 
what I have said in relation to the delay in attacking 
Maiden, and to recrossing the river ; much of what I 
have said upon these subjects will be applicable to the 
cli^arge now^ under consideration. The same facts are 
reiterated in the specifications in so many different 
forms, tliat it is difficult to analyze them, and might 



GENERAL HULL. 87 

excuse repetition. But I shall endeavour, as much as 
possible, to avoid trespassing on the patience of the 
Court ; and shall not repeat what I have already said, 
further than may be absolutely necessary to make my- 
•self clearly undei-stood. 

The extent and state of the force under my com- 
mand, at the time of the attack on the fifteenth and six- 
teenth of August, must be ascertained, before my con- 
duct can be duly appreciated. The detachments under 
colonels Mac Arthur and Cass, consisting of four hun- 
dred of the most eifective men of their regiments, were 
absent on the expedition to the river Raisin. 

On the morning of the sixteenth, the brigade major 
Jessup, as appears by his cross examination, had, by 
my order, made a report of the effective men under my 
command. He stated the number, as appears by a 
document before you, in the three Ohio regiments, to 
be seven hundred, including the Michigan legion and 
waggoners, but not the Michigan militia. The arm- 
ed inhabitants which some of the witnesses have 
mentioned, I presume were not intended to be includ- 
ed, and indeed should not have been. For although it 
may have been agreeable to the disposition of some 
who have testified in this cause, to mention them here, 
that they might swell my numbers in the eyes of the 
Court, yet I believe it will not be thought, that I 
ought to have taken them into calculation in estimate 
ins: mv means of defence. In the field thev wer*i 



88 DEFENCE OF 

only likely to be the first to set an example of disor- 
der, and in a siege they would only have increased 
the consumption of provisions. 

Major Jessup says, that on the fifteenth he received 
an estimate from one of the adjutants of the number 
of men fit for duty. He thinks it exceeded one thou- 
sand. This estimate was not delivered to me, but wa» 
given to general Cass the day after the battle, for what 
purpose does not appear. I wish general Cass had 
produced it on this occasion. 

Of the one thousand, if there were so many effec- 
tive, only three hundred and twenty were regulars j 
that being major Snelling's estimate of the effective 
force of the fourth regiment on the day of the surren- 
der. The rest of this thousand consisted of the Ohio 
vohmteers and Michigan militia. In my letters to 
the government, and in my official account of the 
unfortunate termination of the expedition under my 
command, I have always spoken of the zeal and 
bravery of these troops, in terms of respect; and I still 
think they merited all I have said of them in these re- 
spects. Yet, in estimating their probable services in 
an arduous conflict, I could not but consider their real 
character. My experience in the revolutionary war 
had fixed in my mind a mistrust of the services of un- 
disciplined militia, however ardent and valorous they 
might by language, and even by actions, when not 
liefore the enemy, make themselves appear. Indeed 



GENERAL HULL. 89 

?iie organisiation of the militia corps I had with me 
was particularly calculated to create distrust with re- 
spect to them. All their officers held their commis- 
sions in virtue of an election, mediate or immediate, 
of the men of whom they were the nominal comman- 
ders. My second in command, colonel Mac Arthur, 
lias prefaced his testimony, by telling you that at such 
a time he was elected colonel. 

Colonel Van Horn was elected major ; Mr. Mac 
Commick was elected a lieutenant. From what sta- 
tions or what occupations these gentlemen were elect- 
ed to high military rank, I do not know. It would 
seem, however, that notwithstanding all the experi- 
ence they have had in the field, they have not yet 
learned even military language ; or forgotten what 
were probably the phrases of their former occupa- 
tions. 

General Mac Arthur, in describing the disposition 
he intended to make of his regiment in case of an 
attack, spoke as he would of the gate of a cow-pen — 
of swinging it into the rear line of a hollow square. 
And most of the witnesses against me have spoken 
of the balance of a detachment, as they would of the 
foot of an account in a shop book. Elected officers 
can never be calculated upon as great disciplinarians. 
In every station, the elected will be umvilling to in- 
ciu' the displeasure of the electors. Indeed, he will 
often be found to court their favour, by a familiarity 
and condescension, which are totally incompatible 
9# 



m DEFENCE 01? 

^vith military discipline. The man who votes his 
olficer his commission, instead of being implicitly 
obedient, as every soldier ought to be, will be dispo- 
sed to question and consider the propriety of the offi- 
cer's conduct, before he acts. This system has not 
only an injurious effect upon the soldiers, but it has a 
retro-active effect upon the officers. They, knowing 
how far they are responsible to their electors, and 
what deference is due from them to a majority of 
votes, are under the influence of their own feelings, 
in intercourse with tneir superiours. 

The Court must have observed, with what confi- 
dence, the officers who have testified against me, have 
pronounced every thing to have been done wrong, that 
was not done according to their advice. They seem 
to have thought, that when a Council of War was 
called, it was to be governed by the laws of a town 
meeting ; and that a general was absolutely bound by 
the voice of a majority. 

The testimony of major Van Horn is a remarkable 
elucidation of the ideas of some of my officers in this 
respect. He seems to think, that I was guilty of great 
violation of duty, in not being careful to ascertain 
accurately the votes of the members then present. 
Though, as was actually the case, I had omitted to 
take the vote of a gentleman, whose opinions coin- 
cided with my own. 

Mr. President, my Ideas of a Council of War are, 
that it is called to advise the responsible officer as to 



GENERAL HULL, 91 

any question which he may think proper to submit 
to its members ; that he ought to hear and weigh, with 
what deliberation circumstances will admit, their 
sentiments and opinions. But that after all, he is 
bound to act according to the dictates of his own 
judgment, be the opinions of his officers what they 
may. And inasmuch, as the advice of a council will 
not, in all cases, justify misconduct, I hope it will not 
be considered, that a measure, although it should 
have been wrong, or turned out unfortunate, must be 
condemned, because it was not sanctioned by a ma- 
jority of votes. 

These are considerations, which I think it neces^ 
sary to impress strongly upon the minds of the Court. 
It unfortunately happened, that on most questions- 
which I submitted to the deliberation of my officers, 
their opinion and mine did not coincide, and many of 
the witnesses seem to think, that therefore they must 
be condemned. But such a principle will not, I hope, 
be adopted by this Court. The decisions of the 
councils should have the less influence, because it 
must be recollected, that I could not, with the ex- 
ception only of the officers of the fourth regiment, 
call for the advice of any one who had seen the least 
service, or had the least experience. For though 
most of the witnesses who have been produced on 
the part of the government, have appeared with the 
/ titles and badges of high military rank, yet it is cer- 
" tain, that most of these gentlemen when they joined 
my army, knew no more of the duties of a soldier 



52 DEFENCE OF 

than was to be learned from militia musters and pa^ 
i-ades about their own homes. What services they 
may have since performed to entitle them to the 
lionours tliey have attained, I am ignorant ; and only 
hope, that their elevated rank (as it ought to be pre- 
sumed it was not intended it should,) will not give 
them any other weight, than they would have had, if 
they had remained in their former subordinate situa- 
tions until they had given their testimony against me. 

These observations are made, in reference to the 
principal part of the troops I had under my command ; 
and to shew, that although, as men, they might be 
brave and patriotic, as I have always believed they 
were, and as I have always spoken both of the officers 
and soldiers, yet from the manner of their organization, 
and from their want of discipline and experience, 
they were not that kind of force upon which a com- 
mander could feel, in an arduous conflict, the firmest 
reliance. So far as we had any opportunity of judg- 
ing from trial, this want of confidence in forces of 
this description was justified. 

The expedition under major Van Horn was the 
only instance in which the volunteers acted bj^ them- 
selves in any affair of consequence ; for the rencontre 
at the Aux Canard bridge, falthough both the officers 
and men behaved well) was but a skirmish, which 
could hardly be a test either of courage or discipline. 
The detachment under major Van Horn, as he has 
testified, were not surprised. He had fully prepared 



GENERAL HULL. 93 

Uiem, according to his statement, to expect their foe, 
and yet his party was disordered by the first fire of 
the enemy. Notwithstanding all the gallant exer- 
tions which, as he has stated, he made, he was unable 
to rally them, or to prevent their flying' in confusion 
in the very first moments of attack by nothing but 
savages. 

In submitting to your consideration, Gentlemen, 
the state of the forces under my command, I must not 
omit, painful as it fs to me, to advert to the un- \ 
happy terms in which I was with my officers. They 
took no pains to conceal what they have here testified 
to, that they had lost all confidence in me ; many of 
them manifested it, as appears from their own testi- 
mony, by the most indecent conduct and expressions. 

The Court must recollect the language, which 1 
forbear to repeat, that my second in command, colonel 
Mac Arthur {now Brigadier General Mac Arthur,) 
represents that he addressed to me, when I proposed 
to him to remain with his regiment at Sandwich. • 
Let it be remembered too, that the Brigadier General 
has stated, that when we were in the face of the ene- 
my, and he might hourly be expected to be called to 
battle, he used this language with an expectation, 
that he should be arrested : with an expectation, that 
at such a moment, he would be put in a situation that 
he could not be called upon to use his sword. Briga- 
dier General Mac Arthur has said, that these expres- 
sions were extorted from him, by insinuations of cow- 



94 DEFENCE OP 

ardice. I meant no such insinuation. His declaration, 
that he felt his single self able to cany the fortress 
at Sandwich against any garrison, left no room to 
doubt his own good opinion of his prowess. When 
general Mac Arthur addressed such language to me, 
I had never seen any thing that would have w arrant- 
ed such an insinuation as he conceives I made. But 
if any thing would justify an impeachment of that 
officer's courage, it would be, siich conduct at such ditime. 
/It may be thought, that I ought to have arrested gene- 
' ral Mac Arthur. It is not one of the charges against 
me that I did not ; and therefore I shall not tligress 
further from the course of my defence, thaai to say, the 
peculiarity of my situation alone prevented my doing it. 

If I had taken such a step, I have no doubt his 
men, who had elected him a colonel, would have turn- 
ed their arms against me, with as much alacrity as 
they professed to use them against the enemy. I 
might, and believe 1 should have had a civil war in 
my camp. But to shew what was the disposition of 
my officers towards me, I have only to refer the Court, 
once more to Colonel Cass's {no7v Brigadier General 
Cass) letter to the Government, of the tenth of Sep- 
tember, in which he states, that he, and others, had 
formed a conspiracy to w rest the command from me. 
Whether this was, or was not, a treasonable design, is 
not for me to determine. But what confidence could 
I place in officers, whose conduct had been such as 
they themselves have described ? 



GENERAL HULL. 95 

I know, Mr. President, that my letters to the Sec- 
retary at War, and my official account of the surren- 
der, may be appealed to on this subject. I wish they 
may be — what I have written of the volunteers and 
their officers is just, and what I yet say. They were 
brave, zealous men. It is my pride, that in the very 
hour of misfortune, I had the magnanimity to give 
them all the credit that was due to them, and to take 
upon myself the whole resi)onsibility of a measure 
which I knew would be the subject of so much cen- 
sure. Would, sir, that I could have observed a little 
of the same spirit in my accusers ! That they had 
been willing to take some share of the blame that is 
justly due to them ! And that they had not, in the tri- 
umph of their own elevation on my depression, repre- 
sented, with the most uncharitable bitterness, a man 
whose smiles they once courted. 

I must be pardoned, Mr. President, for yielding to 
my feelings, in these digressions. I have stated to 
you, the numbers, nature, and situation, of the force 
which I had to oppose to the enemy. I shall now 
state what force he brought, or might bring, against 
me. I say. Gentlemen, might bring, because it was 
that consideration which induced the surrender, and 
not the force which was actually landed on the Amer- 
ican shore on the morning of the sixteenth. It is 
possible, that I might have met and repelled that 
force, and if I had had no farther to look than to the 
event of a contest at that time, I should have trusted 
to the issue of a battle. I beg leave first to examine, 



96 DEFENCE OF 

what was the extent of the enemy's force landed at 
Spring Wells on the morning of the sixteenth. 

Major Snelling, who says he made some attempt to 
count the enemy's force, supposes that there were no 
more than seven hundred and fifty whites, of whom 
one third were regulars, and (he rest militia and volun- 
teers — the number of Indians he could not ascertain. 
As he was going to his lodgings, after having satisfied 
himself about the white force, he saw, he says, some 
hundred and fifty liidians in array. He does admit, 
however, that there were some more in the back of 
the town, killing horses, and stealing cattle. But it 
is very evident, that Major SnelJing, as well as other 
witnesses, meant to convey to the Court an impres- 
sion, that they consitlered the Indian force very in- 
significant, both as to numbers and effect. And yet 
it is very extraordinary, that when my conduct would 
be censurable, in proportion as the Indian force in the 
power of the British might be considered numerous 
and effective, their numbers and powers are augment- 
ed. I am charged with having sent out too small a 
detachment under major Van Horn. To prove that 
I did so, the major has testified, that according to 
the, information he received, three hundred Indians 
crossed from the British side the day his party was 
routed. It is necessary to heighten my criminality, 
that in one instance the British Indian force should 
appear to be very small and very insignificant, and 
in the other, very numerous, and very formidable. 
It is well known, however, that all the savages in that 



GENERAL HULL. 9? 

quarter had immediately after the fall of Michili 
mackinac, joined the British. I had had in council, 
between the fourteenth and twentieth of July, the 
chiefs of nine nations, whose warriours amounted to 
between two and three thousand, or more. Is it not 
extremely improbable, that with a large force of this 
nature at their disposal, the British should have em- 
ployed but a small part of it in their enterprise against 
Detroit ? Is it not rather to be presumed, that in an 
undertaking in which they must have been very am- 
bitious of success, they should have employed all their 
disposable force, w hether white or red ? 

The force brought against me, I am very confident, 
was not less than one thousand whites, and at least 
as many savage warriours. 

But it was not only against this force, on our own 
shores, I was to defend mj^self. Their batteries from 
Sandwich were effectually co-operating with them, 
and their ships of war were ready to lend them assis- 
tance in the moment of attack, to cover their retreat, 
and to afford them shelter in case of defeat. 

If the British, landed at Spring Wells, were not much 
more numerous than my own troops, I knew they 
must have a powerful force in reserve, which they 
could bring to operate upon me, either by crossing them 
above the town of Detroit, or by transporting them 
in their ships to that point, and thus attack the fort 
on all sides, and place my army between their fire. 
10 



9S DEFENCE OF 

I should not, however, have yielded to all these coii 
siderations, had the war I was carrymg on, been only 
against civilized men. In that case, those only who 
were in the contest, would have suffered. But I knew 
how sanguinary and remorseless the savages would 
be, should my army be subdued, and the fortress be 
obliged to yield. The whole countiy would have 
been deluged with the blood of its inhabitants- — nei- 
ther women nor children would have been spared. 
The large detachment, which was out under the com- 
mand of colonels Mac Arthur and Cass, of which I 
could get no intelligence, and the detachment under 
captain Brush, at the river Raisin, would most pro- 
bably have been the victims of savage fury, Avhich is 
always excited bj^ battle, and rendered more sangui- 
nary l>y victory. These appeared to me the certain 
and dreadful consequences of unsuccessful resistance. 
If, after a conflict, I should have been able for that 
time to have repulsed the enemy, I might have pur- 
chased fame, and have avoided all I have suffered, 
and wliat I now suffer, in being obliged thus, at my 
lime of life, to vindicate my honour, and plead my 
cause before yon. But at what price should I have 
done this ? How many of the lives of the brave men 
I commanded, would it have cost ? How many of the 
persons, who now appear to witness against me, might 
1 not have sacriticed ? It might, indeed, Mr. Presi- 
dent, have given me an honourable grave — and if 
mine were the only life concerned, I wish it had been 
so, rather than that the foul crimes of which I am 
a(*cu?ed should be coupled with a name, io which my 



GENERAL HULL. 99 

country of late, as well as heretofore, has ackiiow^ 
lodged some obligations. 

But I had rather even that this should be. I railiei 
-tand before you accused, as I am, than have useless- 
ly and wantonly sacrificed a singk life, though it 
should have insured me immortal fame. 

If the attack of the enemy had been repelled, our 
triumph would have been but temporary. My num 
hers must have been diminished by Ios« in battle. 
They would have daily lessened by the cannon of the 
enemy from the opposite shore. The force of tlie ene- 
my, augmented as it was by reinforcements under 
colonel Proctor, major Chambers, and the commandei' 
in chief general Brock, would have been daily aug- 
menting. The force from Michilimackinac and St. 
Joseph's, which would have amounted to several thou- 
sand savage warriours ; the savages, with the addi- 
tion of some hundred white men, mentioned in the 
intercepted letter of Mr. Mac Kenzie ; collected at 
Fort William, v/ould, in a few days, have descended 
upon us. The Canadian militia had all returned to 
their allegiance. The enemy's naval force and means 
of transportation on the lakes were augmented. 
There was no co-operation witli my army from any 
quarter. The letter I had received from generals 
Hall and Porter had not only satisfied me that my 
expectations in this respect were disappointed, but 
that no diversion in my favour was soon to be expect- 
ed. My army was in a corner, surrounded by a wii- 



100 DEFENCE OP 

derness of waters, and a wilderness of woods. Ail 
commmiication with my country, either by land of 
water, cut off, my stores of provision and ammunition 
but sufficient for a short duration ; add to all this, that 
at the moment of expected conflict, I received infor- 
mation that a part of my own troops had gone over to 
the enemy^ and that a larger body were about to join 
him. Under such a combination and pressure of ad- 
verse circumstances, the army must have yielded in 
a little time, notwithstanding any temporary success. 
I did not think I should be justifiable or even excus- 
able, if I risked a battle when victory could purchase 
no real good. And w hen the consequence of defeat, 
or even the consequences of being driven into the 
fort, would lie to sulimit the whole country which I 
was sent to protect, and ihat part of my force, which 
w as on detachment, to '' the ruthless ferocity of sav- 
'■ ages, armed with the horrours of those instruments 
'• of carnage and torture, w hich are known to spare 
- neither age nor sex,'' 

From such calamity, I knew a ca))iiulation would 
»)e a protection. The British, if made masters of the 
country without a battle, would be able to restrain 
their merciless allies, w hich they could not do after a 
contest, even if it should be only so far successful as to 
oblige us to retreat into the fort. A savage will have 
blood for blood, though he draws it from the veins of 
the defenceless — victorj^ only heightens his inhuman 
thirst. 



GENERAL ETULL. 101 

1 offered a capitulation and surrendered. " I well 
^'knew the high responsibility of the measure, and 
*' take the -whole of it upon myself. It was dictated 
'' by a sense of duty, and a full conviction of its ex- 
"pediency. If aught has taken place during the 
"campaign, which is honourable to the army, my 
" officers are entitled to a large share of it. If the 
" last act should be disapproved, no part of the cen- 
" sure belongs to them.'' 

These, Sir, are the words of my official communi- 
cation of this unhappy event to the Secretary at War. 
I repeat them. It was, Sir, a sense of duty which 
drove me to the measure. It was a sense of what 
I owed to the protection of the inhabitants of the 
territory I had so long governed. I felt myself bound 
to sacrifice every private feeling, and in spite of 
themselves, to save from useless waste the blood of 
the brave men I commanded. Nor, Sir, will I con- 
ceal, that in the midst of the carnage that might en- 
sue a battle, my parental feelings saw a daughter and 
her offspring, who were with me in the fort, bleeding 
under the tomahawk of a savage. 

If these be considerations unworthy of a soldier, 
then I am without excuse. Then, indeed, you may 
pronounce your utmost doom. But, do not let me 
transmit to my posterity a name, tarnished by the 
foul crimes imputed to me. I say, I am as free from 
the sins of that black catalogue as any man who 
hears me. But if a propitiation be necessary, and U 



i02 DEFENCE OF 

must be the remnant of the life of a man, whose coun- 
try has heretofore acknowledged his claims to her 
gratitude, and who has not ceased to deserve it— 
here is one that I offer. I would freely part with it, 
if you will not take from me, and from my family and 
posterity, my honour and character. 

I now appeal with some confidence, to this tribunal, 
for their decision upon the accusations which I have 
hitherto considered. Was either of the acts to which 
the attention of the Com-t has been directed, in them- 
selves, and abstractedly considered, unjustifiable, oc 
rather (and this is the true question) was either of 
them so manifestly wrong, so egregiously erroneous, 
that it is of itself, evidence of treason, cowardice, or 
inioiiicer-like conduct ? Are there not so many rea- 
sons for my conduct, in regard to these transactions, 
that I may be supposed to have acted honestly, though 
it should now appear to the Court that it was err<j- 
neously ? 

If an act may have proceeded from pure intentions, 
it would be the height of injustice and misanthropy, 
to impute it to bad motives. 

I shall now proceed to make my defence against 
the other accusations. I shall endeavour to arrange 
them in the order of time in which the facts, by the 
specifications, are supposed to have occurred. 

Hitherto, Mr. President, my defence has chieily 
rested on documentary evidence, or upon facts of 



GENERAL HULL. 1Q3 

general notoriety. As to all that follows, the charge^ 
depend entirely upon parole testimony. 



It seems extraordinary, that there has not been a 
witness examined on the part of the prosecution who 
lias not been promoted since he was under my com- 
mand. 

^ great majority of the young gentlemen who have 
been called by the Judge Advocate, have appeared 
decorated with their two epaulets. These have been 
bestowed, and sometimes with the augmentation of a 
star, upon gentlemen who began their military ca- 
reer with my unfortunate campaign. 

By what services many of these gentlemen have 
merited such rapid promotion, I have not learned. 
But if it all arises out of their achievements while 
under my command, I must say, that it appears to 
me that my expedition was more prolific of promo- 
tion, than any other unsuccessful military enterprise 
I ever heard of. 

It cannot be, that it has been intended to give a 
v/eight to the testimony of these witnesses, by giving 
them ranks and honours, which it would not other- 
wise have had. But, Sir, when my military charac- 
ter and measures are to be tested by the opinions of 
gentlemen, with high sounding titles of military rank, 
I think it necessary to remind the Court, that, with 
the exception of a few of the younger officers, there 



104 DEFENCE OF 

are none of them who have not been promoted to 
their high stations, without having had any military 
experience, and without, so far as I have heard, ever 
having discovered any military talents or genius. 

If the opinions of witnesses on military conduct 
ought in any case to be listened to, (which I conceive 
ought not to be,) yet, I think the opinions of men 
of these descriptions, ought to be received with the 
greatest caution. 

The extraordinary promotions w hich the witnesses 
against me have generally attained, I think may be 
accounted for by a recurrence to the fact, of which 
this trial has afforded the most conclusive evidence ; 
which is, that each of the witnesses, from the gene- 
rals to the youngest and lowest officer that has been 
called by the Judge Advocate, is himself, in his own 
opinion at least, a hero. 

From general Mac Arthur, who thought himself 
capable of fighting a wiiole garrison, down to the 
lowest rank, every officer seems to have thought, that 
if he had been the commanding general, or if I had 
taken his advice, all would have gone well. No 
doubt, they have, in justice to themselves, made these 
representations to the government. And their rank 
must be considered as a reward for the great things, 
which they said they would have done, rather than 
to have been acquired by any actual service?. 



GENERAL HULL. 105 

But, Gentlemen, before I proceed to examine the 
parole testimony, let me call your attention to another 
subject connected with it. I mean the indefatigable 
pains, which have been taken, to propagate and keep 
alive the most hateful prejudices against me. Sir, I 
believe there never was a greater outrage committed 
on the administration of justice, and towards an in- 
dividual, than was the publication of colonel Cass's 
(now brigadier-general Cass,) letter to the government 
of the tenth of September. 

That such a letter should be published, under the 
sanction of the administration, against a man, whom 
the administration w as about to put upon trial for his 
life, I believe is a proceeding of which no country/ 
on earth has before afforded an example. 

That the administration should, under such cir- 
cumstances, permit the publication of such a letter 
as general Cass's, one that labours to represent my 
conduct in the most odious point of view, and takes 
pains to heighten the public resentment against me, 
by a colouring which colonel Cass could not know 
of his ow n knowledge, was true, appears to me to be 
a violation of every principle of justice. 

The Court will please to recollect, that colonels 
Cass and Mac Arthur left Detroit with the detach- 
ment to the river Raisin on the fourteenth of August, 
and did not return to the fort till the evening of the 
sixteenth ; of course they could not know, of their 
own knowledge, what passed in the interim. 



lot) DEFENCE OF 

No person, reading colonel Cass's letter, but would 
(Suppose, he was an eye w itness of all he relates. 

It is impossible to discover, that he was absent 
in the expedition to the river Raisin. Yet general 
Cass states, as if it was a matter within his own 
knowledge, that when the troops received orders to 
retreat into the fort, " one universal burst of indigna- 
" tion was apparent upon the receipt of tliis order." 
I beg to quote from this letter another paragraph, to 
shew what w as the spirit with which it was written ; 
the design of its publication I must leave the Court 
to infer. 

" To see the whole of our men flushed with victory, 
" eagerly awaiting the approaching contest ; to see 
" them afterwards hopeless, dispirited, and despond- 
" ing, at least five hundred shedding tears, because 
*•' they were not allowed to meet their country's foe, 
" and to fight their country's battles, excited sensa- 
" tions, which no American has ever before had." 

Would not every one imagine, that colonel Cass 
was here describing a scene which passed before his 
own eyes ? 

Did he actually see at least five hundred men shed- 
ding tears, or does the Court believe that this is a 
representation of a fact which really occurred ? If it 
were so, it is extraordinary that not a witness has 
testified to it. Captain Mac Commick says, he ob- 



GENERAL HULL. 101 

served some men sliedding tears, but this falls greatly- 
short of general Cass's five hundred. But who were 
these weeping troops ? It is not to be presumed, that 
it was intended that we should believe they were the 
regulars ; they are rot commonly much given to weep-^ 
ing. They were not the Michigan militia, because a 
part of them deserted, and the rest were disposed to 
goj>ver to the enemy rather than fight him. The 
men then who shewed this very extraordinary sensi- 
bility, must have been colonel Cass's patriotic volun- 
teers. The same volunteers, who mutinied in the 
camp at Urbana, and would not march till they were 
compelled to do so by the regular troops. The same 
vohintecTs, who rode the officers of one of their com- 
panies on a rail. The same volunteers, one hundred 
and eighty of whom refused to cross into Canada; 
and the same volunteers, who, when they had an op- 
{)ortunity, under major Van Horn, to gratify their 
eager wishes to meet the enemy in combat, ran away 
at the first fire, and left their officers to be massacred. 

If general Cass did not witness this scene, why did 
he make such a representation ? There can be no 
other reason, than that this kind of inflated descrip- 
tion was intended to recommend himself to the go- 
vernment, by representing himself and his troops in 
the most favourable point of view, and me in the most 
unfavourable, that even hyperbolical language would 
admit. 

Sir, this is not the only means that have been re- 
sorted io, to excite and keep alive the popular 



108 . DEFENCE OF 

clamour against me. Others of my officers finding 
what favour the publication of his letter gave him, in" 
the eyes of the administration, have seen that the 
same road of preferment was open to them ; and the 
news-papers, from one end of the continent to the 
other, have been filled with letters concerning me, 
expressed in terms which neither truth, justice, nor 
even the laws of decorum can sanction. Down to 
this very time. Sir, the same system is pursued. Now, 
while I have been on my trial, publications have 
appeared in the public prints of this city, commend- 
ing the principal and leading witness, for the manner 
in which he gave his testimony against me, that those 
who were to come after him might be encouraged to 
follow his example. 

And, Sir, at this very moment, at the very door of 
this building, is hawked for sale, a work printed within 
this few days in sight of this capitol, entitled Views 
of the Campaigns of the North-western Army, in 
which my conduct or motives are most grossly mis- 
represented. Who are thci/ that thirst so for my 
blood, and take these means to obtain it ? 

It is not the ostensible author of this performance. 
His insignificance, and the contemptible talents em- 
ployed in the work, shew him to be too mean to have 
a motive of his own. I know not who may be the 
authors or instigators of such outrages fepon justice. 
If such things are permitted, and can have any influ- 
ence, then the scc^Jcs ought to be torn from the hand 



GENERAL HULL. 109 

c^f the figure which adorns the hall wherein you sit. 
She ought only to be left the sword with which she 
is decorated, and she ought to wave that as an emblem^ 
that vengeance^ and not justice^ is administered under 
this roof. 

But, Gentlemen, for whatever purpose these acts 
may have been intended, I rely with a perfect confi- 
dence that you will rise superiour to them. If I 
wanted other assurance of it than that which is de- 
rived from your characters, I shoukl have it in the 
patience and impartiality with which this prosecu- 
tion, so far as depended on you, has been conducted. 

Before I enter on an examination of the parole 
testimony, I must be permitted to remark, that I can- 
not but think that the course which has been pursued, 
of examining each witness in the presence of the rest, 
has been unfortunate for me. Till this Court de- 
cided that it should be so, I did think it was a well 
established rule of martial taw, that the witnesses 
should be examined separately. The justice and 
propriety of this rule, I have very sensibly felt on this 
occasion. In a case where so much may depend 
upon the language or phrases in which the witnesses 
express themselves, it would have been desirable, 
that each should haye been left to the necessity of 
selecting his own language to ex|>ress his meaning. 
But according to the course pursued, each witness 
was at liberty to adopt the words, which had been 
used by any other witness on the same point. The 
11 



no DEFENCE OF 

disposition of several of the -vvitnesses to do so, has 
been very plainly manifested by their answering, 
ivhen interrogated as to my personal behaviour, that 
It was the saine as had been represented by a prior 
v.itness. 

It is true, Gentlemen, that the Judge Advocate 
ivoukl not accept these answers, and I presume has 
not taken them down, but they nevertheless shew the 
natural disposition of the witness to borrow the words 
of another, and I have no doubt they have very con- 
•cientiouslj^, and often without knowing it, borrowed 
ideas also. 

Gentlemen, in these Courts Martial, where the 
members, among whom there may be great inequality 
of grades, are intended to be put upon an equal foot- 
ing as judges, care has been taken, to avoid, as far as 
possible, the influence likely to arise from authority. 
It is on this account that the opinion of the youngest 
member is always first taken. And it was on the 
same account, as I conceive, that the rule was es- 
tablished, that witnesses should be examined sepa- 
rately, that the younger might not be influenced in 
his testimony by what might be said by his superiour. 
It would be contrary to experience of the human 
disposition, to suppose, that after a subaltern has 
heard two or three generals and officers of higher 
rank than himself testify, to whose authority he is 
perhaps subservient, or to whose good word he may 
have owed or expects to owe his promotion, he will 



GENERAL HULL.' HI 

he wiliiag to contradict what his superiours have saidj 
or even to make a representation which will varj 
from theirs. 

If on any case, Sir, the w eight of this sort of influ- 
ence coukl be felt on the testimony, the course pur- 
sued on this occasion would give it the fairest scope. 
For the witnesses seem to have been arranged and 
produced, in the first instance, very much according 
to their rank, (except colonel Miller.) After the Ge- 
nerals had been examined, then came the subordi- 
nates. The exception to this general course as to 
colonel Miller struck me as a little singular. I did 
not know why he should have been examined the 
last, particularly as he was the highest officer of the 
regular army which had been engaged in the cam- 
paign. He was with me during the whole time, antl 
had the most intimate knowledge of the transactions 
to which the Other Gentlemen testified. But when 
I found that colonel Miller's testimony was much 
less unfavourable to me than the testimony of the 
witnesses who had preceded him, and that he would 
not support them in the most material parts of their 
testimony, I was at no loss to account for this course 
of proceeding. 

The next accusation which I shall consider, is spe- 
cified under the charge of unofficer-like conduct, and 
refers to the commencement of the march of the ar- 
my. It is in substance, that from the time I took the 
command, I omitted to exercise, inspect, train, review^ 



112 DEFENCE OF 

aod order the troops. I cannot believe, Gentlemeiij 
that it will be necessary for me to say much on this 
isubject. I did expect, that if any part of my conduc t 
eould have escaped the censure of my enemies, it 

\ would have been the manner in which I led the troops 
through the wilderness. When it is recollected, what 
an extent of road it was necessary for me to cut; 
that a great proportion of the men were constantly 
employed in this duty ; that those w ho were not so, 
were most generally fatigued w ith their turn of this lar 

. borious service, I believe the Court will think w ith 
colonel Miller, that there was neither time, nor op* 
portunity, for that sort of discipline and exercise, 
which, under other circumstances, would haA^e been 
proper. The commandants of regiments have testi- 
fied, that, as to their respective commands, there was 
no omission of what was their duty in this respect. 
The fault charged to me is then, that in' th^ depths of 
the forest, through which we w ere marching, I did 
not call off my fatigue parties, guards, and advances, 

(' and go through the ceremonies of military parade. 
And yet, as if every thing that I could have done, 
must, in the opinion of my officers, be condemned, 
my omissions to have these parades are not more 
severely censured than my conduct has been for 
making some display of the troops, and passing them 
in review on some few occasions, when I thought it 
w as consistent with our situation. When the corps 
passed me by sections, after we had crossed the Miami, 
general Mac Arthur thinks it was not a review, be- 
cause I was not, according to his experience, in tha 



GENERAL HULL. 113 

situation which a reviewing general ought to liave 
been ; though, he admits that the officers at the heads 
of sections saluted me, and he admits that it is possible 
he might have saluted me himseh". At the river 
Raisin, I also passed the troops in review. I did the 
same at Spring Wells, and marched the troops front 
thence to Detroit and back. But these parades seem 
to have excited the indignation of general Mac Ar- 
thur, as it did, according to his testimony, of other 
officers ; . but for wiiat reason I have not been able to 
learn. The truth is, that from the moment we com- 
menced our march, the troops were always under my 
eye. I saw them on their line of march. I saw them 
in their working parties, and in their encampments. I 
thought it woukl be as ridiculous as useless to make 
parades in the midst of the woods. Whenever the 
country opened^ so that there was any room for dis- 
play, I availed myself of it ; not only that I might 
see the troops, and put them in military array, but|I 
thought it would have a good effect to shew our line 
to the best advantage at the little settlements Avhich 
we passed, and on our arrival in the neighbourhood 
of Detroit. 

I shall trouble the Court with nothing further hi 
relation to this charge, than the following quotation 
from general Cass and colonel Miller's testimony : ge- 
neral Cass states, that " from the time they left Urbana, 
" the march was conducted v/ith all possible expedition. 
" There was no time te^kcipline the troops." Colo- 
nel Miller, on his cross-examination, says, " On the 
11^ 



114 DEFENCE OF 

" march there was no opportunity to discipline the 
" troops. The fatigues of the march, and cutting the 
" road, and making the encampments, were as much 
" as the troops could endure." 

Connected with the accusation which I have last an- 
swered, is another which is in substance, that I did not 
during the march, prepare, and make known, an order 
of battle. That I prepared and published an order of 
march is admitted; a plan ofit, which has been proved 
by several witnesses, is before you. This plan, as ap- 
pears from the testimony of general Van Rensselear, 
and other witnesses, is that which was adopted by gene- 
ral Wayne, in the expedition which he commanded 
and marched through the same country. This order 
of march was in fact an order of battle, or at least, so 
little change of the disposition of the troops was ne- 
cessary, in case of an attack, that it could be made 
in a moment, and was so obvious that it could neves 
be mistaken. It is remarkable, that the commanding 
officers, whose testimony was expected to support 
this accusation, all say, that they knew how their re- 
spective corps were to form in case of attack ; though, 
as they say, they never heard of any order of battle. 
It seems then, that an arder of battle was made known, 
and the accusation must then rest upon the allegation, 
that the order was not made or published by me. 

General Cass's testimony on this subject is as follows: 
" I think, when v/q arrived near the river Huron, or 
"between that and Swan Creek, the commanding 
'' ofiicers of regiments, under an expectation of an 



GENERAL HULL. 11^ 

'' attack, applied to the general, and he permitted them 
" to form an order of battle. I do not recollect, that 
" the general assisted in making the order. I think 
" the plan originated with colonel Miller. I do not 
*' recollect that the order was afterwards submitted to 
" general Hull. I presume there was an orderly book^ 
" as orders were issued." 

General Mac Arthur's testimony on this point is as^ 
follows : " On the day we passed the river Raisin our 
" march was about nine miles, and we encamped near 
*' Swan Creek. Rumours were among the inhabitants 
*' that we should be attacked by Indians, who were 
*' assembled at the Huron, about six miles in advance. 
" Myself, and colonel Findlay, called on the General^ 
"and stated that some plan of battle ought to be 
•' agreed upon. In the march my regiment was di- 
" vided ; a battalion marched on each side of the road, 
" in the rear of colonels Findlay and Cass. I mentioned 
"to the General, that thus situated, it was impossible 
'' for me to be with both my battalions, and I w ished 
" to be permitted, in case of attack, to form them in 
"one line. The General thought it would be well 
" enough to do so. I suggested the propriety of my 
'* battalions being so formed on the march, in the rear 
" of the regiments, as that, in case of an attack, I 
^' might swing my regiment round, and form the rear 
" line of a hollow square. The General gave me his 
" permission to adopt this plan, I then left him, whether 
" J left the other officers with him or not, I do not knowP 
Major Jessup testifies, that I issued orders on the 



116 DEFENCE OP 

march; that they were generailv sent to him by 
one of my aids-de-camp ; that he assembled the 
adjutants, and communicated to them my orders. He 
further stated, that the orderly books generally were 
surrendered, but that captain Mac Commick and 
captain Rutleff, who were adjutants of Mac Arthur 
and Findlay's regiments, had preserved theirs. It un- 
fortunately happens, that these books have not been 
brought on by these gentlemen. Had they been so, 
it would then have appeared what orders I did issue, 
and this matter would not have been left to the un- 
certain recollection of witnesses. 

As I am accused of having omitted to issue orders, 
and of having given improper orders, I submit to the 
Court, whether I had not a right to expect, that the or- 
derly books, which were in the possession of witnesses^ 
brought forward by the prosecution, would have been 
produced; especially as I requested major Jessup 
might be summoned, with a duces teciim^ to bring be- 
fore the Court all the official documents in his posses- 
sion, and the orderly book. But I proceed to exa- 
mine the testimony in relation to the order of battle. 

Colonel Miller testifies, " That an order of march 
" was published at Urbana, and was generally known 
" to the army ; that the army commonly marched ac- 
" cording to that order. It was my underetanding, 
'-' says colonel Miller, that in case of an attack in 
" front, my regiment was to form the line in fi'ont. In 
'' case of an attack on the right flank, we were to 



GENERAL HULL. 117 

■ form by facing the enemy ; and so in case of an at= 
" tack on the left. This was a general understanding, 
" but I do not recollect to have seen any order to this 
" purport, either written or verbal. I understood it 
" from conversations with general Hull, and I believe 
" it was so understood by the other officers. The 
" General told me, that the order of march which he 
" had adopted, was that which had been pursued by 
" general Wayne. I know nothing to the contrar}^" 
Colonel Miller adds, " of the General's having been 
" almost always, when we were on the march, in a 
" situation to direct the movements of the troops. For 
-' the greatest part of the time, the General rode near me 
'' in front. Sometimes he passed to the rear. Gene- 
" rally the army encamped in a hollow square. After 
"■'' we apprehended danger, we commonly formed a 
" breast-work, and encamped within it. By a general 
'' order, each line was to form in front of its tents, if 
'' attacked in camp. There was also a general order 
•' for turning out the troops by taps of the drum, pro- 
' ceeding from head-quarters along the lines. This 
-' method was practised, and the troops were called io 
■' arms every morning, before dawn, by these signals." 

I believe. Gentlemen, that this is the whole of the 
testimony, on this point, which can be considered as 
of any importance. It cannot be disputed then, but 
that there was an order of battle ; but general Cass's 
testimony seems intended to leave an impression, that 
the order did not originate with me, but that it was 
suggested by my officers, and adopted by them, with 



lis DEFENCE OP 

my assent, without my having given myself much 
trouble about it. I cannot but think, that in this in- 
stance there is a display of the spirit with wliich 
much of testimony has been given in this cause. It 
f seems to have been determined, that I shall not even 
share in the credit of any thing that was done that 
ought to have been done. My officers claim every 
thing that is meritorious as theirs. 
♦ 
General Cass says, he does not recollect whether I 
assisted in making the order, or whether it was sub- 
mitted to me after it was made. This is one of the 
instances in which it is extremely unfortunate for me, 
that the recollection of the witnesses entirely fails 
them as to matters of the greatest importance, and 
which might be decisive, if in my favour, as to the 
particular accusation ; while their memories serve them 
with remarkable correctness and minuteness, as to 
circumstances which are unfavourable to me. 

I hope I may be permitted to digress, so far as to 
remark another instance of the same unfortunate 
want of recollection, though it relates to a different 
point. 

Major Jessuf), after having stated, that he came to 
me in the fort, after the flag was hoisted on the six- 
teenth of August, adds, '^ 1 inquired of tlie General if 
" it were possible we were about to surrender. The 
" General said something about the enemy^s force, and 
" something about terms, which I do not recollect." 



GEiXERAL HULL. 119 

Major Jessiip then goes on to state very particular- 
ly what he said to me, to express his strong aversion 
to the surrender. I have surely great reason to re- 
gret, that major Jessup's memory v^ould not enable 
liim to state what I said, when it might have been sO 
hnportant to shew the motives of my conduct, while 
every thing that he said to me, which was calculated 
to set his own conduct in the most favourable point of 
view, made so deep an impression on his mind, that 
he could undertake to relate the very expressions lie 
had used. But to return to w hat respects the order of 
battle. 

General Mac Arthur states, that after, on his sug- 
gestion, he had settled with me how^ he was to swing 
his regiment in case of an attack, " I then left the 
" General ; whether I left the other officers with him, 
" or not, I do not know." It appears then, that this 
arrangement, about the order of battle, was concluded 
in the presence *of other officers ; what othei*s, general 
Mac Arthur does not state. 

Colonel Miller says, he understood, from conversa- 
tions with me, what was to be the disposition of his 
corps, in. case of an attack. 

Thus it appears, that colonel Mac Arthur, colonel 
Cass, colonel Findlaj'-, and colonel Miller, all knew 
w^hat they were to do, if an enemy was to approach 
us. What foundation is there then for a charge, that 



120 DEFENCE OF 

RO order of battle was made known ? If the subofdi- 
uate officers were not instructed as to their duty, in 
the event of an attack, was it not the fault of these 
commandants of corps and not mine ? Suppose there 
had been no written order of battle; but that after the 
order of march, which so nearly approached the order 
of battle, had been formed, I had explained to the 
commandants the disposition I intended, in case of an 
attack ; could any man say, I was deficient in duiy^ 
because I had not explained my intentions in a writ- 
ten order ? I believe no one acquainted with military 
history or practice, will think a general is bound to 
make an exposure of his plans, in every orderly book 
in his army. If the witnesses, in whose opinions 
these charges and specifications have been framed, 
liave entertained such erroneous ideas of the duties of 
a commander, as this accusation seems to indicate, I 
hope now, that some of them have attained a rank 
which may give them the command of armies, they 
will learn, that to give a general publicity in their 
orderly books to their designs in case of an attack, 
will be a departure from their duty, and that they 
may often thereby afford their enemy an opportunity" 
of gaining information, which he ought not to have. 

As to the order of battle at night, it is proved by 
the testimony of colonel Miller, that that was settled 
by a general order, which was made known to all ; 
and when the Court considers what was the nature 
of our lines of march ; how nearly it approached the 
only order of battle, which could have been proper, 



GENERAL HULL. -121 

ill the warfare ^Nhich Ave were to expect; liow in- 
stantly the order of march was made the order of bat- 
tle ; and consider also, that I was always at the head 
of the troops while thej^ were on the march, I am 
persuaded the Court will think, there is no foundatiott 
for this accusation. If it has not originated in malicej 
it certainly has in ignorance. 

I am unwilling to detain the Court longer on a 
charge, which, in my own opinion, is sufficiently an- 
swered; but I know I ought not to place so much 
confidence in my own opinion, as not to avail myself 
of any thing which may have an influence on the 
opinions of others. I must therefore advert to other 
testimony, which I believe ought to be conclusive on 
this point. I mean my letters to the War Department- 
Tho-se to which I shall refer for this purpose, the 
Court will recollect were read by the Judge Advo- 
cate. If I had offered them, they certainly would not 
have been conclusive evidence in my favour; but 
when introduced on the part of the prosecution, so 
far as they establish any thing in my favour, they are 
as good evidence as they are to prove any thing 
against me. It would be a manifest violation of jus- 
tice, if this sort of testimony should be resorted to for 
my crimination, and I should not be permitted to 
avail myself of it, so far as it might serve for my 
exculpation. It is a general rule, which applies to the 
administration of justice in all courts, that wherever 
a docimient is read by one side, the whole of it be- 
comes evidence, of which either party may avijil 
12 



122 DEFENCE OF 

himself. I beg leave to remind the Com-t that this 
rule has been acknowledged by the Judge Advocate. 
The Court Avill recollect, that in the course of the 
examination of captain Fuller, major Parker objected 
to take down his answer to a question which I put 
to the witness, as being unnecessary, because the fact 
as to which I interrogated him, was sufficiently 
proved by my letters to the Secretary at"War. 

In my letter, dated Solomon's Town, eighteenth 
June, eighteen hundred and twelve, I say, " My or- 
*^' der of march is in two columns, with strong front 
" and rear guards ; the columns flanked by the rifle- 
" men and cavalry, where the ground will admit ; the 
" baggage, provisions, &:c. between the columns. The 
" army has been practised from the two columns to 
" form two lines, either in front, rear, or on either 
" flank, or to form a square facing outward. My order 
" of encampment at night is a square, facing outward 
" with all the baggage in the centre, &c." 

My letters of the twenty-fourth June, eighteen 
hundred and twelve, from near Blanchard's Creek, 
enclosed to the Secretary at War the order of march 
which has been given in evidence. Among the 
manuscript notes subjoined to that order, is one in the 
following words : " The columns are in a situation to 
" form two lines in front, rear, or on either flank, or to 
" form a square." 

After these observations, I cannot but be satisfied- 
that the Court will think that there was no ffroiiiid 



GENERAL HULL. 123 

lor charging me with neglecting to discipline and re^ 
view my troops, or omitting to prepare and make 
known an order of battle. 

The next accusations that I shall consider are, that 
I neglected to repair and put in order the cannon at 
Detroit ; and to put the place in a state of defence :-r— 
that I did not seasonably repair, and put in a state 
of service, the artillery necessary for the operations in 
Canada; and that I did not transport them to the 
enemy's shore, so soon as I ought to have done. I 
have already had occasion incidentally to notice these 
accusations, and I shall give no further answer to 
them than to refer the Court to the testimony of 
captain Dallaba. He states, that when I arrived at 
Detroit, " (he fort was generally in good order, and 
"^' m a good state of repair." On his cross-examina- 
tion, captain Dallaba says, " the fort was in the state 
" of defence I have described, except as to some im- 
" material matters, on the fourth day of July, before 
"the arrival of the army. Afterwards, something 
" was done with the ordnance stores, and mounting 
'' the cannon ; but every thing designed for the de- 
" fence of the fort exclusively, was completed on the 
" fourth of July. After the general's arrival at De- 
" Iroit, industry and exertions were used to put in 
'' order the field pieces and heavy artillery for the 
" siege of Maiden. This was done (says the witness) 
" under my superintendance, and by order of general 

■ Bun:' 



124 DEFENCE OP 

This witness was examined on the eighth of Fe- 
kruaiy : four days afterwards, on the twelfth, he isagaia 
called, by the Judge Advocate, and then he testifies 
as follows, " I have before stated, that no alterations 
" had been made subsequently to the fourth of July, 
" for defence of the fort. 

" Some few artificers, immediately after the arrival 
" of general Hull, went to work to repair and mount 
" some heavy cannon on trucks, to be placed in the 
" batteries on the banks of the river. And some re- 
" pairs were made to three brass field pieces, and a 
" small quantity of ammunition was fixed for them. 
" But no order was received, to my knowledge, to 
" prepare the heavy field artillery, till after the army 
" went to Canada. I have the order, and think it 
" Avas dated on the fifteenth or sixteenth of July." 

I have already made some remarks on this testi- 
.^nony, and stated, that the order was in fiict given on 
the fourteenth of July. Till that time, the artificer 
had been othervvise employed. I will remind the 
Court here of the objection I offered, and which was 
overruled by the Court, to this mode of re-examining 
a witness. If to examine the witnesses in the pre- 
sence of each other be a departure from the usages of 
Courts Martial, it is certainly a much wider and more 
important deviation from that usage, to call up a wit- 
ness, and to alloy*' him to make important alterations 
in his testimony, after he has been listening for tlays 
in the testimony of other witnesses. I now mark 



GENERAL HULL. 125 

this irregularity, as I conceive it to be, for the sake 
of presenting it, as well as the fact of all the witnesses 
having been, pursuant to a determination of this 
Court, examined in the presence of each other, to the 
attention of the high officer, who has authority to 
review these proceedings. 

Colonel Miller testifies, that he "discovered n© 
" want of exertion in respect to preparing the heavy 
" and light field artillery, after the army arrived at 
''Detroit." 

General Taylor says, " I believe no time was lost 
" in preparations. Timber and some large wheels were 
"got out." 

Again, the same witness says, that he visited the 
artificers every day, to hurry the preparations, with 
orders from general Hull ; " and I must say, (adds the 
" witness) that general Hull shewed great anxiety in 
" getting the artillery ready." 

I pray leave to make one remark on this language 
of general Taylor's, which I am aware may have the 
appearance of being hypercritical ; but I beg the in- 
dulgence of the Court, till I have explained my rea- 
sons for noticing a circumstance apparently trivial. 
Why should general Taylor preface his testimony of 
this fact in my favour, with the phrase, " I must say ?" 
It seems as if to state any circumstance favourable to 
me was the result of a compulsion, to which his mind 
12* 



126 DEFENCE OF 

unwillingly submitted. In this instance, he speaks like 
a penitent, whose conscience obliges him to make the 
acknowledgment of a fact, w hich his inclination would 
prompt him to conceal. I had a right to expect, that 
when the witnesses could testify any thing in my 
favour, they would speak in the same unreserved 
language, which they used, when they intended to 
expose my misconduct. 

Upon most occasions, observations on circum- 
stances apparently so light, might not be proper or 
necessary. But, Gentlemen, I beg you to recollect, 
that the witnesses have undertaken to interpret my 
looks, and have ventured to infer from my countenance, 
from my appearance and manner, w hat was passing in 
my mind, and by w hat motives I was actuated. They 
have not hesitated to express opinions derived from 
no other indications, when they knew, that these 
opinions might affect my Jionour and my life. It 
cannot be improper then, that I should ask you to 
remark even the slightest expression of a witness, 
which I may think will betray the disposition with 
which lie testifies. It is with reluctance that I at- 
tempt to impeach the testimony of any witness who 
has been called against me. I have been taught to 
venerate a soldier from my infancy. I know that 
the profession of arms generally adds lustre to the 
most noble virtues. But I know that men do not 
change their natures by becoming soldiers, nor by 
attaining the most elevated rank. And when they 
can reconcile to themselves to accuse me of cowai'd- 



GENERAL HULL. 127 

ice, from appearances so fallacious, surely I may re- 
mark, that expressions they have used indicate bias, 
partiality, or prejudice. 

Without detaining the Court with a particular re- 
capitulation of more of the evidence on this point, 
I shall content myself with referring it to the very 
important and decisive testimony of captain Dyson, 
to the testimony of captain Bacon, and finally to the 
testimony of Mr. Watson ; who says, that after my 
arrival at Detroit, no man could have been more in- 
dustrious and indefatigable than I was. 

I proceed to a new^ subject, and shall now make 
my defence against the accusation, which is in sub- 
stance ; that I did not avail myself of the opportu- 
nity, which the defeat of the enemy by colonels Ca^a 
and Miller, and their possession of the bridge over 
the river Aux Canards, on the ei^hteenlh of July af- 
forded of making an attempt on Maiden ; and that I 
did not maintain possession of the bridge. This 
forms tlie sixth specification under the charge of un- 
officer-Uke conduct. . 

The expcsition I have already presented of my 
views and designs when I crossed to Canada, would, 
I humbly conceive, afford a sufficient answer to these 
accusations. I did not think it expedient to attack 
Maiden, under any circumstances, which existed 
previous to our leaving Canada. Why I thought it 
inexpedient I have already explained. The advaii- 



1^8 DEFENCE OF 

tages which I thought were to be gained by delay ; 
a regard which my orders compelled me to pay to the 
security of my own posts ; the necessity of keeping 
open my communication ; the certain consequences 
of defeat, and the probable consequences of victory, 
have all been considered, in making my defence 
against the charge of undue delay in Canada. If I 
was justifiable, or even excusable, in deferring the at- 
tack on Maiden, I must be so in having omitted to 
avail myself of the possession of the bridge, and in 
not having attempted to maintain it. It would have 
been absurd to have attempted to maintain a post so 
far in advance, unless it was with a view to an im- 
mediate movement on Maiden. But I beg the Court 
to advert to the date of this transaction. It was not 
on the eighteenth of July, as mentioned in the speci- 
fication, but on the seventeenth, as appears by my 
letter to colonel Cass. This was the fifth day after we 
moved into Canada.^ At that time, the deliberations 
of my officers in Canada had uniformly resulted in the 
expression of an opinion, that the attempt on th« 
enemy's fortress should be deferred, till the artillery 
was prepared; and it was immediately after the 
council at Sandwich, in which colonel Cass himself, 
as appears by the testimony of judge Witherill, had 
advised that the attack on Maiden should not be made 
without cannon. 

My views in sending this detachment, or rather in 
permitting general Cass to march it, appear from his 
testimony. I meant it as a reconnoitring party, and 



GENERAL HULL. 129 

by no means intended that the commandmg officer 
should pursue measures which might expose the de- 
tachment to be sacrificed, or oblige me to abandon 
the system I had adopted, by leading my whole army 
to its support. Colonel Cass testifies, that a day or 
two after colonel Mac Arthur was detached to the river 
Trench, he (colonel Cass,) requested me to permit 
him to reconnoitre the ground between Sandwich and 
Maiden; that I did permit it, and a detachment of 
two hundred and eighty men were ordered for that 
service. 

General Taylor states, that he was present when 
news arrived that colonel Cass had taken the Aux 
Canards bridge. " That I expressed my astonishment, 
" that colonel Cass should have commenced hostilities, 
'' as I vv^as not ready with the artillery ; that I appeared 
" to be irritated, because colonel Cass had taken upon 
" himself to act, without my authority : the detach- 
"' raent having only been sent out for observation." 

It cannot be doubled, but that general Cass knew 
my views, and the objects of his detachment. How 
far he w^as justiSable, in pursuing measures so con- 
trary to them, not only in making an attack, which 
might have forced me to a general and decisive action 
for his support, but after my verbal orders to retire, 
persisting to maintain his situation, till he tried the 
effect of a written remonstrance to me, it is unneces- 
sary now to consider. I do now believe, that the 
whole of this proceeding was a manoeuvre, to afford 



130 DEFENCE OF 

grounds for new clamours against me, and ^^eaken 
my authority. My officers, long before they had ma- 
tured their conspiracy to wrest the command from 
me by actual violence to my person, had formed a 
plan, of which I firmly believe this was a part, to 
place me in such situations as would oblige me to be 
obedient to their schemes. If any thing successful 
was done, they would claim all the merit. In case 
of disaster, the blame could easily be thrown on the 
commanding general. If I had led the army to the 
Canards, which probably I must have done to have 
maintained the bridge, instead of its being alleged 
against me as a crime, that I did not do so, do you 
not believe, Gentlemen, in case we had been defeated, 
I should have been charged with misconduct, in hav- 
ing acted in opposition to the advice of all the coun- 
cil, not to move on Maiden without artillery ? And 
when it is considered, that colonel Mac Arthur was 
absent with a large detachment; that I had received 
no intelligence from him ; that I was under great un- 
easiness on his account, I do think that if I had left 
him in my rear, and witli only a part of my army had 
taken ground, which might have been the field of a 
general action with the enemy's whole force, which 
was then either in respect to its regulars, militia, or 
savages, unascertained, and at that time but incon- 
siderably weakened by desertion, I should have been 
highly culpable. 

Colonel Miller's account of this transaction is as 
follows ; "in answer to a message sent to general Hull, 



GENERAL HULL. 131 

" he sent us an order to return. The purport of his 
" message wns, that he could not soon be ready for 
" the attack on Maiden, and could not thuik of divid- 
" ing the firmy. We then wrote to him and pressed 
" in strong terms the necessity of maintaining the 
" bridge, in answer to which he sent a written dis- 
" cretionary order to us, expressing his anxiety about 
" general Mac Arthur, &c." 

This order has been proved. It is in the following 
words : 

Sandwich, July 17, 1812. 
Sir, 

I have received your letter of this morn- 
ing. To my astonishment I have received not the 
least information from Mac Arthur. It is possible 
something unpleasant has taken place. It will pro- 
bably be a week before the cannon will be mounted. 
I am sensible of the advantages of holding the bridge. 
I would not, however, hazard too much for the pur- 
pose. The enemy may pass the ford above, and 
come in the rear. I will, however, leave it to your 
discretion, and colonel Miller's, under all the circum- 
stances of the case to do that which you judge most 
expedient. Twelve miles is a great distance, and 
the enemy can either land in boats above the mouth 
of the river, or pass at the ford to attack you. You 
know the ground better than I do, and as I before 
observed, I ayIU leave the measure and the force to 



132 DEFENCE OF 

your tliscretion and colonel Miller's, and the best 
mode of security to the party. 

I am very respectfully, 

your most obedient servant. 
William Hull, 

Brigadier General, conimaiKliug. 

Colonel Cass. 

Colonel Miller further testifies, that, " upon the rc- 
" ceipt of this letter, the officers were called together, 
" and it w as decided, that unless the bridge, being 
" twelve or fourteen miles from our camp, and only 
" four or five from the enemy, could be supported by 
" our whole force, we had better return ; and that as we 
" had not the disposition of the whole force, which 
" was thought necessary, we ought not to take the 
" responsibility." 

This testimony, I think, developes too plainly to 
hQ misunderstood, the design of these proceedings. 
I was to be compelled to abandon my own plans, and 
to adopt those of my officers. I was to be compelled 
to lead my whole force in a manner under the walls 
of Maiden, without being provided with artillerj^ and 
I was urged to do this, by the commandant of the de- 
tachment, who but a day or two previously had given 
a decisive opinion, in council, that the attack on 
3Ialden should not be made till the ordnance was 
prepared. 



GENERAL HULL. 133 

But when it was found, that my order left the offi- 
cers of the detachment a discretion, and that if an 
attempt to maintain the bridge should be attended 
•with any disaster, the officers must share the respon- 
sibility, then there was no doubt as to the measures 
to be pursued. It would have disappointed the whole 
design if I should escape any part of the odium. 

But however this affair of the bridge has been 
magnified, it is a fact, that the possession of that pass 
by the enemy never was contemplated as an obstacle 
to a movement on Maiden. They, in truth, never 
attempted to maintain possession of it. Colonel 
Cass's rencontre was only Avith a reconnoitring party. 
According to the testimony of colonel Miller, they 
saw no more than fifty of the enemy. He saj s they 
had about twenty five men on the bridge, and about 
twenty five on our side, and that some men were dis- 
covered in the woods. After this, there were, as ap- 
pears from the testimony of colonel Cass, repeated de- 
tachments sent from Sandwich to the bridge. They 
always found it unoccupied by the enemy. It could 
then have been no object to have moved the army to 
that post, until the attack on Maiden was determined 
upon. 

It is curious to observe, Vv^hat trivial and irrelevant 
circumstances ingenuity can bring together to create 
false appearances. Some of the gentlemen, who 
were prisoners with the enemy at the time of this 
transaction, have been produced to testify, that wheri 
13 



134 DEFENCE OP 

accounts reaciied Amherstburgh that our detachment 
had appeared in the Aux Canards, it created great 
consternation ; and it was intended that it should be 
believed, that the enemy were ready to abandon their 
post at our approach. But it turns out, upon further 
explanation from witnesses of the same description, 
that the disposition to fly was only manifested by the 
town's people, who thought it unnecessary to expose 
their persons and effects in a place which was likely 
to be invested. This, so far from being evidence of 
an intention to yield the place without contest, is not 
an uufrequent measure when the most obstinate re- 
sistance is intended. 

In my letter to the Secretary at War of the nine- 
teenth of July, I mention the affair at the Aux Ca- 
nard bridge, and say, great credit is due to colonel 
Cass and his detachment. For firmness, to colonel 
Cass and the other volunteers, when supported by the 
proportion of regulars, which were with them in this 
first encountre with any enemy, I did think credit 
was due, both to men and officers. — But when I wrote 
that letter, I had not the same view of the designs 
formed against me which subsequent circumstances 
have expressed. I did not then see, that a plan 
which has been so successful, was settled to make 
my destruction a merit, which was to give another 
my place, and some of his accomplices, rank and 
fortune, 

I am charged with unofficer-Iike conduct in sufier- 
ing my communication with the river Raisin to be 



GENERAL HULL. ISj 

cut off. This imputation is among the last that I ex- 
pected to find in the catalogue of my accusations. 
If it had been intended to shew, that nothing that I 
did, or intended to do, could escape censure, this spe- 
cification would afford strong evidence of such a dis- 
position. For the means that I took to open this 
communication are also made the subjects of accusa- 
tion. The detachment under colonel Van Horn, 
the retreat from Canada, the detachment under co- 
lonel Miller, and under colonels Mac Arthur and 
Cass, although they were all measures which were 
dictated by the strong necessity, which I saw and 
felt, to keep open the communication in question, are 
all set down as instances of misconduct. Bui I 
would ask those, at whose instigation these charges 
have been made, what measures I should have pur- 
sued to have effected this object? It must be remem- 
bered, that it was utterly in vain to have opened the 
communication to the river Raisin only. No sup- 
plies could come from thence that were not drawn 
from the western states. I must therefore have pro- 
tected the road all the way from Ohio. Was this to 
have been done by stretching back so great a dis- 
tance with a sufficient force ? If so, my whole army 
would have been insufficient for the purpose. The 
two hundred men I sent under major Van Horn my 
two senior officers thought insufficient. In their 
opinion, I ought to have detached, for this duty, one 
of their regiments. Colonel Miller, after he had de- 
feated the enemy, had more than five hundred men 
left, and was within fourteen miles of his destination. 



130 DEFENCE- OF 

He thought it necessary to send back io me for a rc- 
hifoFcement of one hundred and fifty, or two hundred j 
before he could proceed, although he knew that at the 
liver Raisin he was to be joined, and would be 
strengthened in his march back, by the detachment 
under captain Brush, which had escorted the provi- 
sions to the river Raisin. If so great a number of 
men was requisite merely to force a passage to the 
river Raisin and back, how great a portion of my 
army would have been necessary to keep open the 
road to Ohio, or even that portion of it which was 
between Detroit and the river Raisin ? 

1 think it must appear to the Court, that I could 
not have kept open this extensive line of communi- 
cation, without distributing my whole armj'^ along the 
road ; and yet, according to the inferences to be drawn 
from the charges and specifications, I was criminal 
in not carrying on an offensive war in Canada, and 
in not performing, at the same time, another service, 
which would have required all my troops. 

That this communication ought to have been kept 
open is most certain, I tlid expect it would have been. 
I did suppose that a force would have been sent after 
me, adequate not only to this purpose, but to augment 
my army. The grounds I had for these expectations 
will appear from documeiits, which are before the 
Court, to some of which I have already adverted. 

It is alleged, that I was guilty of misconduct in 
sending the detachment under major Van Horn, be- 



GENERAL HULL. 137 

cause it was inadequate to the purpose for wliich it 
was intended. The proof of the inadequacy, I presume, 
is, that it was defeated. It appears, however, that it 
was not owing to want of numbers tliat this defeat 
happened. According to major Van Horn's own ac- 
count, the party that attacked him, he judged from 
the fire, was from one hundred and fifty to two hun- 
dred. This was conjecture, for more than forty sav- 
ages were not seen. But these volunteers, the same 
patriotic men who are said to have wept so bitterlj^ 
because they were not allov/ed to fight at Detroit, 
fled in the first moments of an attack, with the utmost 
disorder and precipitation. Had not this been the 
case the detachment was sufficient. If it had fought 
the enemy, there can be no doubt but it would have 
made its way good to the river Raisin, where it would 
have been joined by a large detachment under cap- 
tain Brush. If the detachment had been ever so 
large, it would have been insufficient, if the men be- 
haved no better than those major Van Horn com- 
manded did upon this occasion. But, Sir, the true 
foundation for this charge is, that I did not think pro- 
per to be obedient to the advice of my two senior 
officers. It was placed in this black catalogue, solely 
for the purpose of giving them an opportunity of pro- 
claiming to the v7orld their own superiour sagacity 
and judgment. It was to give tkcm an opportunity 
to prove by their own testimony, that whatever I did 
was wrong, and that whatever they advised would 
have been right. 
13* 



138 DEFENCE OF 

But possibly I ought to have suffered the advice of 
these officers upon this occasion to have had more 
v/eight. I should have reflected, that they had the 
best opportunity of knowing the character of their 
own troops, and might have anticipated their shame- 
ful conduct; but then I think, I have reason to com- 
plain, that colonels Cass and Mac Arthur were not at 
this time as candid, as they were when it was pro- 
posed to attempt Blalden by assault, and that they did 
not tell me, as they did then, that they could not be 
responsible for their men. If thej^ had told me this, 
I might have thought it right to increase the force of 
the detachment, and to have added to it some regu- 
Urs; whose presence might, as it did at the Aux Ca- 
nards, have encouraged the volunteers to have faced 
the enemy, or made them more afraid to run away 
than to fight. 

The next accusation is one, that can only have 
been set down to swell the list of offences imputed' 
to me ; for it is without any manner of foundation. 
It charges me with unofficer-like conduct, in having 
detached colonel Miller on the eighth of August, and 
not having supplied him with provisions, when he w as 
near Brownstown. 

While, Sir, I feel myself bound to acknowledge the 
liberality with which I have been treated by the 
•ludge Advocate, in the course of this trial, and the 
delicacy with which he has in general refrained from 
repeating the odious epithets, vvhich are so profusely 



GENERAL HULL. 139 

and wantonly used in the specifications, I cannot but 
regret, that he has, in respect to this charge, departed 
from his general observance ; and that he should, upon 
Such evidence as was before him, have thought him- 
self justifiable in imputing to my misconduct, on this 
occasion, an useless waste of American blood. Sir, 
the American blood that was spilled in the contest at 
Brownstown was gloriously shed. It purchased a 
victory that did honour to our arms. True, it was 
inefifectually shed— but to lay the failure of the enter- 
prise to me, and to reproach me with this waste of 
blood, is as unjust as it is inhuman. 

I do not understand, that I am supposed to have 
•lone v.rong in sending the detachment, or in not 
making it of greater force. By the testimony of 
colonel Bliller it appears, that he marched with six 
hundred men, instead of five hundred, as is mentioned 
in the specification. But the misconduct imputed to 
me is, as I understand, solely, that I omitted to sup- 
ply colonel Miller with provisions after the battle at 
Brownstown. With respect to the want of provisions, 
it appears, that the detachment was amply provided 
when it left Detroit. The march they were to per- 
form, was about thirty miles; and colonel Miller 
states, that they Avere furnished with a supply for two 
days when they set out. But he says, that the pro- 
visions were thrown away with the men's knapsacks 
when they were attacked, and though he represents 
the enemy to have been entirely beaten, and so far 
driven from off his rout, that captain Maxwell went 



140 DEFENCE OF 

from him to Brownstown and back, and reported^ 
that the enemy were all gone : and though colonel 
Miller states, that he returned to the battle ground 
with his whole force, and was, in fact, undisturbed on 
that ground nearly two days, yet he says in his cross- 
examination, that the provisions were not recovered, 
because he could not suffer his men to separate to 
take them up. I cannot conceive what necessity 
there could have been for his men's separating. It 
appears to me, that he would only have had to march 
his whole detachment over the ground where the at- 
tack was made, and the provisions might have been 
recovered with as much security to the detachment, as 
w hen they were remaining inactive in the position to 
which they had retrograded. Colonel Miller, iu his 
account of this transaction, states, that he considered 
that his victory opened the communication to the 
river Raisin sufficiently for him' to have proceeded — 
that on the evening of the day on which the battle 
was fought, that is, the ninth, he sent major Snelling 
to make a report to me, to inform me of the loss of 
the provisions, and to request, that I would send boats 
or waggons with provisions, and to take back the 
wounded. He was also to request a reinforcement for 
colonel Miller, which colonel Miller, on his cross-ex- 
amination says, he suggested should be from one hun- 
dred and fifty to two hundred men. Colonel Miller 
also states, that colonel Mac Arthur came down the 
next morning (that is on the tenth) with eight or nine 
boats, and brought with him no more than two barrels of 
flour, one barrel of pork, and half a barrel of whiskey ^ — 



GENERAL HULL. 141 

fhat the place where the battle was fought was 
about fourteen miles from Detroit, and sixteen to the 
river Raisin, between Maguago and Brownstown ; it 
being late in the day before the wounded men could 
be got on board the boats, he knew that he could not 
get through before the next night, (that is the eleventh) 
moving as cautiously as they ought to do ; — that the 
men still complaining of hunger, he concluded that 
he could send to Detroit that evening, (that is the 
tenth) and have provisions the next morning ; — that 
he accordingly sent an express to me on the evening 
of the tenth, requesting that I would send him two 
day's provisions ; — that no messenger from me came 
to him till sun down the next day, (that is the eleventh) 
that the messenger informed him, he had been 
detained by losing his way; — that this messenger 
brought him an order from me to return to Detroit, 
and informed him that he would find provisions at the 
river Ecorce ; — that on the same evening he took up 
his march for Detroit, and arrived there the next day, 
(the twelfth ;) that his force was two hundred and 
eighty regulars, and three hundred and twenty militia, 
some of the Michigan militia, and some of the Detroit 
horse ; — that the militia behaved well ; — that his loss 
was seventeen killed, and sixty-four wounded. 

Sir, it has always appeared to me most unaccount- 
able, that colonel Miller, after he had disposed of his 
wounded men on the tenth, and when, according to 
his own testimony, he considered that his victory had 
opened his communication to the river Raisin, did not 



142 DEFENCE OF 

proceed. He had but sixteen miles to march. He re- 
mained in the position he had taken from the even- 
ing of the tenth, when he had embarked his wounded 
men, till the evening of the eleventh, that is twenty- 
four hours, when he might have accomplished hia 
march, as I should think, in four or five hours. At the 
end of it he was sure not only to meet the provisions 
he was sent to escort, but a strong reinforcement from 
the detachment under captain Brush. He says, how- 
ever, that on the evening of tlie tenth, he determined 
to halt where he was, and to wait the return of an ex- 
press from me, because he should be obliged to move 
with so much caution ; that he knew he could not get 
through until the next night — a very extraordinary 
caution indeed must have been necessary, that could 
have retarded for so long a time the march of a body 
of troops for sixteen miles, through a space, which it 
had been ascertained by the report of captain Maxwell, 
was, as far as Brownstown at least, free from an ene- 
my. But if the want of provisions was a reason for 
not proceeding to the river Raisin, whj^ did not colo- 
nel Miller push on to Brownstown — there was an In- 
dian settlement, which, without doubt, vsas at least 
capable of supplying his immediate Avants, and from 
which he could not have been distant but a very few 
miles. If there he could have got but one meal for 
his troops, it does appear to me, that there would not 
have been any great enterprise in undertaking the 
rest of the march, which might have been twelve or 
fourteen miles, without any further provisions. It did 
appear to me not less extraordinar)^ that when colonel 



GENERAL HliTLL. 143 

Miller advised me when he had gained so decisive 
a victory that he considered his road to the river 
Raisin as opened, and he had ascertained that there 
was no enemy between him and Brownstown, that 
he should, at the same time, have made a demand 
on me for a reinforcement of one hundred and fifty or 
two hundred men — when, after his battle, he had five 
hundred and twenty effective men, two hundred and 
eighty of whom were of his own regiment, and were 
almost the whole force of that description which I 
had under my command. Let me here remark, if so 
great a force, that is to say, between seven and eight 
hundred men, v^^ere necessary, to force their way to 
the river Raisin, what proportion of my troops nmst 
have been necessary, not only to keep open the com- 
munication for that distance, but to guard the line all 
the way to the state of Ohio ? 

But it is not my business to examine the conduct 
of colonel Miller, further than to shew, that when I 
despatched him with so large a detachment, with ra- 
tions for two days, I had made every provision which 
I had any reason to think his exigencies would re- 
quire. 

When, however, I received his demand for provi- 
sions, I took every measure that the duty of my sta- 
tion required to supply him. Colonel Mac Arthur 
was charged with this service, and I beg to present 
to t]ie Court his account of the manner in which he 
performed it. 



144 DEFENCE OF 

" On the day we crossed from Canada," says colo- 
nel Mac Arthur, (that is the eighth of August,) " Colo- 
" nel Miller was sent with a detachment for the pur- 
" pose, as was stated, of opening a communication 
*' with the river Raisin. The night succeeding colo- 
" nel Miller's battle at Maguago, (perhaps the ninth,) 
" the General sent for me — the night was w^et; he in- 
" formed me of the battle, and directed me to take one 
" hundred of my regiment, to take the boats along 
" the river, and to descend to colonel Miller's en- 
" campment, for the purj)ose of bringing up the w ound- 
" ed men. He directed me to get one day's provision, 
"for colonel Miller's detachment. I called at the 
*' commissary's and was detained three or four hours 
" in getting it — I got what I could." 

It has been my misfortune, Sir, that I have not 
been able to obtain the testimony of Mr. Beard, the 
commissary. He has been regularly summoned by 
the Judge Advocate, at my request ; and 1 have se- 
veral times written to him, but he has not made his 
appearance. The Judge Advocate, however, with 
his wonted candour, has admitted a document which 
in some measure supplies his testimony. It is an order 
which I issued to the contractor on the ninth of Au- 
gust, for delivering rations to colonel Mac Arthur for 
colonel Miller's detachment. The receipt of which 
order is acknowledged by the contractor, or a copy 
thereof, which is in the following words : 

" The contractor will issue six hundred rations 
" of bread or flour, six hundred rations of pork, and 



GENERAL HULL. 145 

'• twelve liuntlred rations of whiskey, to be sent to the 
" detachment under the command of lieutenant colo- 
" nel Miller. 

" By order of brigadier general Hull, 

" H. H. Hickman, 

August 9th, 1812. " Captain, Infanti-j'." 

" (correct copy.) 

"■ D. Beard." 

Now, Sir, it appears that general Mac Arthur knew, 
that one purpose of sending him to colonel Miller's 
detachment was to carry provisions. He says, I di- 
rected him to take one day's provisions for colonel 
Miller's men ; that he was detained by the contractor 
three or four hours, and took what he could get. And 
it appears that he arrived at colonel Miller's encamp- 
ment with only two barrels of flour, one barrel of 
pork, and half a barrel of whiskey. When I had 
given the order to colonel Mac Arthur, to take the 
provisions ; when I had issued the order to the proper 
officer to issue them to him, had I not done every 
thing that was incumbent on me, as commanding 
officer ? Was it my duty to go to the commissary's 
store, and to superintend the issues ? If colonel Mac 
Arthur found the commissary disobedient to my order, 
and unduly detaining him, why did he not report to 
me ? How will colonel Mac Arthur excuse his having 
departed on this service, without having with him the 
quantity of provisions I had ordered ? Is it sufficient 
for him to say, that he took what he could get ? If 
14 



146 DEFENCE OF 

ilicre was any deficiency he ought to have informed 
me of it ; he could have had communication with me 
in five minutes. If want of [)rovisions was the rea- 
son why the American blood that was spilled at the 
battle of Brownstown was shed in vain, I again ask, 
was it not most unjust to charge that waste to nie ? 

On the tenth of August, I issued another order for 
provisions for colonel Miller's detachment. This has 
also been read, and is in the following words : 

"Detroit, August 10th, 1812. 
" The contractor will issue, for colonel Miller's de- 
" tachment, two thousand complete rations. 

" A. F. Hull, 

" Aid-de-camp." 

These provisions were sent by the contractor to 
colonel Miller's detachment. Colonel Miller met 
Ihem on his return, and brought them back with him. 

An accusation of the same nature v/ith that which 
I last considered, is, that I also omitted to supply with 
provisions the detachment which left Detroit on the 
fourteenth of Au,2;ust, under colonels Mac Arthur and 
Cass. General Mac Arthur's testimony on this sub- 
ject is as follows : That on the fourteenth of Au- 
gust, about noon, as he thought, I sent for him, and 
informed him, that I had just received intelligence 
from captain Brush, that lie had arrived at the river 
Raisin with provisions, and said, I wished to send 
out a detachment to meet him. That he replied, he 



GENERAL HULL. 1^7 

was ready to obey my order. Colonel Cass sakl the 
same thing. That they (the witness and colonel 
Cass) then returned to camp, and shortly after receiv- 
ed an order to detach one imndred and fifty men from 
^ acli of their regiments. That in the evening I came 
along, and asked if they were ready to march. The 
witness answered, that they were not, but as usual had 
not a bite of any thing to eat. That I said tlie de- 
tachment must not be delayed, and I would send 
provisions after them. The witness then gives an 
account of the proceedings of the detachment till its 
return to Detroit, and states, that they never received 
any provisions from the fort. 

I cannot but think, that this account of general 
Mac Arthur's conduct, though given by himself, will 
excite the surprise of the Court. 

He was ordered to march a detachment at about 
twelve o'clock. He does not move till evening, and 
I then find that he has not obeyed the order. He 
gives me to understand that he has been waiting for 
provisions. If there was no order for provisions, Avhy 
did he not apply to me on the subject ? But there was 
one, and I think general Mac Arthur's testimony 
shews it. 

When he sees me, he does not complain of the 
want of an order, but that he cannot get the provi- 
sions, if there was an order, and the proper officer 
did not obey it, why was not the disobedience report- 



148 DEFENCE OP 

€(l to me ? Instead of pursuing so obvious a course, 
colonel Mac Arthur chose rather to remain in his 
camp five or six hours, and if I had not accidentally 
met \Yith him, how much longer he would have con- 
sidered his delay warranted by the same cause, it is 
impossible to say. It does appear to me, that this 
conduct of general Mae Arthur is very unaccounta- 
ble. Perhaps he had no inclination for the service 
he had been ordered to perform, or it may be, he 
thought, that by the delay, or by going without pro- 
visions, he should bring blame on me. The beha- 
viour of general Mac xVrthur upon these two occa- 
sions, that is to say, in respect to the provisions 
which he ^Yas to take for colonel Miller, and in re- 
spect to provisions for his own detachment, it appears 
to me, manifests very strongly that there was some 
hidden motive for his conduct. And in this last in- 
stance' tliere is a mystery, which I am sure is not ex- 
plained by any thing he has said. It never can be 
believed that he waited so many hours, solely for the 
purpose of obtaining an order for provisions, or if he 
Iiad an order, that his delay was merely for the pur-* 
pose of having it executed. If his only object had 
been to procure provisions, the means of doing so, by 
an application to me, were so obvious and direct, that 
he could not have hesitated to pursue it. But if the 
Court will recollect that at this time the conspiracy 
had been formed to take the command from me, and 
that general Cass, in his letter to the government, has 
stated, that the execution of it was only prevented by 
his and general Mac Arthur's having been sent on 



GENERAL HULL. 149 

iliis tletacliment, it may account for the conduct of 
these officers. The delay was possibly to mature 
their plot, and to put it in practice. 

If general Mac Arthur was on his trial for miscon- 
duct in relation to these transactions, I am persuaded 
that his testimony ought rather to convict him than 
me. 

But I did take measures for supplying the detach- 
ment with the necessary provisions. My information 
from captain Brush was, that he would be on his 
march with the provisions under his escort, with the 
expectation of meeting a detachment frpm Detroit 
for his support. 

It appeared to me, that not a moment ought to be 
lost, in sending a force to meet him ; and when I 
found that general Mac Arthur had delayed to exe- 
cute my orders for so many hours, I determined that 
the departure of the detachment should not be longer 
postponed. I therefore ordered it to march, and de- 
termined to send provisions after it on pack horses. 
I immediately gave the necessary orders to the acting 
Commissary General, for that purpose. This is 
proved by the testimony of general Taylor. He says 
that on the fourteenth of August, I did give him an 
order to furnish pack horses to carry provisions for 
the detachment going to the river Raisin, under 
colonels Mac Arthur and Cass. That he did not 
know whether the provisions were sent, but that pack 
14^ 



IbO DEFENCE OF 

horses were furnished for the purpose, and he pre^ 
sumes the provisions were sent. That I gave all 
the necessarj^ orders for sending them is certain, and 
if my orders were not complied with, I do not think 
I am the person, that ought to be called to an- 
swer for it. It never can be expected, that a com- 
manding officer should not only give orders, but 
should attend to the execution of the details. 
There was, as Mr. Watson has tes^tified, a want of 
system in every department of the army, which it 
was impossible for me to remedy, because the heads 
of them were totally inexperienced. However, the 
fact is, that the provisions in this case were sent. 
But as the detachment, pursuant to my orders, took 
an unusual and obscure road, the guides, as I have 
lieard, misled the provisions, and they were not heard 
of before the surrender. 

In the seventh specification, under ihe charge c4* 
unofficer-Iike conduct, is assembled a variety of accu- 
sations. The first is a little incongruous in its lan- 
guage. It is stated, that the enemy having erected 
batteries opposite to Detroit, I was, from the eleventh 
day of August, to and including the sixteenth day of 
the same month, guilty of a neglect of duty, in not 
preventing the enemy from erecting the said batteries. 

It would be an answer to this charge to say, that I 
could not have prevented the erection of batteries^ 
which it is stated were already in existence. But 
though I think there are many incongruities of the 



GENERAL HULL, 151 

same nature in the specifications^ I have not attempted 
to avail myself of them, and shall no further notice 
this. 

The Court will observe, that this accusation is 
connected v/ith, and indeed entirelj^ rests upon a pre- 
vious allegation, that I v/ell knew these batteries 
were erected by the enemy with an intention to an- 
noy Detroit, and with a design to facilitate the in- 
vasion of the Michigan territory. The fact is, I 
had no such knowledge. I had a firm persuasion 
that the enemy would not invade our territory. I 
did believe that the war on their part would be en- 
tirely a defensive war, and that these batteries were 
only intended for the defence of their own shores. I 
admit. Sir, that my opinions in this respect, subsequent 
events have proved were entirely erroneous. But I 
cannot believe that a mistake in opinion or judgment 
is to be punished as a crime. This would be less a 
defence to an accusation of this nature, was not the 
char2;e so connected, as I have mentioned, with the 
allegation, that I knew how the enemy intended to 
employ their batteries. The question must be first 
asked, had I this knowledge ? There is not'^ particle 
of evidence that I had ; and if this question must be 
answered in the negative, the accusation is not sup- 
ported. But 1 do not rest this part of my defence on 
this ground. 

That the enemy did erect batteries opposite to 
Detroit, and that I did not attempt to annoy them. 



152 DEFENCE OF 

lill they commenced their fire on the fifteenth, are 
facts not to be disputed. I did not annoy them for 
the reason I have ahove mentioned, that I considered 
them as mere defensive Morks. But a desire to pre- 
serve my own ammunition was the principal reason 
for this conduct. I might have hindered the enemy 
from progressing in the day time, but in the night, 
any annoyance 1 could have given them would have 
been ineffectual. Captain Dallaba has given a state- 
ment of the ammunition. Captain Dyson of the 
artillery supposes it would not have lasted more 
than three or four days, if we had commenced and 
continued firing. The fixed ammunition, he says, 
could not have lasted more than two days. Captain 
Bacon testifies, that on the morning of the sixteenth, 
he examined by my orders the magazine, and could 
find but one box of twenty-four pound cartridges, 
and that he reported to me they were nearly ex- 
pended. The testimony of all the witnesses who 
have spoken shews, that my mind was impressed w ith 
the necessity of sparing the ammunition, and that this, 
as well as the expectation that the enemy did not 
intend, as long as I did not provoke, offensive opera- 
tions, w ere the reasons -why I did not cannonade the 
enemy while they were fortifying on the opposite 
shore. Major Trimble testifies, that when he pro- 
posed to me to fire on a party of the enemy, which 
made its appearance on the fourteenth of August at 
Sandwich, I answered that it would not do to expend 
the ammunition uselessly. Captain Bacon says, that 
on the morning of the sixteenth, he was directed by 



GENERAL HULL. 153 

me to go to captain Dyson, at the battery where he 
commanded, and inform him that the twenty-four 
pound ammunition was nearly exhausted, and that he 
must not fire but when there was a prospect of his 
doing execution. 

Another of the accusations which are assembled in 
this specification is, that I omitted to fortify Spring 
Welis. I do not know why it might not as well have 
alleged that I omitted to fortify any other position in 
ihe river Detroit. 

It is not in proof that that spot was particularly 
adapted to a fortification. If it had been fortified, the 
enemy would not probably have selected it as their 
place of debarkation ; almost any other spot within 
the same distance, above or below the fort, was as 
well calculated to afford them a landing. This spe- 
cification also accuses me of having neglected to an- 
noy the enemy after he had landed at Spring Wells. 
Gentlemen, the answer to this specification is em- 
biTiced in the defence I have made as to the final 
surrender. 

I had made preparations for attacking ; the troops 
w ere drawn out, and formed in line of battle ; but 
before the enemy came up, I determined to surrender. 
My reasons for this measure, I have already explain- 
ed. I shall not repeat them. I will only beg you to 
observe, that the reasons I have offered have not 
been suggested merely for the present occasion. Ma- 



154 DEFENCE OF 

jor Munson testifies, that he-sawme the day after the 
surrender ; that I told him I expected to be censured 
for what I had done, but said, " I have done, what 
" under all circumstances was most proper, and I 
*' have saved Detroit and the territory from the hor- 
" rours of an Indian massacre." 

But I am accused of having made the surrender in 
an unofficer-Iike manner ; in having made it before 
the articles of capitulation w ere signed ; in not stipu- 
lating for the honours of war, or for the security of 
the friendly inhabitants of Canada, who had taken 
protection from us. Before I make observations on 
this subject, I beg leave to' present to the Court col- 
lectedly, the testimony which relates to it. 

Major Snelling testifies in substance, that immedi- 
ately after the second shot which did execution in 
the fort was fired, captain Hull was sent across the 
river with a flag, and that he (major Snelling) was 
sent to order colonel Findlay into the fort. The 
witness having performed this duty, went to one of 
the batteries ; while there, a British officer with a 
flag, came to inquire w hat was the meaning of send- 
ing the flag across the river, when general Brock was 
on the American side ? Lieutenant Hunt then went 
w ith the information to me, and returned with a sealed 
letter, and orders that he (the witness) should carry 
it to general Brock. That the witness met general 
Brock at the head of his troops, about three quarters 
of a mile from the fort, where they were not in sight 
from the fort. 



GENERAL HULL. 155 

The wiiness having delivered the letter, of which 
lie was the bearer, general Brock asked the witness 
'^ifhc was authorised to a^ree on terms ?^* The witness 
said not. General Brock then asked two of his offi- 
cers to go with the witness to the fort. 

As they approached the fort, they were met by 
some persons who conducted tliem to a tent, which 
had been erected by my orders, where they were met 
by colonels Miller and Brush, commissioners ap- 
pointed by me, and the capitulation was there signed 
by the commissioners. 

The contents of the note, the witness says, were no 
more than these words : " Sir, I agree to surrender 
*' the town and fort of Detroit." He would not un- 
dertake to say, that the words he gave were the whole 
substaMce of the note, but he believed they were. 

Major Snelling further testifies, that before the ca- 
pitulation was signed, he saw me near the marquee 
in conversation with colonel Findiay, and with the 
British officers, colonel Mac Donald and captain 
Clegg, who were within the marquee. The witness 
said, he did not recollect that I took any part in 
drawing up the capitulation. That I ordered oflT a 
number of our officers, who were collected about the 
marquee, and among the rest the witness. 

In a subsequent part of his examination he says, 
that before the capitulation was signed, colonel Find- 



156 DEFENCE OF 

lay's regiment was marched into the fort, which was 
very much crowded. 

Captain Mac Commick testifies, that after colonel 
Findlay's regiment had been ordered into the fort, he 
met colonel Findlay as he was going into the fort ; 
that they there saw me ; that I requested colonel 
Findlay to join colonel Miller, to treat with the ene- 
my, and said that we could then get better terms 
than we should, if we waited till they attempted to 
storm the fort. Captain Mac Commick further testi- 
fies, that as he went out of the fort, he saw the British 
officers, colonel Mac Donald and captain Clegg, 
coming towards the fort. Some one said, it was im- 
proper they should be permitted to come in, and they 
went to the tent. Shortly after the British officers, 
with colonel Mil fir and colonel Brush, came into the 
fort, and were there together in Dyson's quarters, 
where, as he supposes, the capitulation was signed. 
The witness further testifies, that before this, and at 
about the time the British officers and colonels Miller 
and Brush went into Dyson's quarters, nearly all the 
troops w ere marched into the fort. 

In his cross-examination, captain Mac Commick 
says, it might have been ten minutes, half an hour, or 
more, after the firing ceased, before the troops were 
ordered to march into the fort. That he himself did 
not come into the fort, till half an hour after the firing 
had ceased. 



GENERAL HULL. 157 

Major Van Horn testifies, that on the morning of 
the sixteenth, captain Hull came to the tent of colo- 
nel Findlay, in which the witness also quartered, and 
informed colonel Findlay, that it was my orders that 
his regiment should move to and form on the south- 
west of the fort. 

The witness then describes the position of colonel 
Findlay 's regiment in the line, and the manner in 
which the whole line was formed. He then further 
testifies, that after the line was formed, and about an 
hour, or half an hour before the flag was hoisted, I 
came to the line. That this was during the can- 
nonade. 

British officers were then seen passing to and from 
the Indians. That I appeared satisfied with the po- 
sitions of the troops. That the witness said to me, 
we shall be able to give a good account of them. 
About the time the firing ceased, witness turned 
round and saw a flag hoisted in the fort, and at about 
the same time, captain Snelling came with orders 
from me to colonel Findlay to march his regiment 
into the fort, and said, that it was my directions that 
as the flag was out it should not be violated. 

The witness further testifies, that I remained at 
the line formed by the troops about three, or it 
might have been, five minutes ; — that colonel Find- 
lay expressed dissatisfaction with the order, but said, 
15 



158 DEFENCE OF 

it must be obeyed, and directed the witness to march 
Ills battalion towards the fort, which he did, but halt- 
ed near the fort some minutes ;— that finally he 
marched his men into the fort, and they there stacked 
their arms ; — that colonel Findlay did not come in 
(ill some time afterwards. The witness further testi- 
fies, that when he got into the fort he saw me, but 
was not certain that I was there when he entered ; — 
that some time after the witness had been in the 
fort, I addressed him, and several other officers at the 
«ame time, and invited them into the room of one of 
the officers ; that I told them I had surrendered the 
(fort, and was about to make the terms ; — that I asked, 
if they thought of any thing as a condition, I should 
be glad to know what it was ; — that the witness did 
not go into the room ; — that when he first saw me I 
was on the steps, going into one of the rooms ; — that 
some time after this, colonel Mac Donald and captain 
Clegg rode up, came into the fort, and went into the 
room where I was : — that the witness does not know 
whether I did or did not go into the marquee before 
the British officers came in ; that our whole line, as 
he believes, had marched into the fort and stacked 
their arms ; — that this had taken place before the Bri- 
tish officers came in. 

Major Jessup testifies, tliat he had observed our 
troops retreating, and saw the flag flying. He met 
colonel Findlay, who requested him to ride towards 
the fort, and learn the reason of the retreat j — that 



GENERAL HULL. 159 

lie found me in the fort, and thought me very much 
frightened ; — that after a conversation ^vith me, of 
\vliich he has repeated his own gaihmt expressions, but 
inifortunately cannot recollect what I said, he went 
out and met colonel Findlaj', and said to him all was 
lost; — that when he saw me at the time, the terms of 
capitulation had been agreed upon, that he met me in 
a piazza, before captain Dyson's quarters; — that I wa« 
then perfectl}^ composed. 

He then relates a conversation with me, vviiicli 
concluded with a request that he would continue to 
act in his station, till the troops were marched out of 
the fort; — that he consented to this, and received 
from me, or one of my aids, a copy of the capitulation, 
which I directed him to read to the troops ; and that 
he did this when the troops were marched out at 
about twelve o'clock. 

The witness further states, that he thinks a detach- 
ment of the enemy came into the fort before the ar- 
ticles of capitulation w^ere signed ; but that he is not 
certain whether the enemy's troops marched in before 
the- American troops marched out, but knows that 
the American troops did not march out till after the 
capitulation was signed. 

Captain Burton testifies, that he knew when the 
capitulation w as agreed upon ; — that it was done in 
captain Dyson's quarters, where he saw me, general 



160 DEFENCE OP 

Brock, and two or three British officers; — that they 
were writing and preparing the articles of capi- 
tulation; — that he heard remarks which induced 
him to believe, that the articles of capitulation 
were not agreed upon; — that he could not say, 
whether the American troops were then in the fort, 
but there were, at that time, one hundred and fifty 
British troops standing with advanced arms in the 
fort ; — the enemy were at or about this time placing 
guards in and about the fort ; — that the reason why 
he supposes that the articles were not at this time 
finally agreed upon, was, that he saw general Brock, 
with a paper from which he struck out two or three 
lines, which as he understood related to the regular 
troops returning home, which general Brock said he 
would not agree to ; — that at about this time, he saw 
one of the British officers writing. Before this he 
had seen the British officers and American officers at 
the marquee, and that I also had been there ; — that 
it was about three quarters of an hour after he saw 
the British officers going with me to the marquee, 
before he saw the British officers in Dyson's quar- 
ters. 

On his cross-examination by the Court, major Jes.- 
sup says, when the terms of the capitulation were 
discussing, the American troops were crowded in the 
fort, in the utmost disorder, and the enemy were per- 
mitted to approach so near the fort as to be able to 
take possession of the batteries. 



GENERAL HULL. Vol 

Captain Fuller testifies, that soon after the white 
jlag was hoisted, he went to the fort, and there met 
colonel Mac Donald and major Clegg; — that I was 
standing near the gate, one of the British officers said 
to me, that they were sent by general Brock in con- 
sequence of seeing a flag hoisted, to receive any com- 
munications ; — that I replied, that I should surrender, 
and desired them to go to the marquee, where I would 
go or send to them ; — that major Clegg requested the 
witness to go with him to the marquee for fear our 
militia might fire on him ; — that he went with 'him 
to the marquee ; — they were furnished with pen, ink, 
and paper by major Snelling ; — that soon after they 
got to the marquee, I, colonels Miller and Brush 
came; — that he staid near the marquee about ten 
minutes, and then went to the fort, leaving me at the 
marquee ; — that when he returned to the fort, he 
found our troops were in and had stacked their arms ;— 
that some time after he saw the British officers, 
Mac Donald and Clegg, come out of Dyson's quar- 
ters, one of them having a paper, which he said had 
been signed by me, and that he was going to take it 
to general Brock for his approbation, and wished the 
witness to go with him for the same purpose ; — that 
he accompanied him to the marquee ; — that the wit- 
ness went and found the British column led by colo- 
nel Proctor about half a mile below the fort ; — tliat 
he left colonel Mac Donald and returned to the fort. 

Colonel Miller testifies, that on the morning of the 
sixteenth I was in the fort j — that it was reported in 



162 DEFENCE OF 

me that the enemy were advancing, and that part of 
tlie Michigan militia had joined the enemy ; — that 
upon this I asked him if I had not better send out a 
flag. He told me he did not know. I had better con- 
.sult the officers who were without the fort, that they 
had the best opportunity of judging; — that I said 
there was no time for consultation, that I would send 
a flag, and that I did so; — that some time after this, 
colonel Findlay's regiment marched into the gar- 
rison ; — that I went to a tent and sent for him ; — that 
when he approached the tent, I was standing in the 
lent with my back towards him ; — that he heard me 
say to the British officers in the tent, " I will surren- 
der ;" — that I then requested him, with colonel Brush, 
to assist in drawing up some articles of capitulation ; — 
that he remained at the tent, lying on the ground, 
in a violent fit of the fever and ague, while colonels 
Brush and Mac Donald were penning the articles. 

The original articles of capitulation were then 
shewn to the witness, and he said he believed thera 
to be those which he had signed, but said he was 
strongly impressed with a belief that when they were 
read to him, and he signed them, they contained a 
])rovision that the garrison should march out with the 
honours of war. 

In his cross-examination by the Court, colonel 
Miller states, that according to his best recollection, 
he went to the tent between ten and eleven o'cloek. 



GENERAL HULL. , tC3 

On the morning of the sixteenth ; — that he remained 
about three quarters of an hour ; — that after he had 
signed the capitulation, he went to the fort and went 
to bed. There were then no British troops in the 
fort, but he saw as he went in, a company of about one 
hundred British soldiers, standing near the gate of the 
fort. In a subsequent part of his cross-examination, 
he states, that I tokl him I was willing that he should 
make a surrender the basis of a treaty, and that he 
must get the best terms he could. He further says, 
that when I sent out the flag, I mentioned to him that 
I did it to gain time ; that I expected to procure a 
cessation of hostilities, and that I might in the mean 
time hear from colonels Mac Arthur and Cass. Colo- 
nel Miller Avas called again a few days after his first 
examination, and he then stated, that after the first 
flag was sent out, and before an answer was returned, 
colonel Brush came to me, and having been inform- 
ed, that Enagg's men, who had the advanced post be- 
low the fort, had deserted to the enemy, colonel 
Brush exclaimed, that " By God, or that, he believed 
" by God, his men would desert to a man." 

I believe, may it please the Court, I have here col- 
lected all the testimony that is material, Avhether it 
be for or against me, which in any wise relates to the 
matter now under consideration. I do not pretend 
that I have given the very words of the witnesses in 
all instances ; but I have done so, as nearly as my 
own recollection, and the notes of my counsel, would 



1G4 DEFENCE OF 

permit. If there be any errours, or omissions, they 
certainly cannot be intentional ; because I know that 
the members of the Court will have recourse to their 
own minutes, and to the record of the Judge Advo- 
cate ; and if it should appear that I have, in any re- 
spect, wilfully perverted the testimony, it would be an 
artifice from which I would derive no benefit. 

In reviewing the testimony, the Court, I think, must 
at once perceive a strange variety in the statements 
of the different witnesses. Though the times at which 
the difilerent transactions took place are all impor- 
tant, hardly any two of the witnesses agree in this 
respect. 

The Court will recollect, that there are three docu- 
ments in evidence, which appear to form the articles 
of capitulation. These are all dated on the sixteenth 
of August. One, purporting to be the articles of capitu- 
lation; the other purporting to be a supplement to the 
articles; and the third purporting to be an addition 
to the supplemental articles. There is also a fourth 
document, being a letter directed to the commanding 
officer of the Rapids, which purports to be an expla- 
nation of the articles of capitulation. Before I make 
any observations on this testimony, I will give the 
Court a relation of my conduct in respect to the sur> 
render, and state the motives, which influenced me. 
If a departure from the forms, ceremonies, and eti- 
quette of modern warfare, where civilized men are the 



GENERAL HULL. 163 

belligerents, will condemn me, I must submit. But I 
do persuade myself, that this Court will consider my 
peculiar situation, and the character of the enemy 
which was opposed to me ; and that I will be thought 
excusable, if I permitted a precipitation to which 
some forms and pageantry were sacrificed, with a 
view to save from the cruelty of the savages, many 
brave men, and many families of parents and chil- 
dren. 

As soon as I found that the enemy intended a se- 
rious attack upon Detroit, I knew that sooner or later 
my army must fall. I knew, that even victory would 
not save me, and could be but a temporary advantage. 
The certain consequences of defeat I could not con- 
template without horrour. It presented a scene, which 
I need not attempt to describe. It is obvious, that 
it would have left our savage enemies to indulge, with- 
out restraint, their passion for rapine and cruelty. 
The small body of regulars which I had with me, I 
was obliged to keep in the fort, for its protection. I 
had no other troops that understood the management 
of cannon. With one third of the residue of my force 
absent, and with nothing to rely upon out of the fort, 
but untried and undisciplined militia, officered by 
men, most of whom were in hostility to me, and had 
even conspired against me, what was I to expect from 
a contest ? 

I determined at any rate, that I ought, if it were 
possible, to ward off the attack, and gain time, till the 



IGo DEFENCE OF 

tletaclimeiit under colonels Mac Arthur and Cass^ 
who were my two senior officers, might return. 

The Court will recollect, that I had sent an ex- 
press for them, as soon as I received general Brock's 
summons on the fifteenth. After the line was formed 
on the sixteenth, as appears by the testimony of cap- 
tain Mac Commick, colonel Van Horn, and major 
Snelling, I visited the troops where they were drawn 
up. I then went to the fort, in expectation of hear- 
ing of the absent detachment ; but receiving no intel- 
ligence from them, I determined to propose a cessa- 
tion of hostilities to treat of a surrender. I accord- 
ingl}'^ sent a flag over the river, and when the British 
officer came to inquire the meaning of that flag, I 
sent the note to general ]5rock, of which major Snel- 
ling speaks. That these were my views when I sent 
this flag, appears by the testimony of colonel Miller, 
to whom I explained myself on the subject. I do not 
recollect what were the precise words of this note, 
but I think it will appear very evident to the Court, 
that the contents of it could not have been, as major 
Snelling has stated, neither more nor less than an 
offer of unconditional surrender. For, according 
to major Snelling, tl;*^ first question general Brock 
put to him, after he had read the note, was to ask 
major Snelling if he " was authorized to agree on 
terms." No such question would have been asked if 
I had offered to surrender without terms. 

As soon as I had determined to negotiate, I also de- 
termined to change my positions for defence. I thought 



GENERAL HULL- 167 

it better to draw the troops to the fort, and if I made 
a resistance, it was my opinion that I could do it to 
most advantage, by manning the fort with a full com- 
plement, and forming a line, supported on the right 
by the fort, and on the left by the citadel and the 
batteries on the bank of the river ; having in front a 
line of pickets wliich extended from the fort to the 
citadel, and which was intended to cover the commu- 
nication between one and the other. With these 
views and intentions, I ordered the troops to the fort, 
intending to post them from thence before the negoti- 
ation should break off, if there should be no terms 
agreed upon. When these orders were given, I had 
appointed colonels Brush and Miller to repair to a 
tent without the fort, and treat with the enemy. At 
this moment I received the intelligence, that the two 
companies mentioned by major Anderson, Knagg's 
and Shover's, had gone over to the enemy ; and heard 
from colonel BrusJi, the declaration, that " ly God" 
every man of his regiment had or would desert. The 
consequences of such a defection immediately occur- 
red tome. Colonel Brush's troops had been posted 
to guard the upper part of the settlement. If they 
made no resistance, there v^^as nothing to hinder the 
British and their savages from landing above the 
town ; and, while we should be engaged with the in- 
vaders from the south, the savages would be making 
indiscriminate slaughter of the inliabitants, through 
tlie whole extent of the northern part of the settle- 
ment. 



1G8 DEFENCE OF 

From this moment I determined to surrender on the 
best terms I could obtain. I told colonel Miller, that 
this was my determination. I went to the tent. Colo- 
nel Miller had not arrived there. I had mentioned to 
colonel Brush and the British officers, the terms I 
should insist upon, and concluded by saying, " 1 shall 
surrender ;'' meaning, on the terms I had previously 
mentioned. This was the declaration colonel Miller 
heard. After I had explained the terms I had ex- 
l>ectcd, I left the tent and returned to the fort. On my 
arrival there, I found to my surprise that all the troops 
bad crowded into the fort, had stacked their arms, and 
were in a state of entire insubordination. Let it be 
remembered, that neither of these steps had been 
taken by my orders. I had ordered colonel Findlay's 
regiment onh'^ into the fort ; and it is not proved, or 
pretended, that I gave any orders for stacking the 
arms. I now became impatient to put the place un- 
der the protection of the British. I knew that there 
were thousands of the savages around us. Every mo- 
ment reports were brought to me of their depredations, 
and in the situation in which my troops then were, I 
could afford no protection to the inhabitants. I was 
anxious, that our enemies should have the command 
and government, that they might be able to put a re- 
straint on their savage allies, which I had no power to 
do. An additional weight on my mind, that had 
great influence on my conduct, was what I considered 
might be the dangerous situation of the detachment 
under colonels Mac Arthur and Cass. I thought i^ 
possible it might be at a distance, and might be 



GENERAL HULL. 169 

cut off. If we should unsuccessfully resist, I was sure 
it would. Ill this state of things, the articles of 
capitulation were brought to me from the tent, signed 
and executed. I accepted them. I gave a copy of 
them to major Jessup, as he has testified, and he after- 
wards read them to the troops, when they marched 
out at twelve o'clock. These must be considered 
as the articles of capitulation, and by these my con- 
duct must be tested. For the two other documents, 
the one styled supplemental articles, and the other an 
addition to the supplemental articles, are rather to be 
considered as an agreement between myself and the 
enemy's general than as parts of the capitulation. I 
admit, that when these Avere signed 1 had no power 
to resist if he had not chosen to agree to them, and 
therefore they are no more te be considered as a part 
of the capitulation, than the letter which bears date 
the next day. It was these supplemental articles, 
which were signed in capfein Dyson's quarters, and 
most of the witnes'ses, who speak of what was done 
before or after the capitulation was signed, obviously 
speak with reference to the execution of these instru- 
ments. 

God knows tlie articles are not what I would have 
wished to have had them. If I had been warring 
with civilized man, where the blood of combatants 
only could be shed, I ought not, I would not have 
accepted them. But when upon the consequences of 
refusing them, depended the lives of so many innocent 
people, I did not feel myself authorized to reject 
them. 

16 



170 DEFENCE OF 

Having put before the Court the testimony whicli 
relates to this specification, and given my own ac- 
count of the transactions to which it relates, I will 
asfain notice the accusations, and make some few ob- 
servations upon them. 

Tlie first accusation is, that I surrendered before 
the capitulation was signed. This is certainly dis- 
proved. There w^as not an enemy in the fort before 
the capitulation was brought to me from the tent, nor 
before I delivered a copj^ cf it to major Jessup.' * The 
testimony of colonel Miller is conclusive upon this 
point. He says, there were no British troops in the 
fort when he brought me the capitulation from the 

tent. 

* 

A second accusation is, that I did not stipulate for the 
lionours of war. Among the variety of circumstances, 
in my situation, which I ftml to deplore, and which 
agitated my mind to a great degree, there was none 
that excited my own feelings more, than to find, that 
though this provision had been inserted in the articles, 
as originally drawn by the commissioners, it had been 
stricken out. I tliought of rejecting the articles on 
this account. I nuist have then opened a new nego- 
ciation. I have already stated what appeared to me as 
tlie consequences of further delay. The savages were 
unrestrained. I determined not to expose the lives 
of the inhabitants to their fury for the sake of obtain- 
ing so useless a pageantry. 



GENERAL HULL. 171 

The articles are also condemned, because tliey con- 
tained no stipulation for the security of the friendly 
inhabitants of Canada. With respect to the people 
(of Canada who had been friendly to us, and who had 
■remained in their own country when we retreated, no 
stipulation in their favour was necessary. The Bri- 
tish had ofifered full pardon to all their subjects who 
had shewn any disaffection ; and when the capitula- 
tion was signed, there were none in Canada who had 
not availed themselves of this offer. With respect to 
those who were with us, the capitulation does contain 
an article in their favour. They are unquestionably 
included in the third article, which provides that 
"private persons, and property of every description^ 
" shall be respected." 

But, Sir, a stipulation in favour of Canadians, who 
were with us at the time of the surrender, was, in fact, 
entirely a matter of supererogation ; because, accord- 
ing to the best of my recollection, there was but one 
person of that description with us, at the time of the 
capitulation, ^nd he is now an officer of rank in our 
army. 

The evidence, that any stipulation for the security 
of the Canadians, other than what the articles con- 
tained, was unnecessary, is, that it is the undoubted 
fact, that from the time we retreated from Canada, 
no individual has suffered, either in his person or pro- 
perty, on account of any part he may have taken 
against his own government, or on account of any 
connection which he may have had with our army. 



172 DEFENCE OP 

The specification states other olyections to the 
capitulation, but as they are of an inferiour nature, and 
must be excusable if those I have noted are so, I 
f*ha!l not trouble the Court with any remarks upon 
them. 

Something has been said in the course of the trial, 
as to my having after the capitulation consented to 
the surrender of some distant posts. It might be 
enough to say, that there is no specification on thi& 
subject ; but I will only observe, that so far from this 
being a concession to the enemy, it originated in my 
suggestion. I reflected, that if they should hear of 
the capitulation, before they were informed that they 
v.ere included i*the surrender, they might retreat, if 
they should judge it in their power to do so — but if 
early intelligence of the surrender should not reach 
them, tliey would be exposed to the whole savage 
force of the enemy, and might be sacrificed, unless 
they were protected by the capitulation. Much tes- 
timony has also been given in relation to the situation 
of the British troops before the surrender, and to shew 
that they were suffered to approach too near our w orks 
before the capitulation v/as signed. It would be easy 
to sheAv the strange contradiction of testimony on 
this point, and to prove that such an accusation would 
be without foundation. But certainly the accusations 
against me, and which I am obliged to answer, are 
sufRciently numerous. The Court would hardly think 
me excusable in trespassing on their patience, to 
make a defence against accusations not preferred— ^ 



C4ENEIIAL HULL. 173 

I shall therefore say nothing further as to this sug- 
gestion, than that a specification founded upon it is 
not to be found under any of the charges. 

There is, Gentlemen, one other charge which I 
have to answer. It is an accusation which has been 
the most woundmg to my feelings, and the discussion 
of which is the most painful task I have yet had to 
perform. Not because I have any doubt but that I 
shall convince you it is as much without foundation 
as any other, but because it imposes upon me the ne- 
cessity of examining testimony, which no man, how- 
ever innocent he may be, can repeat without disgust. 

If in the embarrassing and difficult situations in 
which I was placed during my late command, I have 
committed some errours, surely what I have suffered 
by this prosecution, and what I must now suffer in 
making this pe.rt of my defence, will be some atone^ 
ment. 

For more than half a century I supported a charac- 
ter without reproach. My youth was devoted to the 
service of my country. I fought her battles in that 
war which achieved her liberty and independence, 
and which was ended before many of yon, Gentlemen, 
who are my judges, were born. 

If, upon any occasion, a man may speak of his own. 
merits, it is at sucli a time as this, and I hope I may 
be permitted to present to you, in very few words, ii 
16* 



174 DEFENCE OF 

narrative of my life, while I was engaged in scenes 
which were calculated to prove a man's firmness and 
courage. I shall do -it with the less reluctance, because 
the testimony I have offered of the venerable men 
who served with me in the revolutionary war will 
vouch for all I have to say. 

In the year seventeen hundred and seventy-five, at 
the age of about twejijy-one j ears, I was appointed a 
captain in one of the Connecticut regiments. During 
that campaign, and until March, seventeen hundred 
and seventy-six, when the enemy evacuated Boston, 
I served with the army at Cambridge and Roxbmy, 
nnder the immediate command of general Washington? 
1 was with that part of the army in March, seventeen 
hundred and seventy -six, which took possession of 
Dorchester Heights, the movement which compelled 
the enemy to evacuate Boston. The next day, the 
regiment to which I belonged marched for New-York. 
I was on Long Island when the enemy landed, and 
remained until the night the wlioie army retreated. 
1 was in several small skirmishes, both on Long 
fsland and York I slan(J before Ihe army retired to 
the White Plains. I then belonged to colonel Charles 
Webb's regiment, of Connecticut. 

This regiment was in the severest part of the ac- 
tion on Chatterdon's Hill, a little advanced of the 
White Plains, a few days after the main body of the 
army abandoned New-York. This battle is memora- 
ble in the history of our country, and the regiment to 



GENERAL HULL. TT5 

which I belonged received the particular thanks of 
general Washington, in his public orders, for its bra- 
very and good conduct on the occasion. It was par- 
ticularly distinguished from all the other troops en- 
gaged in the action. I received a slight wound by a 
musket ball in my side, but it did not prevent me 
from remaining at the head of my company. I was 
in the battle at Trenton, when the Hessians were 
taken, in December, seventeen hundred and seventy- 
six, and being one of the youngest captains in the 
army, w^as promoted by general Washington, the day 
after the battle, to a majority, for my conduct on that 
occasion. 

The first of January, seventeen hundred and seven- 
ty-seven, I was in the battle of Princeton. In the 
campaign of the same year, the regiment to which I 
belonged served in the northern army. I was early 
in the spring ordered to Ticonderoga, and commanded 
the regiment (being the senior officer present) under 
general Saint Clair, and I was with that officer in his 
retreat from that post. After general Saint Clair's 
army formed a junction with general Schuyler's army, 
on the North river, at Fort Edward, the regiment to 
which I belonged was detached and marched to Fort 
Schuyler, and relieved that post which was besieged 
by general Saint Ledger. On the retreat of general 
Schuyler's army from Fort Edward, I commanded the 
rear guard of the army, and being two miles in the 
rear, was attacked by a large body of British troops 
and Indians at day light in the morning, in which 



176 DEFENCE 01?^ 

action were killed and wounded between thirty and 
forty of my guard, and I received the particular thanks 
of general Schuyler for my conduct on the occasion, 

I was in the two memorable battles on the nine- 
teenth of September, and the seventh of October, on 
Bhemus's Heights, against general Burgoyne's army, 
previous to its surrender. In the action of the nine- 
teenth September, I commanded a detachment of 
three hundred men, who fought the principal part of 
the afternoon, and more than one half of them were 
killed and wounded. 

On the seventh of October I likewise commanded 
a detachment from the brigade, which assisted in at- 
tacking the enemy on the left of our position, defeated 
him, followed him to the right of his lines, stormed 
his entrenchments, and took and held possession of 
the right of his position, which compelled him to re- 
treat to Saratoga, and there capitulate. 

After the memorable event of the capitulation of 
general Burgoyne's army, the regiment to which I 
belonged was ordered to Pennsylvania, to join the 
army under the command of general Washington. 

I remained with the army the winter of seventeen 
hundred and seventy-seven, at Valley Forge, and in 
the spring of seventeen hundred and seventy-eight, 
when the British army evacuated Philadelphia, I was 
in the battle of Monmouth. From December, sevea 



GENERAL HULL. 177 

teen hundred and seventy-eight to May seventeen 
hundred and seventy-nine, I commanded the Ameri- 
can posts in advance of the White Plains, near 
Kingsbridge, during which time I had various skir- 
mishes with the enemy. In May, seventeen hundred 
and seventy-nine, the principal part of the British 
army advanced up the North river to Verplancks 
and Stony Point, and I was ordered to retreat before 
them to West Point. 

I then joined the light infantry under the command 
of general AVayne, and was in the memorable attack 
on Stony Point, with a separate command of four 
hundred light infantry. 

For my conduct on this occasion, I received the 
j)articular thanks of general Wayne, general Wash- 
ington, and Congress. 

In the summer and autumn of seventeen hundred 
and eighty, I commanded the advanced posts of the 
army, and in December of that j^ear I commanded 
an expedition against the enemy stationed at Morri- 
siana, which was successful, and for which I re- 
ceived the thanks of general Washington in his 
general orders to the army, and likewise the thanks 
of Congress. 

General Washington in his orders, I well remember, 
made use of these words, " he thanked me for my ju- 



178 DEFENCE OP 

" dicioiis arrangements in the plan of operation, and 
" for my intrepidity and valour in the execution." 

From the conclusion of the revolutionary war I 
have lived with the respect of my countrymen, and 
have enjoyed repeated marks of their confidence in 
the offices which have been bestowed upon me. 
When I found that the independence for which I had 
BO often fought was assailed ; that again my 'country 
must appeal to arms to avenge her wrongs, and to 
protect her rights, I felt that I might yet do. her some 
service. For though many years had passed since I 
had fought under her standard, and though my arm 
might not have its wonted strength, yet my spi- 
rit was unbroken, and my devotion to her unimpaired. 
I thought, in the field, where there could be but few 
who had any military experience, what I had learned 
in the most active scenes of a seven years war, might 
be useful. I fondly hoped that in my age, as well as 
in my youth, I might render services that should de- 
serve the gratitude of my country. That if I fell by 
the sword of her enemies, my grave would be moist- 
ened with the tears of my countrymen, that my de- 
scendants would be proud of my name and fame : but 
how vain is anticipation ! I am now accused of 
crimes which would blast my former honours, and 
transmit my memory with infamy to posterity. And 
in that hideous catalogue, there is none from the im- 
putation of which my nature and my feelings have 
more recoiled than from that of cowardice, to which 
1 am now to answer. I shall confine myself under 



GENERAL HULL. 179 

this cliarge to the specifications, or to such part of 
the- specifications, as relate to my personal deport- 
ment. 

Almost every omission or commission timing the 
campaign, which it has been thought proper to cen- 
sure, has been assembled under this charge, and 
they have all been imputed to cowardice. But as 
most of the acts have been specified in support of 
other charges, I shall not again notice them, but con- 
fine myself to the allegation that I shewed personal 
fear and a want of courage. 

However painful the recapitulation of the testimony 
on this point must be to me, it is so necessary that it 
should be brought together, to the end you may have 
it before you in one view, that I shall go through the 
disagreeable task of repeating it. 

The first witness in point of fact, as well as of im- 
portance, is major Snelling. He was a captain when 
he joined the army at Urbana ; but is now a colonel. 

He testifies as follows. " During the cannonade I 
" frequently saw^ the General. I once saw him stand- 
" ing ; he might have risen twice ; most of the time he 
" was sitting on an old tent, under the curtain of the 
" fort opposite the enemy's batteries. 

" I have been taught to believe, that there are cer« 
" tain human passions which are indicated by appear- 



180 . DEFENCE OF 

*' ances, and the appearances of general Hull accord- 
" ing to my mind indicated fear. 

" The reasons that induced me to draw tliat con- 
" elusion were, that the General selected the safest 
" place in the fort for his seat ; his voice trembled 
" when he spoke ; he apparently unconsciously filled 
" his mouth with tobacco, so that his cheeks were 
"extended by it; the saliva ran from his mouth on 
*' his neckcloth and cloaths ; he often rubbed his 
"face with his hands, and distributed the tobacco 
*' juice about his face." 

He further testified in his cross-examination, that 
when he returned from Spring Wells, at the dawn of 
day on the morning of the sixteenth, he went into 
the fort to make his report to general Hull, but could 
not find him, nor find any one who knew where he 
w^as. 

He said, he did not know if general Hull was in 
the fort at the time the officers were killed. He saw 
him immediately afterwards. After the men were 
killed it might have been fifteen or twenty. minutes 
before he saw captain Hull with the white flag. It 
might have been an hour, but he did not think it was. 

The witness could not say that he saw general 
Hull in the situation he has described between the 
time the men were killed and the sending the f?ag by 
captain Hull. He recollects that at the time captain 



GENERAL HULL. 181 

Hull was fixing the flag, general Hull was standing, 
and was in the situation he has described. General 
Hull was out of the fort early that morning, but the 
witness does not know where he was. At the time 
the enemy was crossing, the General was standing on 
the parade. 

I wish the Court to notice the great attention, 
which major Snelling paid, to be particular in very 
minute circumstances in giving his testimony ; not 
only as to the positions in which he saw me, but when 
his examination was read over to him, and he found 
that, as it stood, it represented him as saying that I 
had distributed the tobacco over my face, he desired 
it might be corrected, so as to state that what he had 
said, was confined to the lower part of my face. 

Captain Mac Commick testifies as follows, " I was 
" not present when colonel Findlay received orders 
" to march into the fort. I joined him as he was 
''- going into the fort ; he told me of the order, and said 
" he would not obey it ; but would go into the fort 
" himself, and directed me to form the regiment. 
" The colonel then came back so near to me, as to 
" tell me to let the companies marcli up, and I did 
'' so." The witness then relates what passed between 
colonel Findlay and myself, and proceeds as follows* 
" The General appeared very much agitated. He 
" a])peared to be under as much alarm as I ever sa^v 
" a person. He had been chewing tobacco, and the 
17 



182 DEFENCE OF 

*' lower part of bis face and his vest were covered 
" with it." 

On his cross examination he testified, that it might 
have been ten minutes, or half an hour, or more, after 
the firing ceased, before the troops were ordered to 
march into the fort ; — that it was at least half an 
Iiour after the firing before the witness went into the 
fort; — that he saw me once that morning out of the 
fort, and thinks I was near where colonel Findlay's 
regiment was forming the line of battle behind the 
picket fence. Colonel Van Horn, who was a major 
of colonel Findlay's corps, testifies, that after colo- 
nel Findlay's regiment was formed on the morning of 
the sixteenth of August, and about an hour or half 
an hour before the flag was hoisted, I was at the 
line ; — that this was during the cannonade ; — that at 
about the time the firing ceased, captain Snelling 
came, with orders that colonel Findlay should return 
with his regiment to the fort ; — the cannonade had 
then ceased ; — the witness turned round, and saw the 
flag hoisted on the fort. The witness further stated, 
that he then went into tlie fort with his battalioji, and 
after he got in he saw me, but is not certain whether 
I was there when he entered. The witness then 
proceeded as follows, " when I first saw general Hull 
"' he was on the steps going into one of the rooms. 
" His face was discoloured with tobacco juice. It was 
" over the lower part of his face, and a spot was over 
" his eye. I thought he was under the influence of 
"fear. I had no doubt.of it.'' On his cross-exami- 



GENERAL HULL. 183 

nation he says, that he saw me on the night of the 
fifteenth, and as he thinks, about midnight, and before 
the cannonading had ceased, at the place where colo- 
nel Findlay's regiment was formed that night. He 
saw me the next morning out of tlie fort at colonel 
Findlay's quarters, and again at the line of battle. 
When the witness was asked, whether care and anxiety 
might not have produced the appearance he describ- 
ed, he answered, that care and anxiety might have^ 
added to those appearances, but upon comparing faces 
he thought mine had the indication of fear. 

Captain Baker testifies as follows, " I saw general 
" Hull on the morning of the sixteenth. He appeared 
" to be embarrassed, and at a loss how to act. I had 
*' but one opinion, which was that he was under the 
" influence of personal fear. I could not account for 
« the surrender in any other way." On his cross-ex- 
amination he said, " on the morning of the sixteenth, 
*' during the cannonade, I saw the General in the 
"fort sometimes sitting, sometimes walking, and 
'' sometimes standing.'' 

Lieutenant Stansbury testifies, that on the night of 
the fifteenth of August, he found me at about eleven 
o'clock at night, lying on the piazza of the barracks 
in the fort, with my boots and cloaths on ;— that in 
the morning when he awoke at day break 1 was not 
there. " I saw the General," says he, " on a tolerably 
" safe place ; as to his being afraid, I cannot say whe- 
" ther he was or not." " I saw the General on the 



184 DEFENCE OF 

" parade ground. I did not see any necessity for his 
" exposing himself more than he did." 

Major Jessup testifies, that on the fifteenth, after 
the cannonade commenced, he in company with Mr. 
Diigan met me on horseback in the street near the 
second battery. He says, " the General appeared to 
*' be agitated ; either Mr. Dugan or myself observed, 
" the General was frightened; one of us said, we 
" must cheer him up. We approached him, spoke to 
" him, he appeared pale and confused, immediately 
" dismounted and led his horse towards the fort." 

" I did not see general Hull till about break of day 
" on the morning of tlie sixteenth, when the General 
" came to my tent, and directed me to write an order 
" for the return of colonels Cass and Mac Arthur." 

The witness further testifies, that shortly after the 
enemy commenced their fire, at the request of 
colonel Findlay, he went to me to have an explana- 
tion of an order which had been delivered by my 
aid-de-camp ; — that he found me and received direc- 
tions from me, for forming the line of battle ; — that 
while he was attempting to collect some dragoons, of 
whicli I had directed him to take the command, he 
saw that our line was breaking and retreating towards 
the fort ; — he then looked towards tJie fort, and saw 
the white flag flying from it ; — that at the request of 
colonel Findlay, he then went to the fort. The wit- 
ness then proceeds as follows, " I found the General 



GENERAL HULL. 185 

'*' in the fort. I thought him very much frightened. 
" When I met him, I inquired of him, if it were pos- 
" sible we were about to surrender. He said some- 
" thing about terms, and something about the enemy's 
" force, which I do not recollect. His voice at that 
"time was tremulous. I observed, we could at least 
" liold out till joined by colonels Cass and Mac Ar- 
« thur. He replied, my God, what shall I do with 
" these women and children !" The witness then 
states, that he left the fort, went to colonel Findlay, 
and did not see me till terms of capitidation had been 
agreed upon; — that then I was perfect!}^ composed. 
The witness also testifies as follows : — "When I came 
" to report to the General, after reconnoitring the 
" enemy, I found him on the side of the fort next the 
'^ enemy, completely sheltered, sitting on a tent be^ 
"side a bed. At the same time I reported that our 
'' guard, the most advanced towards the enemy, had 
"surrendered. The General said that colonel Brush 
" had reported to him that his men were leaving himc 
" After this when 1 met the General in the fort, and 
^' after the flag was hoisted, he exclaimed that four 
'' men had been killed by one shot ;— he appeared so 
*' alarmed as not to know what he was doing." The 
witness then describes my appearance at that time 
nearly in tiie words which had been used by other 
witnesses. 

The witness on a subsequent part of his examina- 
tion stated, that at the moment when he was in con- 
versation with me on the evening of the fifteenths . 

17* 



186 DEFENCE OF 

near the second battery, a shot struck a stone house 
near me ; — that I appeared much agitated, dismounted 
my horse, and walked off without making him a reply. 
" Whenever I saw the General," says the witness, 
'' before the capitulation was signed, he appeared agi- 
" tated ; afterward, entirely composed. Whether the 
" agitation proceeded from the novelty of his situa- 
" tion or fear, I cannot say, but I believe the latter, 
'' if not both." 

Captain Eustman testifies as follows, " on the even- 
" ing of the fifteenth, a shell appeared to be coming 
" into the fort. General Hull ran towards the north- 
" west bastion, apparently to avoid it, and to get un- 
" der cover of the platform. The General appeared 
*' alarmed and frightened, as I also observed to my 
" companions at the time." 

Lieutenant Philips testifies as follows, " I saw ge- 
" neral Hull on the morning of the sixteenth. Most 
" part of the time during the cannonade he was sitting 
" with his back to the parapet next the enemy. He 
" was sitting there with a number of gentlemen. I re- 
" collect one gentleman and one lady near to him. He 
" appeared to me under the influence of fear. He ap- 
" peared very much agitated. I think doctor Cun- 
"ningham was the gentleman that was with him. 
" There might have been other officers with him, but 
" I do not recollect." 



GENERAL HULL. 187 

Colonel Miller testifies as follows, " I did not dis- 
" cover any agitation in the General on the fifteenth. 
" On the sixteenth he did appear mucli agitate^. He 
" was on the fort. He was sometimes sitting, some- 
" times standing, and sometimes walking. Whether 
" his agitation proceeded from anxiety on account of 
" the responsibility he was taking, or from personal 
'* alarm, I cannot say. After the surrender he told 
*' me he was afraid, if he had fought the enemy, they 
*' would have taken advantage of that part of his pro- 
" clamation, which declared that no white man taken 
'•'■ fighting with an Indian should be spared." 

On his cross-examination, colonel Miller said, " I 
'' saw no act of the General's on the morning of the 
" sixteenth which I can say might not have proceed- 
'• ed from the fatigue and responsibility he was under." 

I put to colonel Miller the following question:— -Can 
you mention any act of mine on the sixteenth, which 
you did then or do now impute to personal fear ? — 
To this the witness answered :—" Yes, I did think 
" such an immediate surrender must have proceeded 
" from your fears." 

To the following question : — Did you see me, while 
I was in the fort, in any place or situation unfit for a 
commanding officer ?— The Colonel answered : — " I 
'* can describe to the Court where the General wa?, 
** and the Court can judge." 



188 DEFENCE OF 

" He was generally near the easterly parapet of the 
" fort. I was there part of the time mj^self. The 
" Gei^eral leaned down. The whole easterly side of 
" the fort was as safe as the spot where the General 
'^ was for the most part of the time. The General's 
" station was the most convenient to receive commu- 
" nications from without the fort." 

Colonel Miller, upon a re-examination, further tes- 
tifies, that he had frequently observed a habit which 1 
had when I w as much engaged, of chewing tobacco to 
excess, and taking it from my mouth with my fingers, 
and rolling it in my fingers, and putting it in my mouth 
again, and rolling it from my mouth to my fingers 
alternately. That he observed more of this habit on 
the sixteenth than usual, and thought the addition 
might be owing to v^-ant of rest from fatigue. 

Major Whistler says, my appearance induced him 
to tliink I was under the influence of personal fear. 

Lieutenant Peckham testifies, that he saw me on 
the sixteenth of August, and says, " I had no doubt 
*' but that the General was under the influence of per- 
" sonal fear, from his embarrassment, as he sat still and 
*' gave no orders."' 

Major Munson testifies, that he saw me on the fif- 
teenth of August, and saw me again on the sixteenth, 
after the capitulation was settled. He adds, " The 
'** General's gituittion was critical. If he had had any 



GENERAL HULL. I8§ 

" feelings, he must have had great care and anxiety. I 
" saw nothing which might not have been accounted 
" for, without resorting to the impression of personal 
" fear." On his cross-examination by the Court, this 
witness says, "It was ten or fifteen minutes after the 
" officers were killed, that he saw me sitting in one of 
" the officers' quarters; but does not recollect that it 
" was during the cannonade, either on the fifteenth or 
"' sixteenth, that he saw me." 

Captain Maxwell testifies, that he served in the re- 
volutionary war ; v^^as engaged in the affair at Browns- 
town under colonel Miller, which made the twenty- 
third battle in which he had fought; — that after the 
cannonading commenced on the fifteenth, he saw me on 
horseback at one of tJie batteries ; — that I had a con- 
versation with the officer commanding at the time the 
balls were passing and repassing ; — that he took notice 
of my countenance, and that I appeared firm, collect- 
ed, and cool ; — that I sat four or five minutes on my 
horse, and rode off again ; — that he did not see me on 
the sixteenth ; — that at the time the army was re- 
treating from Sandv/ich, there was a clamour, that I 
was intimidated, and that was the reason why, on the 
evening of the sixteenth, he particularly observed my 
countenance. 

General Taylor testifies, that he saw me several 
times on the evening of the fifteenth, during the can- 
nonade ; — that there was no impression made on his 
mmd of my being under personal fear on that day or 



100 DEFENCE OF 

evening ; — that I appeared to be thoughtful and very 
low spirited ; — that he heard no indication of inspirit- 
ing the men ; — that my countenance was dull ; — that 
he saw me near the gateway, and that I ordered colo- 
nel Findlay to move from the upper to the lower side 
of the fort, without any specific orders how to form. 
Early on the sixteenth, information came that the 
enemy were preparing to cross, and no orders were 
given to resist them ; — that my appearance displayed 
more of the marks of tobacco than he had generally 
seen in a neat man ; — that his impression was, that I 
was under the influence of personal fear ; — that he did 
not see me again till the flag was hoisted ; — that when 
he saw me near the gate on the sixteenth, he saw 
many officers with me, and among the rest captain 
Snelling; — that he did not consider being there as 
shrinking from danger. 

Captain Bacon testifies, that he saw me in the fort 
very frequently on the fifteenth and sixteenth ; — that 
on the sixteenth he saw me, with doctor Cunningham 
and his wife, sitting on some planks ; — that he also saw 
other persons there, some of Avhom he thinks were offi- 
cers ; — that during the cannonade he saw me on the 
parapet of the fort, once on the evening of the fifteenth, 
and once on the sixteenth ; — that he s^w me in differ- 
ent places about the garrison, during the cannonade ; 
— that I seemed engaged as usual, but agitated on the 
morning of the sixteenth more than common ; — that he 
did not know the cause ; — that he had no suspicion 
that it was personal fear, neither did he hear such a 



GENERAL HULL. 191 

suspicion expressed by any of the officers ;— .that after 
the shot came in which did execution, the officers 
and men very generally were in the eastern side of 
the fort, under the protection of the parapet next the 
enemy. 

Judge Witherell testifies, that he saw me on the 
fifteenth, during the cannonade, near one of our bat- 
teries, when, from all he saw, 1 was cool and collected. 

1 believe, Gentlemen, I have now collected and 
presented to you in connection, every syllable of the 
testimony which has been offered in support of the 
specifications under this charge which relate to my 
personal ap[)earance and deportment. Such parts of 
the testimony as have the most bearing, I have endea- 
voured to repeat in the witnesses' own words, and 
have done it with as much accuracy as the notes 
taken by my counsel w^ould permit 

Before, Gentlemen, I proceed further on the exami- 
nation of this testimony, aHow me to lay before you an 
extract from an author of great respectability, contain- 
ing rules not inapplicable to the present occasion, by 
which the credibility of a witness ought to be tested. 

" A witness," says Mr. Tytler, in his essay on Mi- 
litary Law, " who amplifies his testimony, unneces- 
" sarily enlarging upon circumstances unfavourable to 
"a party; who seems to be gratified by the opportu- 
^' nity of furnishing condemnatory evidence, or mant- 



192 DEFENCE OP 

" festly betrays passion or prejudice in the substance of 
" his testimony, or in the manner of delivering it, is 
" to be listened to with suspicion of his veracity. If 
■•' a witness," the author adds, " takes upon him to re- 
" member with the greatest minuteness ail the cir- 
*' CLimstances of a transaction long since passed, and 
" which are of a frivolous nature, and not likely to 
" dwell on the memory, his testimony is thereby ren- 
" dered very susiricious." 

I ask the members to test the testimony which has 
been given against me by these rules. Were there 
not many of the witnesses who amplified their testi- 
mony, and unnecessarily enlarged upon circumstances 
unfavourable to me ; who seemed to be gratified by 
the opportunity of furnishing condemnatory evidence ? 
I appeal to the Court to judge of the manner in which 
the testimony of some of the witnesses was delivered, 
and whether they did not betray a warmth, that could 
not leave them free from a suspicion of strong preju- 
dice or bias ? 

Major Snelling has certainly taken upon himself 
to remember with the greatest minuteness circum- 
stances of a frivolous nature. He remembered that 
my cheeks were swelled with the tobacco I put in 
my mouth. He remembered that my neckcloth and 
vest were soiled, and the tobacco was distributed about 
my face. And when his examination was read over 
to him, his recollection was so extremely accurate 
as to the most minute circumstance, that he insisted 



GENERAL HULL. . 193 

that what had been written, should be so corrected, 
as to read that it was the lower part of my face which 
was soiled. Though, on this particular, he is contra- 
dicted by colonel Van Horn, who it appears w as no 
less observing of minute circumstances, and whose 
memory is not less tenacious of them. Colonel Van 
Horn recollects, and has been very particular in, 
stating, that there was a mark made by the tobacco 
over one of my eyes. He was so very minute as to 
observe, that it was over my left eye, though I be- 
lieve it is not so recorded in his testimony. 

Major Snelling's correction, with respect to the 
situation of the tobacco on my face, will not appear 
in the record of his testimony. But it will be brought 
to the remembrance of the Court, by my reminding 
them, that when major Snelling proposed the altera- 
tion in the record, so as to state that he meant to have 
spoken only of the lower part of my face, I objected 
to its being altered in the minutes, and wished that it 
might appear from the record of the evidence, that 
this was a correction of his. 

But, Gentlemen, the opinion of major Snelling that 
I was under the influence of personal fear, as well as 
the same opinion of other witnesses, who have very 
nearly followed his words in their description, is 
formed, as they avow, from my appearance, and from 
my situation and conduct in the fort, 
18 



194 DEFENCE OF 

A correct and certain judgment of the emotions of 
the mind from indications of the countenance, or from 
mere personal appearances, can liardly ever be formed. 
And it must be infinitely difficult to do so when fa- 
tigue, anxiety, and a great responsibility may, all at 
the same time, be producing their effect. 

iMajor Snelling, though a very young gentleman, it 
is to be presumed has great acquirements, and it 
would seem from his testimony, that the human pas- 
sions have been the objects of his etudy. He intro- 
duces his testimony on this point, with these words : 
" I have been taught to believe that there are certain 
" human passions which are indicated by appearances, 
*' and the appearance of general Hull, in my mind, 
*' indicated fear.'' 

I hope that these professions of major Snelling will 
not give his opinion an undue weight, because he has 
not told us in what school he acquired his science in 
physiognomy. Nor has he given us the rules by 
which, when the mind may be under various excite- 
ments, he can distinguish the appearances which will 
indicate the prevalence of one over the other. 

Blajor Snelling, I have no doubt, when he gains 
more age and experience, will find that the indica- 
tions of appearances iii respect to the human mind 
are fallacious. His own case may afford an evidence 
of it. 



GENERAL HULL. 195 

I myself, and many who heard his testimony, and 
that of many other of the witnesses, and marked the 
manner of it, thought that they manifested great pas- 
sion and prejudice against me ; that they seemed gra- 
tified with the opportunity of furnishing condemnato- 
ry evidence. These appearances may have been fal- 
lacious, but if they were so, it is strong evidence that 
the most erroneous conclusions may be drawn from 
expressions of countenance, tone of voice, and eager- 
ness of manner. 

I beg it may be observed, that most of the witnes- 
ses, except major Snelling, who have given their tes- 
limony on this point, did not see me in the fort, tilW 
after the flag was hoisted, when there was of course a 
cessation of hostilities, nor till after I returned from the 
tent. The witnesses have all endeavoured to impress 
on the minds of the Court, that I intended in all events 
to make an unconditional surrender. If this were the 
case, where was the occasion for personal fear, after I 
had invited, by the flag, a negotiation, and had stop- 
ped the enemy's fire ? Major Jessup says, that when 
be saw me before the capitulation was signed, I ap- 
peared greatly agitated, but that afterwards I was en- 
tirely composed. And yet, as major Jessup did not 
see me in the fort on the sixteenth, till after the nego- 
tiation was commenced, there was no more ground for 
agitation from personal fear, w hen he saw me on that 
day previously to the capitulation, than there was 
after that eveut 



196 DEFENCE OP 

There is a part of major Jessup's testimonj^ wliicli 
is certainly worthy of remark. His power of judging 
of the human passions from appearances is even supe- 
riour to major Snelling's, because, from his testimony, 
it seems he can perceive the appearances, when the 
object is at some distance. He states, that when he 
and Mr. Dugan saw me on horseback, on the fifteenth, 
I appeared to be frightened, one of them said, we must 
cheer him up; we then approached him, says the wit- 
ness, and spoke to him ; he appeared pale, &c. So 
that they had, according to this testimony, perceived 
that I was frightened, while I was on horseback, in 

^the face of the enemy's fire, and before they had ap- 

^proached me, or spoke to me. 

I do not deny that on the morning of the sixteenth 
I was greatly agitated. My body w as worn with fa- 
tigue, and my mind was filled with the deepest anxiety. 
On the one hand, I well knew the consequences of a 
surrender. I knew how unfortunate it was for my 
country, that I should be obliged to yield. I saw the 
consequences to myself, I knew that the disappoint- 
ment of the high expectations which had been raised, 
would be charged to me. And that all the faults o£ 
others, to which, in fact, the failure of the expedition 
was owing, would be laid at my door. I saw too, 
what was intended to be the effect of the opposition of 
ray officers to a measure, they knew I must, or would 
pursue. In proportion as they found me decided on 
this final step, they became insolent in their opposi- 
tion, and were most so when it was ascertained, that 



GENERAL HULL. 19^ 

they would not meet the enemy, and could not be 
punished by me. They foresav/, that great reputation 
was to be purchased at so cheap a rate, as appearing 
highly averse to the surrender, and afterward pub- 
lishing to the world all they said and did, as evidence 
of my criminality and their own heroism. 

While ail these considerations enlisted every pri- 
vate feeling against the surrender; my mind was agi= 
tated by the opposite demands of duty. The dread- 
ful consequence of unsuccessful resistance, or indeed, 
of any thing less than a most decisive victory, filled 
my thoughts. In the midst of a people, among whom 
I had lived so long, as to be known to almost every 
inhabitant, all of whom looked to me for protection, 
and many of whom had sought safety in the fort ; t 
could not reflect on the horrours of a general massacre, 
wiiich would have been the consequence of a defeat, 
without emotion. He, who in such a situation, could 
have been perfectly tranquil, whose appearances 
should have discovered no agitation, must have been 
either less, or more than man. He must have been 
denied the sensibilities common to our nature, or 
been endowed with faculties more than human. 

When the Court considers my situation, how many 
causes there w^ere to excite strong emotion, will they 
believe that the witnesses, who have testiiied on this 
point, were capable of such discrimination, as w^ould 
enable them to ascertain, that the appearances which 
they have described, proceeded from personal fear ? 
18* 



198 DEFENCE OF 

Major Snelling professed to have been instmcted lii 
this branch of science. But captain Mac Commick, 
who was not in the fort till after Findlay's regiment 
bad marched in, made no such pretensions. He ap- 
peared to found his judgment on his natural instinct, 
and indeed he did right not to make a claim, which 
was beyond the first stage of civilization; to which 
rank, notwithstanding his tawdry regimentals, it was 
evident he belongetL 

Several of the witnesses have given their opinion 
on this subject, with less confidence, and some quali- 
fications. Colonel Van Horn has admitted that care 
and anxiety might have added to the appearances 
which he described. His belief, however, as to what 
related to personal fear, he saj s, he formed from a 
comparison of faces, by which he judged, that mine 
indicated fear. 

I believe. Sir, that in the comparison of counte- 
nances, when I was surrounded by my officers at the 
time of the surrender, a vast difference might have 
been observed, between the expression of many of 
theirs and mine. If my countenance expressed what 
I felt, it must have shewn traces of the painful anxiety 
by which I had been oppressed, and marks of the 
deepest regret for the measures I had been obliged to 
pursue ; while other faces might perhaps have beamed 
with the exultation, which the minds of some can feel, 
when they look upon what they may think a fallen 
man. 



GENERAL HULL* 199 

Possibly, there may have been around me, those 
who felt, and whose countenances expressed a joy, 
that by the capitulation, thej^ had purchased personal 
security, and avoided a bloody contest, at the expense, 
as they supposed, of my character and honour. 

General Taylor also concluded from my appear- 
ance that I was under the influence of personal fear. 
He gives you the grounds, on which he drew his 
conclusion. They are, that I appeared thoughtful, 
and very low spirited ;— that my countenance was 
dull, and that he saw about me more of the marks of 
tobacco, than was consistent with neatness. Are 
these grounds which will warrant a conclusion, that 
is to affect the life of a man ? As to w hat has been 
said on this disgusting subject of the tobacco, I will 
dismiss it as to all the witnesses, with a reference to 
the testimony of colonel Miller, who proves, that I 
had a habit, which might have produced all the ap- 
pearances, which the witnesses say my chewing had 
produced. It is known, that where there is a habit 
of using tobacco, it is commonly, unconsciously, taken 
to excess, whenever the mind is much occupied. 
Even the excitement that some of the witnesses, who 
use tobacco, felt, while they w ere untler examination, 
deluged this floor with their expectorations. 

Major Munson saw me in the fort, fifteen minutes 
after the officers were killed. He does not recollect, 
that the cannonade then»*continued ; but I beg the 
Court to remark, that he speaks of a time, to which 



200 DEFENCE 01? 

tile testimony of many of the officers who have spoken 
of my personal appearance, must refer. He says, he 
saw nothing which might not have been accounted 
for, without resorting to the supposition of personal 
fear. 

Captain Maxwell did not see me on the sixteenth, 
but on the fifteenth he saw me in a situation, where 
I was exposed to the fire of the enemy. He says that 
I was collected and cool. He informs you, why he 
was induced to notice my appearance, and his testi- 
mony is of some importance, because it shews, that 
as early as the retreat from Canada, my officers had 
begun to propagate imputations on my courage ; and 
because his testimony must relate to the same time, 
when major Jessup says, he saw me on horseback, 
and observed such strong indications of fear. If, Sir, 
the opinions of these two witnesses are in opposition, 
the Court must determine, whether they will rely on 
the veteran, who has been twenty-three times engaged 
with the enemies of his country, or the young gentle- 
man who, at the time he speaks of, was about twenty- 
five years of age, and who knew no more of battles, 
than what he had heard or learned from books. The 
testimony of judge Witherell, who was a revolutionary 
officer, who also saw me on the evening of the fifteenth, 
is likewise in opposition to the testimony of major 
Jessup. 

Captain Bacon says, iVas much agitated on the 
morning of the sixteenth, but that he had no suspicion 



(GENERAL HULLo 201 



iiwas personal fear; neither did he hear such a suspi- 
cion expressed by any of the officers. 

The deposition of major Anderson, I have not been 
able to procure in time, to submit to my counsel, pre- 
viously to my defence being closed. It is very im- 
portant, not only as it respects the point now under 
consideration, but the Court will 'find, that there is 
a great variati-3n between his testimony, and that of 
general Mac Arthur, in relation to the fortification at 
Sandwich, but as I would not ask another postpone- 
ment of the Court, for the sake of making any further 
observations on the testimony of major Anderson, I 
must rely upon the Court to examine his deposition, 
and to give his testimony its due weight. 

There are some of the witnesses who have given 
a more naked opinion, that I was under the influence 
of personal fear, without assigning any reasons for 
their opinion, whose testimony I shall not notice. It 
is impossible it can have any influence in the minds 
of the Court. 

Major Jessup said, that whether the agitation which 
he described, proceeded from the novelty of my situ- 
ation, or fear, he could not say, but he believed the 
latter, if not both. Captain Baker said, he was of 
opinion, that I was under the influence of fear, as he 
could not account for the surrender in any other way. 
This explanation of captain Baker may afford a key 
to much of the testimony on this point. He» like 



202 DEFENCE OF 

many other of the officers, thought the surrender un« 
necessary. They did not concern themselves with 
considerations of what might be the consequences of 
resistance. They therefore saw no other motive for 
the step I had taken, than my own fears. They 
therefore, when questioned on this point, said, they 
thought I was under the influence of personal fear, 
because I surrendered. 

I beg the Court to note, that colonel Miller's an- 
swer to the interrogatory put to him on this subject, 
is to the same effect, although he was stationed in the 
fort, and I had been in his sight whenever I was in 
the fortress, from the commencement of the cannonade, 
till the surrender. He says, he saw no conduct of 
mine, which might not have proceeded from fatigue, 
and the responsibility of my situation, and that he 
could mention no act of mine, which he did then, or 
does now, impute to personal fear, but the surrender ; 
and yet colonel Miller had better opportunities of ob- 
serving me, than any other witness. He was an older., 
and a more experienced soldier, than any who have 
given their testimony ; many of whom heard the re- 
port of an enemy's gun for the first, at the time to 
which their testimony relates. 

If, Gentlemen, your decision upon this point could 
rest upon the weight of the opinions given by the 
witnesses called by the Judge Advocate, the prepon- 
derance would be in my favour. The opinions of 
colonel Miller, he having been placed in a situation 



GENERAL HULL. 203 

which gave him such superiour advantages for con- 
tinual deliberate observation, must deserve more re- 
spect, than the testimony of all the inexperienced and 
young men, who only saw me occasionally, on the 
morning of the sixteenth, and who have attempted to 
support this charge by their opinions. 

So far as any of the witnesses have founded their 
opinion, that I was under the influence of personal 
fear, from the act of surrender, as is the case with 
colonel Miller, and captain Baker, and others, their 
testimony can have no weight. The Court have the 
same opportunity of drawing a conclusion from that 
fact, that they had. I have endeavoured to satisfy 
the Court, that that act was justifiable, or at least, 
that I had strong reasons for thinking it so, and if this 
were the case, it cannot be made the ground of con- 
demnation, because witnesses may have made it the 
foundation of their opinion of my want of courage. 

But, Gentlemen, there is no example of the opinion 
of witnesses on this subject, ever having been re- 
ceived as evidence on which to ground a conviction. 
Expressions of the human countenance, and the man- 
ners of men, are but fallible indications of the work- 
ings of the human mind. The difference in appear- 
ances, produced by the excitements of different pas- 
sions, are too subtle, to admit of observations, from 
w hich any certain conclusions may be drawn — much 
depends upon constitution, and often much upon the 
temporary physical condition of the body. 



204 BEFENCE OP 

A man, worn with fatigue of body or mind, and 
pressetl with a thousand dreadful anxieties, may, 
ihough on the point of inevitable destruction, forget 
his own fate, and be moved only by the condition of 
those around him, while the superficial observer 
would impute his agitation to the dread cf death. The 
uneducated spectator, who has not been taught, as 
major Snelling has been, the indications of the human 
pasf?ions, would most probably see, in the countenance 
ana lanner of the Laocoon, only expressions of terror 
and bodily pain ; and would not understand, that the 
artist has expressed, in the countenance and convul- 
sive agitation of a dying father, agony of mind ex- 
cited by the torture of his expiring children. 

There never has been, and in justice, never can 
be a conviction, under this charge of cowardice, but 
where a want of courage is indicated, by the omission^ 
or cmnmission of some act in violation of the duty of 
the person, against v/hom the charge is made. 

I shall conclude my observations upon that part of 
the evidence, which relates to my personal appear- 
ance, with some extracts from an English historian, 
Avho gives an account of the trial of Lord George 
Sackville, who was tried for misconduct at the battle 
of Minden. Dr. Smollet having stated, that some 
testimony was given to prove, that when certain or- 
ders were delivered to Lord George, he was alarmed 
in a very great degree, and seemed in the utmost 
confusion ; subjoins remarks, from which tli€ follow- 



GENERAL HULL. 205 

iog are extracts : " The candid reader will of himself 
" determine, whether a man's heart is to be judged 
" by any change of his complexion. Granting such a < 
" change to have happened, whether it was likely, 
" that an officer, who had been more than once in 
" actual service, and behaved without reproach, so as 
" to attain an eminent rank in the army, should ex- 
" hibit symptoms of fear or confusion, when in reality « 
*' there was no appearance of danger. 

" With respect to the imputation of cowardice le 
" veiled at Lord George, by the unthinking multitude, 
" and circulated with such industry and clamour, we 
-' ought to consider it as a mob accusation, w hich the 
^- bravest of men, even the great Duke of Marlborough 
'•' could not escape. We ought to view it as a dan- 
-' gerous suspicion, which strikes at the root of cha- 
" racter, and may blast that honour in a moment, 
• which the soldier has acquired, in a long course of 
" painful services, and at the continual hazard of his 
" life. We ought to distrust it as a malignant charge, 
" altogether inconsistent with the former conduct of 
*' the person accused." 

The testimony of some of the witnesses appears to 
have been intended to prove, that I manifested a 
want of courage, by certain acts during the cannon- 
ade, as well on the fifteenth as on the sixteenth. 
These are, that on the fifteenth, I dismounted and 
ivent towards the fort, when a shot struck a house 
19 



i^oe DEFENCE OF 

p.ear me ; that I avoided a shell which appeared to 
be coming into the fort ; and that I remained in the 
fort in a place of security, during the cannonade. 

It does appear to nle, Gentlemen, that if all these 
facts were exactly as the Avitnesses would wish them 
to appear, they would not support any charge. 

If I found myself unnecessarily exposed to the shot 
of the enemy by being on horseback, was it not my 
duty to dismount ? Is it to be considered a dereliction 
of duty in an officer, to avoid the explosion of a shell ? 
Or is it unjustifiable in a commander, when in a for- 
tress that is bombarded, to put himself in a place of 
security, provided he be in such situation, as that he 
may give his orders, and perform the necessary duty 
of his station? Judging from what I have seen of ser- 
vice, with the bravest men our country ever pro- 
duced, I may venture to say, that the Court would 
answer these (Questions in the negative. But yet I 
jnust ask the patience of the Court while I give the 
testimony which has been offered on one of these 
points, (that is to say,) my remaining in the fort, and 
my situation there, a slight examination. The others 
I do not thiulv worthj^ my attention. 

Major Snelling went into the fort when he returned 
©n the morning of (he sixteenth from Spring Wells. 
He was roused from a repose, after having been at a 
post all night, by the commencement of the cannon- 
ade. He remained there till after the flag w ent out, 



GENERAL HULL. 20^ 

when he was sent with orders to colonel Findlay's 
regiment. He appears to have returned to the fort 
again, about the time that the British officers went 
into captain Dyson's quarters. Li short, major Snell- 
ing was in the fort, according to his account, durinpj 
the whole tune of the cannonade on the sixteenth, 
and until the British troops marched in, with the ex- 
ception of a very short interval between the sending 
of the flag and the final surrender. Now, during the 
time of the cannonade, major Snelling saw me stand- 
ing but once. His memory is so extremely tenacious 
of the minutest circumstances, even of a frivolous 
nature, that he will only admit as a possibility, that I 
may have risen twice. The words of major Snelling 
are, 

" During the cannonade, I frequently saw the Ge- 
" neral. I once saw him standing ; he might have 
" risen twice ; most of the time he was sitting on an 
" old tent, under the curtain of the fort, opposite the 
" enemy's batteries." 

Whether I was sitting or standing in the situation 
which major Snelling describes, is immaterial. I 
should have been equally safe in either position. It 
is, therefore, extraordinary that so unimportant a cir- 
cumstance should have made such a lasting impres- 
sion on his mind. 

The testimony, however, of the other witnesses 
called by the Judge Advocate does not appear to cor- 
respond with the recollection of major Snelling. 



208 DEFENCE OF 

General Taylor's testimony is certainly worthy of 
remark. It appears, that though major Snelling 
thought, that my taking a position under cover of the 
parapet of the fort during the cannonade was evidence 
of cowardice, yet major Snelling himself, it seems, 
thought he was at liberty to avail himself of the very 
same protection. General Taylor says, he saw ma- 
jor Snelling, as well as many other of the officers, in 
the same situation that I generally occupied, during 
the firing, when I was in the fort. 

Captain Baker says, " on the morning of the six- 
'^ teenth, during the cannonade, I saw the General in 
" the fort, sometimes sitting, sometimes walking, and 
'• sojnetimes standing." Colonel Miller also states, 
that I was sometimes sitting, sometimes standing, and 
sometimes walking. 

' Indeed, there could, have been no reason for my 
remaining precisely in one situation during the can- 
nonade, if I had been actuated by an undue regard 
to personal safety. For it appears, that the whole 
eastern side of the fort was as secure in one part as 
another. If there were any reasons for giving prefer- 
ence to the spot where the witnesses say I was sit- 
ting, it is, that it was near the gate, a situation where 
I could easily be found, and where it was most con- 
venient, as colonel Miller has testified, to receive re- 
ports, and to give my orders. 

From this post, I had the whole interiour of the 
fort under my view, and could communicate my or- 



GENERAL HULL. 209 

ders to any part. Was I not then in a proper situa- 
tion for a commander? The Court will recollect, 
that colonel Bliller stales, that he himself was some- 
times with me, while I was in the place the witnesses 
have described. And the fact is, that every officer 
in the fort placed himself under the protection of the 
eastern parapet, when his duty did not require that he 
should be in a more exposed situation. 

But it has been attempted to prove, that I remained 
in the fort, and took no measures, and issued no or- 
ders for a disposition of the troops, after the cannon- 
ade commenced. 

Major Jessup states, that shortly after the answer 
had been returned to the British summons on the fif- 
teenth, he met me on horseback, and that I then gave 
him directions for the disposition which was to be 
made of the troops, for the defence of the town. It 
is also proved by the testimony of major Jessup, that 
in the evening of the fifteenth, I was on horseback, 
% isiting the batteries while the cannonade continued. 

Major Munson met me on the same evening on 
horseback, when I was visiting the posts. Major 
Jessup said, he met me on the night of the fifteenth, 
at about midnight, at the position which colonel Find- 
lay's corps had taken up for that night. I was also, 
as he testifies, at his quarters about day break on the 
morning of the sixteenth, while he was writing by 
candle light, and gave him directions to despatch an 
10* 



210 DEFENCE OF 

order for colonels Mac Arthur and Cass. And cap- 
tain Mac Gommick testifies, that he saw me on horse- 
back at the thue on which the troops were formed, a 
short time before the firing ceased. Several other 
witnesses prove, that they saw me out of the fort at 
several times, as well on the fifteenth, as the sixteenth. 
V/hat foundation is there, therefore, for the charge, 
that during the whole time of the cannonade I took 
slielter in the fort ? 

Major Snelling's testimony is so important, as to 
my ersonal appearance, that I cannot but direct the 
attention of the Court to any circumstance in his tes- 
timony on any other point, which I think may de- 
velop the spirit or disposition with which he has 
testified. With this view, I beg the Court to notice, 
that major Sneiling has testified, that when he re- 
turned from the S})ring Wells, on the morning of the 
sixteenth, at dawn of day, he went into the fort to 
make his report to me. " But," says the major, " I 
•could not find the General, nor find any one who 
•' knew where he was." It has been proved by other 
witnesses, that I was out of the fort at that time. 
Now, when major Sneiling could not find me in the 
fort, nor find any body that knew I was there, it 
seems to me, he might have ventured to say, I was 
not in the fort at that time. I do think, he had at 
least as good grounds to draw that conclusion, as he 
iiad to infer, that I was under personal fear, from the 
appearances he observed. Major Sneiling does, in a 
subsequent part of bis examination, say, that I was 



GENERAL HULL. 211 

out of the fort early that morning. But whether this 
refers to the time when he made his report or not, I 
do not know. 

I have now, Gentlemen, done with this charge, so 
far as it respects my personal appearance and deport- 
ment. You, who I am to presume, and do believe 
are brave and honourable men, will judge of w hat I 
must have suffered, to have sat here day after day, 
listening to imputations, of all others the most wound- 
ing to the feelings of a soldier ; to have these impu- 
tations cast upon me, by representations intended to 
make me appear abjectly and disgustingly base;*to 
})e obliged to hear my name and fame polluted by the 
testimony which has been given ; to be obliged to 
repeat the language of the witnesses in my defence, 
are in themselves punishments hardly inferiour to that, 
wluch would be the consequence of your pronounc- 
ing me guilty. But, Gentlemen, of that, upon this 
charge of cowardice, I am bold to say I have no 
dread. 

I h^ive fought more battles, than many of the young 
men who have impeached me of this crime, have 
aumbered years. 

I appeal to the history that bears record of those 
who were engaged in the bloody contests for our 
liberties. There you shall often find my name, but 
Rot as a coward ! 



212 BEFENCE OF 

I have brought before you the testimony of the few 
who remain of those, who were my companions in 
arms, in times that tried men's souls. Do they say 
I am a coward ? 

I invoke the spirits of the departed heroes, who 
have died at my side by the sword of the enemy, to 
say if I am a coward ! 

I would call the shades of Gates, Wayne, Schuyler, 
and of Washington, to tell you how often they have 
led me to battle, and to say if they found me a coward. 

* • 

Will you believe, that the spirit, which has so 
often prompted me to risk my life for my country, 
should now so far have forsaken me, as that I should 
liave become a traitor and a coward ? 

Will you believe, that the years in which I have 
grown gray in my country's service, should so far 
have changed my nature, as that I could have been 
the base and abject thing my enemies have repre- 
sented ? 

No, Gentlemen, that blood which animated my 
youth, age has not chilled. I at this moment feel its 
influence, and it makes me dare to say, that no man 
ever did, or can think me a coward. 

Before I conclude, permit me to say a few words. 
It may be thought, that I have spoken of the officers 



GENERAL HULL. 213 

who have been witnesses against me, with too much 
asperity. They have, in my opinion, forfeited all 
claims to my respect ; but I do not mean to charge 
any of them with wilful perjury. I believe they have 
imbibed a prejudice and bias against me, which has 
influenced the perceptions of their own minds. 

My object, by the examination I have given theif 
testimony, has been to make that bias and prejudice 
appear to yo i. Many of them are young men, who 
give their country great promise. Many of them, I 
believe, have good hearts ; and such I know will one 
day regret, that they should have yielded to an in-f 
fluence, which has induced them to represent me in 
colours that they will be conscious I have not de- 
served. I know the time will come, when they will 
consider how they courted my favour when I was in 
power, and how they treated me when they thought 
I was in disgrace, and saw me in adversity. 

When that time comes, as come I am sure it will, 
let it be a consolation to them to know, that what- 
ever may be my fate, I pity and from my heart for- 
give them. 

I have now. Gentlemen, concluded my defence. 
I have noticed every accusation which the Judge 
Advocate, in the opening of the cause, mentioned as 
those which he should rely upon, and which he ex- 
pected to maintain. 



214 • DEFENCE OP 

I have not left, as I believe, any part of the speci- 
fications to which any testimony whatever was offer- 
ed, unanswered. 

Allow me, Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the 
Court, with tlie most heartfelt sensibility to return 
you my sincere thanks, for the manner in which thig 
trial has been conducted. For though, as I humbly 
conceive, there has been some departure from accus- 
tomed forms, in respect to the examination of wit- 
nesses, I know that the Court has been governed by 
nothinj^ but its own sense of propriety. 

The conduct of the members of this Court, and of 
the Judge Advocates, has been such as I had antici- 
pated ; and every thing that I could expect from 

honourable, impartial, and humane men. 

1 

AVhatever may be the sentence, I shall ahvavti 
' with gratitude acknowhMlge that I have had a fair, 
' candid, and |)atient hearing. 1 do feel myself bound 
' to make particular acknowledgments to the special 

Judge Advocate, for the delicacy and propriety of 
' his deportment towards me, and though I may feel 
^ the force of the talents with which he has conducted 
* this projspcutiou, it shall not make me forget what I 

owe to his humanity and liberality. 

^ Gentlemen, my life i* in your hands. But you are 

^ guardians of what is more dear to me ; you are the 

guardians of my honour I with you iu sacred deposite 

RD-94 < 



ii 



GENERAL HULL. 215 

is that swortl, which has been my companion in times 
that might have appalled the weak hearted. It 
lias been taken from me, (ill you shall pronounce 
that I am not unwortiiy to wear it. I feel, that ia 
justice, 1 may demand it of you. And Avhen I shall 
receive it at your hands, believe me, that here is yet 
enough of heart and life, and in this arm is yet nerve 
enough, to draw it in vindication of my country's 
rights. If 1 should receive it, imtaryiishcd by your 
judgment, I may yet live, to |)rove by ni} future, as^ 
well as 1»5' my past coiuluct, how I have been caUnn- 
niated, and the Justice of your }>€nicn<:c. 



^ 



